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Research Methodology

This dissertation is a qualitative research with two methods of study. It involved
interviews with Crime Scene Analysts and Offender Profilers. This method provided first
hand and up to date information on the different approaches to offender profiling.

The standard legal research method of case analysis has also been used. This involved
extensive case analysis. Cases that involved offender profiling have been analyzed. This
method provided adequate background information on the admissibility problems of
offender profiling evidence.

The limitation to this dissertation is the unwillingness of some profilers to grant
interviews and share their knowledge.
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Abstract

This dissertation examined the use of offender profiling evidence in criminal cases. The
meaning, history, approaches and legal admissibility of offender profiling have been
discussed. The introduction of offender profiling into the courtroom has been
controversial, problematic and full of inconsistencies. This dissertation therefore,
examined the central problems with offender profiling evidence, and answered such
questions as - Is offender profiling impermissible character evidence? Who is qualified to
give expert profiling evidence? Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative? Is
offender profiling an opinion on the ultimate issue? Is offender profiling sufficiently
reliable as to be admissible? This dissertation has noted that in United States, there are
inconsistencies in the court decisions on offender profiling evidence as a result of the
three conflicting rules governing the admissibility of expert evidence. After a critical
examination of the three rules, the adoption of one rule has been suggested. The Frye test
standard combined with the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 provides the best
admissibility standard.

Many people are confused as to the appropriate discipline of offender profiling. This
dissertation has therefore, presented a step by step analysis of the history and
development of offender profiling. Offender profiling is a multi-disciplinary practice that
cuts across many disciplines. At the moment, it is best described as an art with the
potential of becoming a science. This dissertation concludes that offender profiling is not
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sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. It is too prejudicial than probative. This
dissertation also concludes that there is an uneasy relationship, lack of unity and absence
of sharing information amongst the different segments involved with offender profiling,
and that this problem has limited the potential of offender profiling. Hence, some courts
are not convinced as to the reliability and validity of this technique. Several
recommendations have been made.

7

Introduction

In spite of the ever-increasing media interest in the use of offender profiling in criminal
trials, this technique is still not well understood by a lot of people, including judges,
lawyers and jurors. Some people see offender profiling as some sort of mystic and others
simply see it as a fiction. It is the aim of this dissertation to demystify offender profiling
and try to raise the general level of knowledge and understanding of this crime
investigation technique. This dissertation has two hypotheses. The first is that offender
profiling is not widely accepted in courts because its reliability and the scientific basis
has not been established and second, that there are inconsistencies surrounding the
admission of offender profiling as a result of the conflicting rules and standards
governing its admissibility in various jurisdictions. The central thesis of this dissertation
is that offender profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible (in proving the
guilt or innocence of an accused), its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its
probative value and that there is an uneasy relationship, lack of unity, cooperation and
absence of sharing of information among the different segments/profilers which has
limited the potential of offender profiling. There is the problem with the existence of
three rules governing the admissibility of expert evidence in United States. This has led
to inconsistencies in the decisions to admit or exclude offender profiling and its
derivatives. There has been a lot of conflicting court decisions on this technique.

8

This dissertation examined the central problems of offender profiling evidence. Two
questions provided the guideline to this dissertation. First, is offender profiling
sufficiently reliable as to be admissible? Offender Profiling involves gathering
information from the crime scene, witnesses, victim statements, autopsy reports,
offender's physical descriptions, race, age, criminal records and so on. The question then
is - how accurate is information gathered in this manner? Should it be tendered in court
as proof of guilt or innocence? Offender Profiling does not point to specific offenders. It
does not determine whether a given defendant committed a specific act. This question
arises because in several cases the reliability and accuracy of offender profiling has been
at issue. Second, is offender profiling more prejudicial than probative? Offender profiling
is too prejudicial to the accused. Offender profiling only provides an indication of the
type of person likely to have committed a type of crime. It does not point to a specific
individual. This question arises because in several cases examined, courts have been
inconsistent in their decisions on this issue.

In chapter one, we have discussed the meaning and nature of offender profiling. The
goals of offender profiling have also been discussed. Offender profiling is an innovative
but worrying technique of crime investigation. In order to have a better understanding of
this technique, the history and development have been discussed in this chapter.

Offender Profiling is mainly used by the police to narrow down suspects list in cases
where no physical evidence were left at the crime scene. In recent times however, this
technique has been introduced into the courtroom as evidence and there has been a lot of

9

controversy surrounding it. Hence, there had been conflicting court decisions on its status
as admissible evidence. In several cases, the reliability, validity and scientific basis of this
technique had been at issue. Chapter two therefore, introduced us to the principles and
practice of offender profiling. The different approaches to profiling have been discussed,
bringing out their various strengths and weaknesses.

In chapter three, the general rules and principles governing the admissibility of scientific
evidence are discussed. The Frye Test Standard, The Federal Rules of Evidence, The
Daubert Decision and the Kumho Tire Co. decision have been critically examined. As we

mentioned earlier on, there are a lot inconsistencies surrounding the admission of
offender profiling in criminal cases. One reason has been identified and it relates to the
fact that there are three main rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. The
three rules are as follows. The Frye Test Standard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and
The Daubert Decision. Each state in United States has adopted one of these
rules/standards. Some states are using Frye, some have adopted the Daubert criteria
while others have adopted Frye plus their own Rules of Evidence. It should be noted that
the Daubert criteria is the main rule at the federal courts. This leads us to the question - Is
it possible to adopt one particular rule? This is a question that has also been examined.

This dissertation is also aimed at providing a critical analysis of the use of offender
profiling in criminal cases. Hence, in chapter four, we discussed the central problems of
offender profiling evidence. Cases that involved offender profiling have been critically

1
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examined. The different areas of challenging offender profiling have also been discussed.
We have answered such questions as:
(1) Is offender profiling impermissible character evidence?
(2) Who is qualified to give expert offender profiling testimony?
(2) Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative?
(3) Is offender profiling an opinion on the ultimate issue?
(4) Is offender profiling sufficiently reliable as to be admissible?

One of the aims of this research is to provide a comparative analysis of the use of
offender profiling in various jurisdictions. In chapter five therefore, we have discussed
the admissibility of offender profiling in England and Canada. We have also examined
the state of offender profiling in other countries.

In this dissertation we have made some recommendations, looked at the future of
offender profiling and have suggested areas where further research is needed. This
dissertation argues that offender profiling is a specialized area of knowledge, but at the
moment it has not reached a sufficient level of reliability as to be admissible. This
dissertation is very critical of the continued admission of offender profiling in criminal
trials and concludes that offender profiling is a technique based on assumptions,
suspicion, stereotypes and probabilities.

This dissertation differs from other previous published studies in many ways. First, this
work has presented an interdisciplinary and non-segmental approach to the understanding

11

of offender profiling. The nature, theory, practice and the legal aspects of offender
profiling have been presented in one study. This dissertation goes further with the theory
that offender profiling can be used in developing crime prevention measures. There has
also been an examination of offender profiling in a comparative perspective. Above all,
none of the previous published studies examined the uneasy relationship among the
different segments/approaches to offender profiling which has limited the potential of this
technique. This work has demystified offender profiling.

12

CHAPTER ONE
What is Offender Profiling?

'Offender profiling' has become part of public consciousness
even though many people are not really sure what it is and
the great majority of people have no idea at all of how it is
done. This ignorance is just as prevalent in professional
circles as amongst the lay public. Psychologists,
psychiatrists, probation officers and social workers all have
an interest in how their disciplines can contribute to police
investigations, but few practitioners are aware of exactly
what the possibilities for such contributions are. Others, such
as police officers and lawyers, who seek advice from
'profilers' often also have only the vaguest ideas as to what
'profiling' consists of or what scientific principles it may be
based on. The army of students who aspire to emulate the
fictional activities of psychologists who solve crimes is yet
another group who desperately need a systematic account of
what 'offender profiling' is and what the real prospects for its
development are. I
Offender profiling has been defined in many ways by various scholars based on their
backgrounds. Similarly, offender profiling is known by various names such as
psychological profiling, criminal profiling, criminal investigative analysis, crime scene
analysis, behavioral profiling, criminal personality profiling, sociopsychological profiling
and criminological profiling. In this dissertation however, the term 'offender profiling'
will be used.

1 David

Canter, Series Preface, in D. Canter, and L. Alison, (eds) Profiling in Policy and Practice, VII

(1999),

13

As Canter has noted, 'offender profiling' is a tenn coined by the FBI in the 1970's to
describe their criminal investigative analysis work. 2 He maintained that "when FBI
agents first began this work they invented a new tenn to grace their actions: offender
profiling. By doing so they created the impression of a package, a system that was sitting

waiting to be employed, rather than the mixture of craft, experience and intellectual
energy that they themselves admit is at the core of their activities,,3.

Canter sees offender profiling as 'criminal shadows'. He maintained that a criminal
"leaves psychological traces, tell-tale patterns of behaviour that indicate the sort of
person he is. Gleaned from the crime scene and reports from witnesses, these traces are
more ambigious and subtle than those examined by the biologist or physicist. They
cannot be taken into a laboratory and dissected under the microscope. They are more like
shadows, which undoubtedly are connected to the criminal who cast them, but they
flicker and change, and it may not always be obvious where they come from. Yet, if they
can be fixed and interpreted, criminal shadows can indicate where investigators should
look and what sort of person they should be looking for,,4

Canter and Heritage also maintained that "a criminal leaves evidence of his personality
through his actions in relation to a crime. Any person's behaviour exhibits characteristics

2D

.
aVId Canter, Criminal Shadows: Inside the mind a/the serial killer, 12 (1994).

3

Id.

4

Id.
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unique to that person, as well as patterns and consistencies which are typical of the subgroup to which he or she belongs".5

Ainsworth defined offender profiling as "the process of using all the available
information about a crime, a crime scene, and a victim, in order to compose a profile of
the (as yet) unknown perpetrator,,6. For Davies, "offender profiling (more technically
known as Criminal Investigative Analysis) is the name given to a variety of techniques
whereby information gathered at a crime scene, including reports of an offender's
behaviour is used both to infer motivation for an offence and to produce a description of
the type of person likely to be responsible.,,7

Geberth sees a criminal personality profile as "an educated attempt to provide
investigative agencies with specific information as to the type of individual who may
have committed a certain crime,,8. Turvey, writing from a behavioral evidence analysis
point of view, defined offender profiling as "the process of inferring the personality
characteristics of individuals responsible for committing criminal acts,,9. For Grubin,
offender profiling refers to "information gathered at a crime scene, including reports of

David Canter and Rupert Heritage, "A Muiltivariate Model of Sexual Offence Behaviour: Developments
in Offender Profiling", Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, (1990).

5

6

Peter .B. Ainsworth, Offender Profiling and Crime Analysis, 7 (2001).

7

Anne Davies, Rapists Behaviour: A three Aspect Model as a Basis for Analysis and Identification of a
Serial Crime, Forensic Science International, 173 (1992).
Vernon J. Geberth, Practical Homicide Investigations: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques,
edition, 46 (1996).

8

9

Brent Turvey, Criminal Profiling: Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis, 1 (2002).

15

4th

an offender's behaviour, used both to infer motivation for an offence and to produce a
description of the type of person likely to be responsible"lO.

Put simply, offender profiling is a crime investigation technique whereby information
gathered from the crime scene, witnesses, victims, autopsy reports and information about
an offender's behavior is used to draw up a profile of the sort of person likely to commit
such crime. It is a complementary technique and is usually taken up when no physical
traces were left at the crime scene. Offender profiling does not point to a specific
offender. It is based on the probability that someone with certain characteristics is likely
to have committed a certain type of crime.

Rationale for Profiling

There are two operating words in offender profiling: modus operandi (method of
operation) and behavior. The modus operandi could lead to clues about the offender.
There is the idea that an offender is likely to commit a particular type of crime in a
particular or similar pattern. Thus offender profiling is based on the premise that the
modus operandi may lead to clues about the perpetrator and that the crime scene
characteristics may point to the personality of the perpetrator. Behavior helps to predict
the personality type or the motives for the crime. Therefore, the single most important
thing that a pro filer looks for at a scene of crime is anything that may point to the
personality of the offender.
10

Don Grubin, Offender Profiling, Journal of Forensic Psychology 259 (1995).
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The rationale behind this approach is that behavior reflects personality, and by examining
behavior the investigator may be able to determine what type of person is responsible for
the offense. II When profiling, the profiler notes the physical description, individual traits,
any odd behaviour and remarks or records of anything that the offender said or did during
the attack. Also to be noted are information about the steps the offender used to avoid
being detected, method of killing, or the way he approaches his victims, as well as notes
about the offender's gender, age group, race, occupation and criminal records. 12

The Purpose/Goals of Profiling

Offender Profiling is mainly used when the offender did not leave any physical trace at
the crime scene. It is used to narrow down the suspects list. As Douglas and Olshaker
have pointed out, "criminal profiling is used mostly by behavioral scientists and the
police to narrow down an investigation to those who posses certain behavioral and
personality features that are revealed by the way a crime was committed,,13. Continuing,
Douglas and Olshaker also maintained that "the primary goal is to aid local police in
limiting and refining their suspect list so that they can direct their resources where they
might do the most good".

11

John. E. Douglas., Ressler, R.K., Burgess, AW., and Hartman, c.R., Criminal Profilingfrom Crime
Scene Analysis .Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 403 (1986).
12

13

Norbert Ebisike, An Appraisal ofForensic Science Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 44 (2001).
John. Douglas, J., and Olshaker, M., Mindhunte: Inside the FBI's Elite Serial Crime Unit, (1999).

17

"Another key use of a profile, is when necessary, to go proactive, which means letting the
public become a partner in crime solving. The unknown suspect may have displayed
some sort of odd behaviour to those close to him that will indicate his involvement with
the crime. Getting the public, and hopefully those people to be aware of what they have
seen, telling them to corne forward may solve the case". 14

Egger maintained that "the purpose of profiling is to develop a behavioral composite,
combining sociological and psychological assessments of the offender. Profiling is
generally based on the premise that an accurate analysis and interpretation of the crime
scene and other locations related to the crime can indicate the type of person who
committed the crime".IS

Hence, "because certain personality types exhibit similar

behavioral patterns (in other words, behavior that becomes routine), knowledge and an
understanding of the patterns can lead investigators to potential suspects".16 Similarly,
Jackson and Bekerian maintained that "a profile is based on the premise that the proper
interpretation of crime scene evidence can indicate the personality type of the
individual(s) who committed the offence. It is assumed that certain personality types
exhibit similar behavioral patterns and that knowledge of these patterns can assist in the
investigation of the crime and the assessment of potential suspects". 17

Id.

14

15 Steven A. Egger, Psychological Profiling: Past, Present, and Future, Journal of Contemporary Criminal
Justice, vol. 15, No.3, August 1999,243 (1999).

Id.

16

17

Janet L. Jackson, and Bekerian D. A. (eds), Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice, 3 (1997).

18

Holmes and Holmes have outlined three major goals of profiling as follows. 18

(1) Social and psychological assessments of offenders.

This involves an evaluation of the social and psychological characteristics of the
offender. In fact, "a profile should contain basic and sound information concerning the
social and psychological core variables of the offender's personality, including the
offender's race, age, employment status and type, religion, marital status, and level of
education. This psychological information will help to focus the investigation by
allowing police to narrow its range, which in tum will have a direct effect upon the
number of days and weeks police must spend on the case".19

(2) Psychological evaluations of belongings found

III

the possession of suspected

offenders.
This involves the evaluation of any items found at the suspect's home, such as souvenirs
taken from the crime scenes, pictures, videos, books, magazines or other items that might
point to the background and motives for the crimes, as well as link the suspect to the
crime. Holmes and Holmes noted the case of Jerry Brudos a sadistic serial killer in the
United States who had such a fetish about his victims' high heeled shoes. He took their
shoes, wore and stored them at his home. 2o

18

Ronald. M. Holmes., and Stephen T. Holmes., Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool, 3 (1996).

19

Id

20

Id, at 4.

19

(3) Suggestions and strategies for interviewing suspected offenders when they are
apprehended.
Another primary goal of profiling is to suggest the most effective interviewing strategy to
be used once the offender has been arrested. As there are different types of offenders, one
interviewing/interrogation strategy may not be suitable for all the different types,
especially when dealing with rapists. As Holmes and Homes have pointed out, "not all
people react to questions in the same fashion. For one type of offender, one strategy may
be effective, but it is a mistake to assume that all those who commit similar crimes will
respond to the same interviewing strategy. For example, not all serial murderers kill for
the same reasons, and not all respond to the same type of interviewing strategy. Violent
personal offenders also vary in their motives as well as their responses to interrogation,,21.

It has been observed that offender profiling is usually taken up late in an investigation.

Offender profiling tends to be normally taken up as an alternative where DNA profiling is
impossible because there were no samples left at the scene of crime?2 There are
obviously certain dangers with this approach. It is therefore suggested that in
serious/major crimes, offender profiling should be used at the onset, along with the other
techniques. It should not be left till later in the investigation when we have come to
realize that no physical trace has been left at the crime scene, bearing in mind the issue of
'staged crime scenes'. Important details might be lost later in the investigation and as we
know, crime scenes can be tampered with, by both weather conditions and human
tampering.
21

Id, at 5,

22

Eb'lSI'ke, supra note 12, at 48,

20
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Crime Scene Staging

'Crime scene staging' occurs when the offender alters the crime scene in order to conceal
the original intent. For instance, the offender may stage signs of burglary in order to
conceal a homicide. Arguably, staging is mainly done by an organized offender as
opposed to a disorganized offender. Hence, any evidence of staging at the crime scene
may point to an organized offender. In fact, an offender stages a crime scene in order to
"mislead the authorities and/or redirect the investigation. Staging is a conscious criminal
action on the part of an offender to thwart an investigation,,23. Geberth has clearly
outlined three types of staging:
1. The most common type of staging occurs when the perpetrator changes elements
of the scene to make the death appear to be a suicide or accident in order to cover
up a murder.
2. The second most common type of staging is when the perpetrator attempts to

redirect the investigation by making the crime appear to be a sex-related
homicide.
3. Arson represents another type of staging. The offender purposely torches the
crime scene to destroy evidence or make the death appear to be the result of an
accidental fire.

24

Vernon J. Geberth, Practical Homicide Investigation: Tactics, Procedures, and Forensic Techniques, 4th
edition, 22 (2006).

23

24

Id, at 23.

21

Modus Operandi or Method of Operation (MO)

An offender's method of operation includes such things as the type of victim chosen,
location of attack, time of attack, type of weapon used, as well as the method of gaining
entry. The method of operation is very important in linking cases, but needs to be
examined with caution.

It should be noted that the method of operation can change. In fact, as an offender

commits more crime, he/she learns new ways that will help avoid detection. Hence, the
method of operation can change. For instance, an offender who normally strangles the
victims with bare hands may change and start strangling the victims with stockings or
start suffocating the victims with pillows.

Similarly, an offender may change from

attacking at night to attacking during the day time, or the offender may change from
choosing females to males, young victims to older victims, blacks to whites, or blondes to
brunettes.

Douglas and Munn maintained that "the offender's actions during the perpetration of a
crime form the MO. The offender develops and uses an MO over time because it works,
but it also continually evolves. The modus operandi is very dynamic and malleable.
During his criminal career, an offender usually modifies the MO as he gains experience.
The burglar refines his breaking and entering techniques to lower his risk of apprehension
and to increase his profit. Experience and confidence will reshape an offender's MO.

22

Incarceration usually impacts on the future MO of an offender, especially the career
criminal. He refines the MO as he learns from the mistakes that led to his arrest,,25.
Furthermore, "the victim's response can also significantly influence the evolution of an
MO. If the rapist has problems controlling a victim, he will modify his MO to
accommodate resistance. He may bring duct tape or other ligatures, he may use a
weapon, or he may blitz-attack the victim and immediately incapacitate her. If such
measures are ineffective, he may resort to greater violence or kill the victim. Thus, MO
will evolve to meet the demands of the crime,,26. In fact, Turvey maintained that an
offender's MO "most often serves (or fails to serve) one or more of three purposes:
protects the offender's identity, ensures the successful completion of the crime and
facilitates the offender's escape',27.

Offender's Signature or Calling Card

It should be noted that modus operandi is different from the 'signature aspects', or the

'motives' of a crime. Holmes and Holmes maintained that "the signature of a perpetrator
is the unique manner in which he or she commits crimes. A signature may be the manner
in which the person kills, certain words a rapist uses with victims, a particular manner in

25 John. E. Douglas, Munn, C. M., "Modus Operandi and Signature Aspects of Violent Crime, in Douglas,
et ai, Crime Classification Manual, 260 (2006).
26

27

Id.
Brent Turvey, Criminal Profiling: An Introduction to Behavioral Evidence Analysis, 151 (1999).

23

which a perpetrator leaves something at crime scenes, or some other indicator,,28. Geberth
also maintained that "the signature aspect of a violent crime is a unique and integral part
of the offender's behavior. This signature component refers to the psychodynamics,
which are the mental and emotional processes underlying human behavior and its
motivations,,29. In fact, "when an offender displays behavior within the crime scene and
engages in activities which go beyond those necessary to accomplish the act, he is
revealing his signature. These significant personality identifiers occur when an offender
repeatedly engages in a specific order of sexual activity, uses a specific type of binding,
injures and/or inflicts similar types of injuries, displays the body for shock value, tortures
and mutilates his victim, and engages in some form of ritualistic behavior".3o Geberth
also noted that "one of the common signatures is that of the psychopathic sexual sadist,
who involves himself in complete domination of the victim".3)

The signature aspects of a crime, which can also be called the 'mark' of the perpetrator, is
an element in an offender's behavior which in most cases may always be present, and
recognizable at the scene of crime, but it can change. It is the overriding psychological
need of an offender. It is what drives a killer to engage in an attack and the particular
method of carrying out that attack. Signature aspects of a crime reveal the deep emotional
needs that have to happen in order for the offender to fulfill his or her fantasy. Put
simply, the signature aspect of a crime refers to the specific thing(s) that an offender tend
28

Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 42.

29 Vernon J. Geberth, "The Signature Aspect in Criminal Investigations", Law and Order Magazine, 43 (11)
November 1995.
30

31

Geberth, supra note 23, at 824.
Id.

24

to do at the crime scene. It could be cutting off a specific part of the victim's body and
taking it as a souvenir, cutting the victims throats, or putting the victims inside the bathe
tub after killing them, and so on. Hence, signature can be described as the 'mark' of a
killer, which may distinguish one killer from another. It should be noted however that
there are various things that can affect signature. Therefore, signatures are not a
conclusive or a reliable indicator that a particular offender carried out a particular attack.
Offenders learn from other offenders, from television crime series, from their experience,
develop new fantasies and they also read/learn from books on crime investigations and
forensic science, and so their signature may change. Geberth will probably support this
view, and he wrote: "the 'signature' component may also change to some degree.
However, the change usually involves a progression of violence and sexual mutilation,
which is consistent with the paraphilia sexual sadism seen in lust murders,,32. The point
however, remains that signatures may change.

Motives of a Crime

The motive of a crime refers to the reason why the offender committed the crime. Motive
deals with the primary reason why a particular crime was committed. It is one of the
identifying elements at a crime scene. An offender can have different motives for
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different crimes. Turvey observed that "an offender's motives are evidenced by signature
behaviors that suggest overall signature aspects, or motivational aspects of a crime". 33

Linkage Analysis

Linkage analysis refers to the method whereby behavioral patterns, wound patterns,
crime scene characteristics, victimology and other aspects of two or more crimes
committed at different crime scenes are examined in an attempt to ascertain whether the
crimes were committed by one offender. Linkage analysis has faced a lot of criticism.
Professor Risinger and Loop, for instance, argued that linkage analysis "appears to have
been developed, not as an investigatory aid, but primarily as a means of obtaining either
the admission of other crimes evidence which might not otherwise be admitted, or a
means to convince the jury that the other crimes evidence was more meaningful than they
otherwise might believe, or both. In sum, it was not a way to identify unknown
perpetrators, but a tool to help build a case against defendants already believed to be
guilty". 34
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Types of Crime Suitable for Profiling

It has been recognized that not all types of crime are suitable for profiling. In fact, there is

general agreement that crimes most suitable for profiling are:
1. crimes where the perpetrator showed elements of psychopathology.
2. crimes believed to be part of a series.
3. violent crimes.

4. attacks on strangers.

5. contact crimes - crimes where the offender engaged in long conversations and
communications with the victim.

Serial murders, serial rapes, sexual homicides, ritual crimes, arson, and hostage taking
have been seen to be very suitable for profiling. Research by Holmes and Holmes have
shown that the types of crimes most suitable for profiling include sadistic torture in
sexual assaults, evisceration, postmortem slashing and cutting, motiveless fire setting,
lust and mutilation murder, rape, satanic and ritualistic crime and pedophilia.,,35 It has
also been noted that "cases involving mere destruction of property, assault, or murder
during the commission of a robbery are generally unsuitable for profiling, since the
personality of the criminal is not generally revealed in such crime scenes. Likewise drug
induced crimes lend themselves poorly to profiling because the true personality of the
perpetrator is often altered,,36.
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'Contact crimes' are suitable for profiling. In fact, "these 'contact crimes' are believed to
be the ones in which aspects of an offender's underlying personality and motivations are
most likely to be revealed by the way in which an offence or series of offences has been
carried out".37 Schurman-Kauflin noted that "serial killers are the most frustrating and
disturbing of all violent predators, but they are the most profilable. Why? When they kill,
they are filling complex psychological needs. Sometimes, they may steal when they kill,
but from my experience of studying serial predators for twenty years and interviewing
over twenty five of them, their motivations are in their heads, not their wallets. Because
they kill for psychological reasons, many times, they leave a lot of clues for profilers".38
Geberth also maintained that "practically speaking, in any crime in which available
evidence indicates a mental, emotional, or personality aberration by an unknown
perpetrator, the criminal personality profile can be instrumental in providing the
investigator with information that narrows down the leads. The behavioral characteristics
of the perpetrator as evidenced in the crime scene - not the offense per se - determine the
degree of suitability of the case for profiling,,39.
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History and Development of Offender Profiling

Offender Profiling goes as far back as 1876 when the Italian Criminologist, Physician and
psychiatrist, Cesaro Lombroso (Nov. 6, 1835 - Oct. 19, 1909), published his work
"L'Uomo Delinquente" (The Criminal Man), in which he argued that there are certain
physical characteristics that are indicative of a born criminal. He maintained that by
comparing information about similar offenders like race,

age,

sex, physical

characteristics, education and geographic location, that. the origins and motivations of
criminal behavior could be better understood and subsequently predicted. Lombroso,
basing his ideas on Darwin's theory of evolution, maintained that there are six types of
criminals, the born criminal, the insane criminal, the criminal by passion, the habitual
criminal, the occasional criminal and the criminaloid.

Lombroso had the idea that there is a born criminal and argued that criminality is
inherited and could be identified by physical defects. For him, criminals have certain
physiognomic deformities. He saw criminals as savage and atavistic. In his theory of
atavism, he measured the heads of living and executed criminals against the skulls of
apes and prehistoric humans and came up with the idea that criminals were victims of
atavism.

He

maintained

that

'born

criminals'

have

the

following

physical

characteristics/deformities:
•

Deviation in head size and shape from type common to race and region from
which the criminal came.

•

Asymmetry of the face.
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•

Eye defects and peculiarities.

•

Excessive dimensions of the jaws and cheek bones.

•

Ears of unusual size, or occasionally very small, or standing out from the head as
do those of the chimpanzee.

•

Nose twisted, upturned, or flattened in thieves, or aquiline or beak-like in
murderers, or with a tip rising like a peak from swollen nostrils.

•

Lips fleshy, swollen, and protruding.

•

Pouches in the cheek like those of some animals.

•

Peculiarities of the palate, such as are found in some reptiles, and cleft palate.

•

Chin receding, or excessively long, or short and flat, as in apes.

•

Abnormal dentition.

•

Abundance, variety, and precocity of wrinkles.

•

Anomalies of the hair, marked by characteristics of the hair of the opposite sex.

•

Defects of the thorax, such as too many or too few ribs, or supernumerary nipples.

•

Inversion of sex characters in the pelvic organs.

•

Excessive length of arms.

•

Supernumerary fingers and toes.

•

Imbalance of the hemispheres of the brain (asymmetry of cranium).

Lombroso maintained that the insane criminals were the type of criminals who suffered
from mental illnesses and also had some physical deformities. The habitual criminals
according to Lombroso are those who commit crimes as a result of poor socialization.
The occasional criminals commit crimes to protect family honor and as self-defence. The
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criminaloids are those who commit crimes when the opportunities anse

In

their

environment. Lombroso maintained that criminaloids are usually left-handed, which he
said was common among swindlers, are also characterized by early baldness and
grayness, insensitivity to pain and that a large number of them abuse alcohol.

Lombroso believed that the study of individuals should involve the utilization of
measurements and statistical methods in compiling anthropological, social and economic
data. He was against capital punishment and argued in favor of rehabilitation. He also
contended that there should be humane treatment for criminals because their criminality
is inherited.

Lombroso's views were undoubtedly criticized. The greatest criticism came from Charles
Goring an Englishman, who carried out a study of 3,000 English convicts and compared
them with groups of university students, hospital patients and British solders. Using
statistical methodology, Goring compared measurements of thirty seven specific physical
characteristics of the groups and observed that "in fact, both with regard to measurements
and the presence of physical anomalies in criminals, our statistics present a startling
conformity with similar statistics of the law-abiding classes. Our inevitable conclusion
must be that there is no such thing as a physical criminal type,,40.

Goring also noted that "all English criminals, with the exception of those technically
convicted of fraud, are markedly differentiated from the general population in stature and
body-weight; in addition, offenders convicted of violence to the person are characterized
40
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by an average degree of strength and of constitutional soundness considerably above the
average of other criminals and of the law-abiding community: finally, thieves and
burglars (who constitute, it must be borne in mind, 90 percent of all criminals) and also
incendiaries, as well as being inferior in stature and weight, are also, relatively to other
criminals and the populations at large, puny in their general bodily habit". Goring also
observed some differences between criminals and non criminals in terms of sexual
profligacy, alcoholism, and epilepsy, and he concluded that "the one vital mental
constitutional factor in the etiology of crime is defective intelligence".

Goring's views also met severe criticisms. Hagan argued that "while Goring refuted
Lombroso's notion of physical differences, his own methodology was critically flawed.
Eschewing the then-available Simon-Binet tests of mental ability, he used his own
impressions in order to operationalize the mental ability of his subjects. The nail in the
coffin of Goring's theory was the advent of wide-scale mental testing of US military
conscriptees during World War 1. Using Goring's definitions of feeblemindedness,
nearly one-third of the draftees would have been so classified; the standards for such tests
were modified as a result. Other studies comparing mental age found no difference in
performance by prisoners and the draft army, and one even found that the former
performed better. As a result, the notion of feeblemindedness as a cause of criminal
behavior was interred in the graveyard of outmoded criminological concepts,,41.

Similarly, Sutherland and Cressey argued that Goring's study did not include women.
That Goring saw crime as a male disposition. They also argued that Goring "considered
41
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only few environmental factors, as opposed to many that exist", and finally that Goring
did not consider a wide range of offenses in his study.

It should be noted at this point that two of Lombroso's students - Enrico Ferri (1856 -

1929) and Raffaelo Garofalo (1852 - 1934), later took a different approach to the
explanations of criminal behavior. For instance, Garofalo in this theory of moral
degeneration, maintained that degeneration resulted from retrogressive selection and
caused the individual "to lose the better qualities which he had acquired by secular
evolution, and has led him back to the same degree of inferiority whence he had slowly
risen. This retrogressive selection is due to the mating of weakest and most unfit, of those
who have become brutalized by alcohol or abased by extreme misery against which
apathy has prevented them from struggling. Thus are formed demoralized and outcast
families whose interbreeding in time produces a true face of inferior quality".42

Following the criticisms of his work and after further research, Lombroso later revised
his work and admitted that social, economic and environmental factors also played
significant roles in criminal behavior. He however, still maintained that at least 40
percent of criminality is a result of biological heredity. Nevertheless, Lombroso's early
explanation of criminality, using measurements is undoubtedly the beginning of the
attempts to find a scientific basis to the idea of predicting crimes and criminals.
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Following the work of Goring, Earnest Hooton, an American anthropologist, in 1939,
carried out a study of 13,873 male criminals in 10 states and compared it with a civilian
group of 3,023 and found out that "criminals are organically inferior. Crime is the
resultant of the impact of environment upon low grade human organisms. To eliminate
crime, the physically, mentally, and morally unfit must be exterminated or segregated
completely in a "socially aseptic environment".43

Hooton claimed that certain morphological characteristics were more common in
criminals than among civilians. These characteristics include thin lips, straight hair, thin
beards and body hair, thick head hair, long thin necks, sloping shoulders, low and sloping
foreheads, compressed jaw angles, blue-gray and mixed eyes, protruding and small ears,
tattooing, and nasal bridges and tips varying to both extremes of breath and narrowness. 44
Hooton also believed that criminals were inferior to non criminals, and that inferiority
could be explained by heredity, arguing that physical inferiority indicates mental
inferiority. Furthermore, Hooton claimed that murderers and robbers tend to be tall and
thin; burglars and thieves tend to be undersized and that short and heavily built men tend
to be involved in sexual offenses and assaults.

Hooton's arguments were seen as fundamentally flawed. VoId, for instance, argued that
Hooton "ignored the fact that more than half of his prisoners had served previous terms
and a very large proportion of these previous sentences had been for crimes different
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from the offense of the current tenn.,,45 Johnson also contended that "in using prisoners
to represent criminals, Hooton ignored the effects of the differential selection of prisoners
from the total body of offenders that the system of criminal justice makes according to
factors extraneous to criminal behavior. Hooton's control group was too small and
included firemen and militiamen who had been accepted for these occupations after
passing a physical examination, thus exaggerating physical differences between offenders
and nonoffenders,,46.

Dr. Hans Gross, an Austrian judge and criminologist also made very important
contributions towards the attempts to explain criminality and the prediction of criminals.
In fact, he is widely regarded as the first person to write about offender profiling per se.
In 1893 he published his work "Criminal Investigation: A Practical Textbook for
Magistrates, Police Officers, and Lawyers", in which he maintained that criminals can be
better understood by studying their crimes. Gross argued that "in nearly every case the
thief has left the most important trace of his passage, namely the manner in which he has
committed the theft. Every thief has in fact a characteristic style or modus operandi
which he rarely departs from, and which he is incapable of completely getting rid of; at
times this distinctive feature is so visible and so striking that even the novice can spot it
without difficulty; but on the one hand the novice does not know how to group,
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differentiate or utilize what he has observed, and on the other hand the particular
character of the procedure is not always so easy to recognize".47

Gross also maintained that by examining the character and beliefs of an offender that we
can know more about the offender's criminal actions, and he wrote:
Is it not known that every deed is an outcome of the total
character of the doer? Is it not considered that the deed and
the character are correlative concepts, and that the character
by means of which the deed is to be established cannot be
inferred from the deed alone? Each particular deed is
thinkable only when a determinate character of the doer is
brought in relation with it - a certain character predisposes to
determinate deeds, another character makes them unthinkable
48
and unrelatable with this or that person.

In 1888 there were several murder cases in the Whitechapel area of East London,
England. In fact, between August 31 st and November 9th 1888, five female prostitutes
were murdered, and the police had no clues as to the identity of the killer. On August 31,
1888 Mary Ann Nichols was found brutally murdered. This was followed by the
discovery of the viciously mutilated body of Annie Chapman on September 8, 1888. On
September 30, 1888 was the discovery of the double murder of Elizabeth Stride and
Catherine Eddowes. On November 9, 1888 another murder occurred and this time Mary
Jane Kelly was brutally murdered. At this point Dr. Thomas Bond, a police surgeon was
asked to perform an autopsy on Mary Jane Kelly. The killer after strangling the women,
will cut their throat and then remove some of their internal organs. This prompted the
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police to think that the killer may be somebody with anatomical or surgical knowledge
like a surgeon or a butcher.

Hence, Dr Bond was also instructed to give an opinion on this issue. After the autopsy on
Mary Jane Kelly, Dr. Bond also studied the medical reports of the other victims as well as
the police reports, and he decided to do a crime scene reconstruction to see if he could
find any behavioral patterns that could lead investigators to the possible killer.

He

believed that the mutilations of the five victims suggested that one person was
responsible for the five murders. Above all, all the five murders shared similar
characteristics. All the victims were left in open places, where their bodies were found
soon after they were killed, all the victims were women and prostitutes, all the victims
were viciously mutilated and internal organs removed from their body.

Dr. Bond produced a report/profile which he sent to the head of the Criminal
Investigation Division, London. In his report/profile, Dr. Bond wrote that:

The murderer must have been a man of great physical strength and
of great coolness and daring. There is no evidence that he had an
accomplice. He must in my opinion be a man subject to periodical
attacks of Homicidal and Erotic mania. The character of the
mutilations indicate that the man may be in a condition sexually, that
may be called Satyriasis. It is of course possible that the Homicidal
impulse may have developed from a revengeful or brooding
condition of the mind, or that religious mania may have been the
original disease but I do not think either hypothesis is likely. The
murderer in external appearance is quite likely to be quiet
inoffensive looking man probably middle-aged and neatly and
respectably dressed. I think he must be in the habit of wearing a
cloak or overcoat or he could hardly have escaped notice in the
streets if the blood on his hands and clothes were visible.
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Assuming the murderer to be such a person as I have just described,
he would be solitary and eccentric in his habits, also he is most likely
to be a man without regular occupation, but with some small income
or pension. He is possibly living among respectable persons who
have some knowledge of his character and habits and who may have
grounds for suspicion that he isn't quite right in his mind at times.
Such persons would probably be unwilling to communicate
suspicions to the police for fear of trouble or notoriety, whereas if
49
there were prospects of reward it might overcome their scruples.

It should be noted that the unknown killer was referred to as the "Leather Apron" killer,

but in a letter he sent to the police he called himself "Jack the Ripper". As at today, the
identity of this killer is still a mystery. Hence, the five murders still remain unsolved.
Therefore, the accuracy or usefulness of Dr. Bond's profile/report cannot be evaluated.
However, his efforts constitute another major contribution towards the history and
development of offender profiling.

In 1943 the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS) asked Dr. Walter C. Langer, a
psychiatrist based in New York to produce a psychological profile of Adolf Hitler. This
was for military intelligence purpose, and not for criminal investigation. The OSS was
the ann of the US Anny responsible for gathering intelligence. 50 The OSS wanted a
personality profile of Hitler so that they will know the best interrogative
strategy/technique to be used if he was captured. Dr. Langer studied and analyzed the
speeches made by Hitler, studied Hitler's book - Mein Kampf, and interviewed those
Who knew Hitler and he came up with a psychodynamic personality profile. Dr. Langer
stated that he was asked by the OSS to provide "a realistic appraisal of the Gennan
49

50

Donald Rumbelow, The Complete Jack the Ripper, 138 (1975).
The CIA took over this intelligence in 1945 when the

38

ass was disbanded.

situation. If Hitler is runnmg the show, what kind of person is he? What are his
ambitions? We want to know about his psychological makeup - the things that make him
tick. In addition, we ought to know what he might do if things begin to go against him."Sl

Dr. Langer predicted that:
•

Hitler may die of natural causes - deemed to be a remote possibility, as he was in
good health aside from a stomach ailment, probably linked to a psychosomatic
disturbance.

•

Hitler might seek refuge in a neutral country - unlikely, as it would cast doubt on
his myth of immortality ifhe fled at the critical moment.

•

Hitler might get killed in battle - a possibility, as he might desire to cast himself
as a fearless leader, and his death might have the adverse effect of binding the
German people to his legend.

•

Hitler might be assassinated - another plausible outcome, which he himself
speculated over.

•

Hitler might go insane - he was believed to exhibit many characteristics of a
borderline schizophrenic, and if faced with defeat, it was likely his psychological
constitution would collapse.

•

German military might revolt and seize him - an unlikely event because of the
unique position he enjoyed in the eyes of the German people, but he might be
confined in secret should he become unstable.
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•

Hitler might fall into Allied hands - the most unlikely eventuality as this would be
the scenario he personally would do his utmost to avoid.

•

Hitler might commit suicide - the most conceivable conclusion due to his
inordinate fear of death, which he had already envisaged, stating "Yes, in the hour
of supreme peril I must sacrifice myself for the people,,52.

Dr. Langer's profile was seen to be correct, as Hitler committed suicide in a bunker when
he found out that the Allies were winning. Langer's work and contribution has been well
received by many scholars. Holmes and Holmes maintained that:
Despite its Freudian psychoanalytic orientation, Langer's profile
proved to be amazingly accurate as far as the scenarios for the
war's end were concerned. Hitler did commit suicide in a bunker
with Eva Braun. He never married, perhaps because he never
found anyone he felt was enough like his mother. Hitler's writings
from the time near the end of the war indicate that he appeared to
be on the fringe of mental illness. He also left many documents
that pointed toward some unusual sexual leanings: coprolagnia and
urolagnia (sexual excitement gained from eating feces and drinking
urine) and others. Langer's work was not in vain. It proved to be a
worthy attempt at the use of profiling as a tool to understand an
aberrant personality. 53

Commenting also on the work of Dr. Langer, Norris maintained that "although Langer
details each circumstance and its likelihood of occurrence, perusal of the document
indicates the tenuos nature of the profile in general. Although there is some level of
psychiatric assessment - for example, describing Hitler as a borderline schizophrenic or a
hysteric - significant interpretation of his actual behavior relies on Hitler's own
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assertions, gleaned primarily from his writings and speeches. Nevertheless, Langer was to
pave the way for others to analyze unknown individuals based on their observable
. ,,54
behaVlOr .

In 1949 William H. Sheldon, a psychologist came up with his "Somatotype" theory in
which he argued that physique or body type is related to certain temperaments. During an
eight year period, Sheldon tested his theory on delinquent boys and normal college
students and found out that there is a link between the mesomorphic body type and crime,
which explained why some juveniles are delinquent. His three body types are as follows.
(1) Endomorphs: These are individuals who he said are soft, round/fat physiques, and

plump.
(2) Mesomorphs: This people are muscular, hard, with heavy chest and heavy bones.
(3) Ectomorphs: These are people who are thin/lean, fragile, with droopy shoulders
and small faces.

Sheldon's three temperaments are as follows:
(1) Viscerotonia - the individuals with this type of temperament tend to be relaxed,

comfort-loving, greedy for affection and approval, slow in reaction, even in
emotions, and tolerant.
(2) Somatotonia - this type of temperament is associated with individuals who are
assertive, adventure-loving, psychologically callous, energetic, compulsive, and
ruthless.
54 Gareth Norris, "Criminal Profiling: A Continuing History" in Wayne Petherick (ed) Serial Crime:
Theoretical and Practical Issues in Behavioral Profiling, 3 (2006).
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(3) Cerebrotonia - individuals with this type of temperament are tight in posture,
physiologically overresponsive, emotionally restrained, unpredictable in attitude
and mentally overintense.

For Sheldon, endomorphs tend to have viscerotonia temperaments, mesomorphs tend to
be somatotonic and ectomorphs have cerebrotonia type of temperament. In his study of
200 delinquent boys (aged 15 - 21) in a rehabilitation center, he found out that delinquent
youths tend to be mesomorphs. Sheldon used statistical correlations and ranked
individuals on a subject scale of 1 to 7 to indicate the predominant temperament in each
individual. Using what he called an "Index of Delinquency" or "Index of
Disappointingness", Sheldon tried to provide a quantitative account of an individual's
psychiatric problems, residual delinquency, as well as shortcomings in IQ insufficiency.
He concluded that delinquents are mainly mesomorphs.

As we have seen, Sheldon made a great contribution towards the attempts to predict
criminals and criminal behavior. In fact, his study was later supported by Sheldon and
Eleanor Gluecks. In 1956, the Gluecks, using Sheldon's somatotype system, studied 500
boys considered to be persistently delinquent and compared them to 500 non-delinquent
boys in Boston public schools, Massachusetts, and they also found out that mesomorphic
boys have higher delinquency level/potential than the other body types.

The studies by Sheldon and the Gluecks were undoubtedly criticized. Indeed, "the studies
have been criticized for inadequate sampling and their misuse of control groups. Ideally,
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the offenders studied should represent all criminals, and the subjects in the control groups
should represent all noncriminals. Thereby, differences found between the two samples
would be applicable to the respective populations they were supposed to represent".55

In 1955, Ernst Kretschmer (1888 - 1964), a German Criminologist, came up with a body
types theory in which he argued that there is a high degree of correlation between body
types, personality types and criminal potential. Kretschmer studied 260 insane people in
Swabia (a southwestern German town), and in his work "Physique and Character", he
contended that there are four body types and that each is linked to a person's personality,
character and criminal potential. His four body types are as follows.

(1) Leptosome or Asthenic: Tall and thin, and mainly involved in fraud and thievery. He

said that schizophrenics fall into this group.
(2) Athletic: Very muscular, flat stomachs, and usually involved in violent crimes.
(3) Pyknic: Short, fat, broad faces, and usually involved in fraud, deception and
sometimes violent crimes, and that manic depressives fall into this category.
(4) Dysplastic or Mixed: These are individuals who fit into more than one body type and
they are generally involved in some violent crimes and indecency. Generally, these
individuals are very emotional, lack self control and mostly involved in sexual offenses
and crimes of passion.

Kretschmer's work attracted a lot of criticisms. "Kretschmer's theories, however, were
Viewed as extremely dubious because he never disclosed his research, his inferences and
ss
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descriptions were always incredibly vague, and no specific comparisons were performed
with non-criminals populations. In short, he would not submit his findings for any form
of peer review, and his approach was clearly non-scientific. As a result, many argued
that his theories regarding his findings were nothing more than unfounded inference and
correction masquerading as science"s6.

Dr. James Brussel, an American Psychiatrist, is arguably the father of modem offender
profiling. In 1956, Dr. Brussel who was in private practice and was also the Assistant
Commissioner of Mental Hygiene for the state of New York was approached by police
investigators to help them with the investigation of series of bomb explosions in New
York City. It should also be noted that Dr. Brussel was the Chief of Neuropsychiatry in
the US Millitary (at Fort Dix) prior to going into private practice. Later he was the head
of US army neuropsychiatry during the Korean war.

In 1956, Brussel compiled a psychological profile which led to the identification and
arrest of George Metesky (known as the New York Mad Bomber) who caused thirty-two
explosions in New York City between 1940 and 1956. Using crime scene information,
Brussel was able to make psychodynamic inferences. He studied the crime scene photos
and the letters that the bomber wrote and he produced a profile of the likely offender.
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In his psychological profile, Dr. Brussel urged the investigators to "look for a heavy man.
Middle-aged. Foreign born. Roman Catholic. Single. Lives with a brother or sister".57 He
also stated that "when you find him, chances are he'll be wearing a double-breasted suit.
Buttoned".58 In general, Brussel's profile also asked the police to look for:
Single man, between 40 and 50 years, introvert. Unsocial
but not antisocial. Skilled mechanic. Cunning. Neat with
tools. Egostical of mechanical skill. Contemptuous of
other people. Resentful of criticism of his work but
probably conceals resentment. Moral. Honest. Not
interested in women. High school graduate. Expert in
civil or military ordinance. Religious. Might flare up
violently at work when criticized. Possible motive:
discharge or reprimand. Feels superior to critics.
Resentment, keeps growing. Present or former
Consolidated Edison worker. Probably case of
.
. 59
progreSSIve paranOIa.

Dr. Brussel's profile proved to be accurate. Metesky was a former employee of
Consolidated Edison, and most interesting of all, when the police went to arrest him at his
house, they asked him to get changed and he came out dressed in a double-breasted suit,
just like Brussel predicted. Metesky confessed to having committed the crimes.

Dr. Brussel was also asked by the police to help them in the case of the "Boston
Strangler". In Boston, Massachusetts, between June 1962 and January 1964, thirteen
sexually motivated murders occurred and the police had no suspects. In what became
known as the 'Boston Strangler' case, Dr. Brussel was asked to produce a psychological
profile of the likely offender. Initially, the investigators believed that the murders were
57
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committed by two killers. This was based on the fact that the victims were of two age
groupS - young women and older women. Dr Brussel believed that only one person was
responsible for the thirteen murders, and he produced a profile. Albert DeSalvo was
arrested in November 1964 in connection with another rape and murder known as the
"Green Man Sex Crimes". He fitted the profile drawn up by Brussel. He was detained
and he later confessed to his psychiatrist that he was the 'Boston Strangler'. While in
person, awaiting trial for the other murders, DeSalvo was stabbed to death by a fellow
inmate. Hence, he was not tried for the 'Boston Strangler's murders. Therefore, the
accuracy or otherwise of Dr. Brussel's profile cannot be evaluated on this case.

Suffice

it

to

say

however,

that

Brussel

used

his

practical

psychiatric

knowledge/experience, personal intuition and police and medical records to come up with
the profiles. Such approach is therefore subjective and should be used with caution. In
fact, Brussel admitted that he made mistakes in some of his cases, and he wrote: "The
only thing that I have done to get my name in the papers has been to apply some common
psychiatric principles in reverse, using my own private blend of science, intuition, and
hope. With this approach, I've been able to help the police solve some bizarre criminal
cases and I've been summoned as an expert witness in some famous criminal trials".6o

Furthermore, Brussel maintained that, "I haven't chosen the cases to show what a clever
fellow I am. I made mistakes in some of them, as I will admit. I analyzed facts incorrectly
or incompletely, I made deductions I had no right to make. Some of the cases earned me
60
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accolades, but others did not. In one of them, the police and courts didn't even listen to
me. In another, the major questions were not answered and the persons will never be
caught

,,61

Following the work of Dr. Brussel, the FBI in the 1970's started to expand on offender
profiling and they established the Behavioral Science Unit at the FBI training academy in
Quantico, Virginia in 1974, with the aim of studying serial rape and homicide cases.
Howard Teten and Pat Mullany were the first instructors at this unit. However, in 1975,
Robert Ressler, Dick Ault and John Douglas joined and expanded the unit. It should be
noted that in 1983 Pierce Brooks founded the FBI's VICAP (computer reporting system)
and the unit was made up of Anna Boudea, Ken Handtland, David Icove and Jim
Howlett. In 1984, the NCA VC (National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crimes) was
created. This unit was charged with the responsibility of identifying and tracking serial
killers.

During the 1970's there were several murder cases that the FBI were unable to solve.
They became increasingly frustrated with the fact that physical evidence even when
present at the scene of crime could not provide clues as to the sort of person they should
be looking for. The FBI needed a technique that would help them focus on the most
likely offenders rather than focusing on a large number of suspects. The FBI conducted
indepth interviews with thirty six convicted serial killers and found that their crimes were
all almost sexually motivated. Their main aim of carrying out the interviews was to
identify the personality and behavioral characteristics of these offenders.
61
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Following the interviews, the FBI then came up with the idea of organized and
disorganized offenders. 62 As Ainsworth has pointed out:
The FBI believed that this classification into organized and
disorganized murders was helpful as they claimed that the two
different types of offenders typically had very different
personality and demographic characteristics. In the case of
organized murderers, a typical offender would be intelligent (but
possibly an underachiever), socially skilled, sexually competent,
and be living with a partner. This mask of 'normality' however
often hid an antisocial or psychopathic personality. Such an
individual may have been experiencing a great deal of anger
around the time of the attack and have been suffering from
depression. He would also be likely to follow news reports about
6
his offence and to leave the area following the attack.

Ainsworth further argued that "such characteristics are in sharp contrast to the
disorganized murderer who is more likely to live alone and quite near the scene of the
attack. He would be socially and sexually inept, of low intelligence and to have had some
quite severe form of mental illness. He was also likely to have suffered physical and
sexual abuse as a child. In the case of these disorganized offenders, the offence would
tend to be committed when in a frightened or confused state,,64.

The first case in which the FBI used offender profiling occurred in June 1973 when a
seven year old girl, Susan Jaegar went missing while on a camping holiday with her
parents. She was abducted from her tent while her parents were sleeping. For a year, the
Montana Police could not find the missing girl. Then in January 1974, police discovered
62
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the charred body of an eighteen year old girl in the woodland near the camp where Susan
Jaegar was abducted. Police suspected that one killer was responsible for both murders
and they decided to call in the FBI to assist them with the investigation. The FBI drew up

a profile of the likely killer, which among other things stated that :(1) the offender was a young white male.

(2) A loner.
(3) Lived near the camp.
(4) Likely to have been arrested before.
(5) Likely to have kept souvenir from the victims.

Their profile fitted David Meirhofer who was already on the FBI suspects list. He was
named by an informant. He was arrested, questioned but released as there was no
physical evidence linking him to the murders. As part of their investigation, the FBI kept
a telephone recorder at Susan Jaeger's mother's house .... as predicted, an anonymous
caller telephoned and said that he has abducted Susan, her mother was able to record his
voice. It was identified as that of Meirhofer. A search of his home revealed the gruesome
body parts, kept as 'souvenirs'. He later admitted to both murders as well as two others of
local boys, before hanging himself in his cell. 65

It should be noted that the FBI in the 1970's carried out another interview with 41
convicted serial rapists and they came up with four types of rapists - power reassurance,
power assertive, anger-retaliatory and anger excitation. These initial groupings of

;:-------------------Canter, supra note 2, at 14.
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murderers and rapists eventually led to the development of the Crime Classification
Manual (Ressler, Douglas, Burgess and Burgess). This is a classification system for the
types of crimes in which the behaviour of the perpetrator plays an important role.

66

In Britain, on the other hand, Paul Britton, a British criminal psychologist was
approached by the police in 1984 to assist them with the case of a 33 year old woman Caroline Osborne, from Leicesterhire, England. Caroline's body was found with seven
stab wounds and her hands and feet were bound with string. There were no signs of
robbery or sexual assault. It should be noted that a piece of paper containing a drawing of
a pentagram in a circle was found at the crime scene. This image is usually linked to
black magic or satanism. In order to draw up a profile of the likely killer, Britton studied
the crime scene photographs and autopsy reports and he predicted that the killer was :(1) Male in his mid-teens to early twenties.
(2) Sexually immature.
(3) Lacked social skills to maintain relationships.
(4) Lived at home with both parents or one parent.
(5) Likes to keep to himself.
(6) Probably lives near the area where the body was found.
(7) Was a manual worker.
(8) Strong and athletic build.
(9) Had forensic awareness or kept souvenirs.
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Another murder occurred fourteen months later in the area, with similar patterns and
Britton was called in again to assist with the investigation. Britton said that even though
there were a few differences in the two murders that they were committed by the same
person. Following Britton's profile, Paul Kenneth Bostock was arrested. Britton
suggested to the police the interviewing strategies to be used and Bostock later confessed
to the two murders. In June 1986 he was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Leicester
Crown Court. Britton believed that there were sexual motives for the murders and he
wrote: "Caroline Osborne's murder was an expression of a corrupt lust. The bindings,
control and choice of victim suggested a killer whose sexual desire had become mixed
with anger and the need to dominate. He would have rehearsed the scene in his mind
beforehand - fantasizing about a woman being taken, restrained, bound, dominated,
mutilated and killed with a knife".67

Paul Britton was also involved in the controversial case of Rachel Nickell, a twenty year
old model who was murdered on July 15, 1992 on Wimbledon Common, London, while
walking her dog with her two year old son. Following the initial investigation, police had
a suspect Colin Stagg, but he was released because there was no physical evidence to
charge him. The police, on the advice of Paul Britton decided to organize a sting
operation whereby an undercover policewoman codenamed Lizzie James would begin a
relationship with the suspect. The aim of the operation was to link their suspect to the
crime. Lizzie James started to exchange letters with Colin Stagg and swapped sexual
fantasies. Britton's idea was to see if the suspect would implicate himself. Hence, through
letters, meetings and telephone calls over seven month undercover operation, Lizzie

;--------------------Paul Britton, The Jigsaw Man, 49 (1997).
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James encouraged Colin Stagg to develop his fantasies that matched the profile
characteristics drawn up by Paul Britton. It should be noted that Colin's replies to the
letters written to him by Lizzie James led to him being charged with the murder of Rachel
Nickell. In one of their meetings, Lizzie told Colin that she enjoyed hurting people and
always "wants blood, buckets of it". She also described to Colin how in her teenage years
she was involved in satanism and had murdered a mother and her baby. She told Colin
that she was looking for a meaningful and long lasting relationship with a man with
similar experience and desires. In order to impress Lizzie and carryon with their
relationship, Colin told her that he murdered a woman in New Forest. Police records and
investigations showed that there was no such murder and that Colin lied to impress
Lizzie. Britton at this point advised Lizzie to go back to Colin and tell him that she does
not believe the New Forest story and that "if only you had done the Wimbledon Common
murder; if only you had killed her, it would be all right". Colin told her that he was not
involved in that murder, yet because he fitted some of the characteristics in the profile
drawn up by Britton, he was charged with the murder.

During the trial the defense argued that the undercover police operation was unfair and
constitutes a breach of a defendant's right not to incriminate himself. Gisli Gudjonsson, a
psychologist representing the accused, argued that Britton's profile was mere speculation
and based only on his own personal intuition. It was also argued that the offender
profiling used is an unreliable technique that had not achieved general acceptance as a
science.
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On September 14, 1994, Mr. Justice OgnaU acquitted Colin Stagg of the murder. The
judge was very critical of the seven month undercover police operation and the role of
Paul Britton in the case. The judge ruled that the whole operation was unfair, a breach of
a defendant's right not to incriminate himself and was "misconceived", and he said: "I
am afraid this behaviour betrays not merely an excess of zeal, but a blatant attempt to
incriminate a suspect by positive and deceptive conduct of the grossest kind. Any
legitimate steps taken by the police and the prosecuting authorities to bring perpetrators
to justice are to be applauded, but the emphasis must be on the word legitimate. A careful
appraisal of the material demonstrates a skilful and sustained enterprise to manipulate the
accused, sometimes subtly, sometimes blatantly".

It should be noted that because of his role in this case, Paul Britton faced charges of

professional misconduct by the British Psychological Society. However, the Disciplinary
Committee of the society met on October 29 and 30, 2002 and dismissed the charges. The
committee maintained that due to the delays which occurred during the process of the
case, that it believed that Mr. Britton would not receive a fair hearing. The committee
stated that "the disciplinary process was originally subject to four years delay, due to the
likelihood of private civil proceedings, then latterly it was delayed by the need to gather
extensive evidence and agree a date when all parties would be available. All of this has
had a bearing on whether Mr. Britton could receive a fair hearing after so long".

Canter and Alison were also very critical of the work of Britton. They described Britton's
Work as mere intuitive personal opinion, and they wrote:
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Britton uses an additional device to help convince the
audience of his profiling expertise - he presents points as
separate though they are clearly related. For example in
stating that an individual is sexually immature also implies
he has few if any previous girlfriends. However, Britton is
able to give the impression that these are two separate points
merely by separating them by another point in a list of
characteristics. It is perhaps more surprising, that nowhere in
Britton's account are there any references to psychological
principles or any indication of a process by which he has
come to his conclusions. Thus despite an advert for Britton's
book that boasts, 'if you did it he'll get you' we are no
clearer by the end ofthe book of how 'he will get you. 68

Paul Britton as we have seen has assisted the police in several cases in Britain, but David
Canter is undoubtedly the father of offender profiling in Britain. Between 1982 and 1986
series of rapes and murders occurred in London and the Home Counties and the police
were not making any progress in apprehending the offenders. Hence, the police sought
the help of David Canter, a Professor of Psychology, presently at the University of
Liverpool. In July 1985, three violent rape attacks occurred and the police launched
'Operation Hart'. In August 1985 John Duffy was arrested and charged with violent
offences but was released on bail. Immediately after Duffy was released, a nineteen year
old girl, Alison Day, was dragged from an East London train and taken to a garage where
she was raped and killed. Another girl, fifteen year old Maartje Tamboezer was also
raped and killed on her way to the shops in West Horley, three months later. Her body
was set on fire. However, semen traces were found. Another attack occurred on May 18,
1986 when Mrs. Anne Lock was abducted on her way to work.

;---------------------David Canter., and Lawrence Alison, "Profiling in Policy and Practice", in D. Canter., and A. Lawrence,
(eds) Profiling in Policy and Practice, 8 (1999).
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Having found semen traces on one of the bodies, the investigations intensified. John
Duffy was re-arrested, interviewed, but he refused to give blood sample. Duffy was again
released on bail and he later bribed one of his friends to "mug" him. He reported to the
police that he has been mugged and voluntarily checked himself into a psychiatric
hospital claiming that he is suffering from trauma and amnesia as a result of the mugging.
John Duffy attacked and raped another girl, a fourteen year old girl. The girl survived the
attack. She was blindfolded during the attack but a caught a glimpse of Duffy when his
mask fell off. She later identified Duffy as her attacker at the identification parade.

The profile compiled by Professor Canter matched Duffy'S characteristics and he was
placed under surveillance. 69 A few weeks later, he was arrested at his mother's house
where physical evidence was gathered. It should be noted that his blood sample matched
the semen traces found on Maartje Tamboezer's body. Some fibres found on Duffy's
clothing also matched those found on one of the victims. Strings found at Duffy's house
also matched the strings used to bind the victims. Thus, there was enough evidence to
charge Duffy with the murders and rapes. Mr. Justice Farquarson on February 26, 1988
sentenced Duffy to seven life sentences.

In this chapter, we have defined offender profiling. A historical account of offender
profiling has also been discussed. In the next chapter, we discuss the different approaches
to offender profiling, examining their various strengths and weaknesses.
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CHAPTER TWO
Approaches to Offender Profiling

There are three main approaches to offender profiling - Diagnostic Evaluation or Clinical
approach, Criminal Investigative Analysis or the FBI approach, and the Investigative
Psychology or Environmental Psychology approach. In recent times however, some
scholars have developed other 'approaches' such as Geographic Profiling, Behavioral
Evidence Analysis, and Crime Action Profiling.

Diagnostic Evaluation (DE) or Clinical Approach

Behavioral details from crime scenes, reconstructed crime
activity and witness accounts can offer an additional
perspective to forensic information gathered by traditional
investigative methods. This behavioral information can often
provide insights into the thinking patterns and personal habits
of offenders that extend beyond the limits of the offence
itself. The offender's focus of interest, the type of
relationship that he makes with the victim, the criteria by
which he chooses the circumstances of the offence, the
amount of planning he engages in and the risks he is willing
to run, all help to build up a picture of the offender's mental
world. This, in tum, can provide useful insights into his likely
motivations, his personal needs, his lifestyle and his past
history. The professional who considers these issues is more
likely to understand the contexts within which the offender
commits the offence. This broad, contextual information can
help generate, or support, particular lines of enquiry during
investigations. This type of information can be particularly
useful, for instance, where linked series of offences are being
investigated, where the victim may be a stranger to the
offender, or where an offence seems bizarre and
inexplicable. 7o
7°R'lchard J, Badcock, "Developmental and clinical Issues in Relation to Offending in the Individual", in
Janet L. Jackson, and Debra A. Bekerian, Offender Profiling: Theory, Research and Practice, 40 (1997),

56

Diagnostic Evaluation or Clinical Approach is the oldest approach to offender profiling.
It is an approach mainly adopted by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. Diagnostic

evaluation approach looks at offenders from a mental illness point of view and tries to
examine crimes and crime scenes from that perspective. Based on their clinical practice
experience, their knowledge of mental health processes and their knowledge of
psychological disorders, these practitioners try to predict the type of offenders who are
likely to be responsible for certain types of criminal behavior. Hence, the diagnostic
evaluation approach "relies on the clinical judgment of a profiler to ascertain the
underlying motives behind an offender's actions".7!

The Diagnostic Evaluation approach is based on the premise that "psychiatrists may be
able to offer insights into some of the more bizarre forms of clinical activity, or at least
those which do not fit into the more normal pattern of criminal behavior. In some cases
the police may be baffled by a particularly unusual crime and might be struggling to
interpret the significance of some aspects of the incident. In such cases a psychiatrist or
clinical psychologist may, from their knowledge of many forms of mental illness, be able
to offer an explanation for behaviour which appears, on first encounter, to make little
sense. Whilst the media may talk of a 'senseless' killing, the clinician may at least be able
to offer an explanation of the killing from the offender's perspective"n. Under the
diagnostic evaluation approach, "the construction of profiles is achieved by diagnosing
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the probable psychopathology and/or personality type likely to have committed the crime.
However, such a diagnosis can vary widely among different practitioners,,73.

There is general agreement that some forms of mental illness may predispose certain
individuals to commit certain crimes. This is why psychiatrists and clinical psychologists
playa very important role in offender profiling. Their knowledge of mental disorder, for
instance, helps them to be in a better position to produce a profile of the individuals likely
to

commit

certain

types

of crime,

especially

crimes

showing

elements

of

psychopathology, paraphilias and sadomasochistic behavior. Indeed, Badcock noted that
"the mental disorders most commonly associated with offending are the psychoses,
sociopathic personality disorder and drug/alcohol additions,,74.

Diagnostic evaluation approach was very useful and in fact seen to be accurate in the
"New York Mad Bomber" case in 1956, when Dr. James Brussel produced a
psychological profile of the bomber using this approach. 75 This approach was also used
by Dr. Thomas Bond in profiling Jack the Ripper. Similarly, this was also the approach
used to produce a psychological profile of US President Woodrow Wilson (this was not
for criminal investigation).
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In spite of the above noted successes of diagnostic evaluation, it is not without criticism.
The scientific basis of this approach is still in question. This is an approach that relies
heavily on the personal clinical experience and knowledge of an individual practitioner.
As such it is subjective and cannot be empirically tested.

Another criticism leveled against this approach is that it is an approach done by
psychiatrists and psychologists who do not have any law enforcement background. Egger
argued that diagnostic evaluations are done by psychiatrists and psychologists who "have
very little experience or knowledge of law enforcement or investigation,,76. Wilson et al
sees the main problem with this approach as being its individualistic nature, arguing that
"this individualistic approach also prevents adequate comparative assessments of validity,
utility and process, and the category of profiling now in the ascendancy is that of crime
scene analysis,,77. Ainsworth also argued that "rather than studying a large number of
cases and drawing inferences from those, this approach is more likely to involve multiple
observations of single cases,,78. Ainsworth further contended that "such an approach has
some advantages but may also suffer from some disadvantages when compared to
approaches which involve the study of large numbers of cases. For example, the single
case study allows for a very detailed consideration of all the aspects of one incident and
may thus produce information which a less considered examination might reveal.
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However, information derived from such a single case may be so specific to that incident
that it is all but impossible to extrapolate the findings to other investigations,,79.

In the final analysis, it should be noted that all other approaches to offender profiling
originated from diagnostic evaluation, and as we have seen it has proved very useful in
several cases. The most important thing about this approach is that it offers a better and
more authoritative insight into the motivations underlying an offender's criminal action.

Criminal Investigative Analysis (CIA)/FBI Approach or Crime Scene Analysis

(CSA)

Although obviously an oversimplification, the basic
blueprint for the FBI approach involves considering the
available aspects of the crime scenes; the nature of attacks;
forensic evidence; and information related to the victim:
then classifying the offender and, finally, referring to the
appropriate predictive characteristics. Results from such
investigations are incorporated in a framework which
basically classifies murderers according to whether they are
'organized' (which implies that murderers plan their
crimes, display control at scene of crime, leave few or no
clues, and that the victim is a targeted stranger) or
'disorganized' (which implies that murders are not planned
and crime scenes show evidence of haphazard behaviour)
.
or a mIxture
0 f the two. 80

79

80
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The FBI defined Criminal Investigative Analysis as "a process of reviewing crimes from
both a behavioral and investigative perspective. It involves reviewing and assessing the
facts of a criminal act, interpreting offender behavior, and interaction with the victim, as
exhibited during the commission of the crime, or as displayed in the crime scene".81 This
approach is based on crime scene analysis and involves an examination of the method of
operation and other behavioral patterns that can be deduced from the crime scene
characteristics. Having found that the diagnostic evaluation approach proved very helpful
in apprehending unknown serial killers, and having been influenced by the work of Dr.
James Brussel, the FBI introduced criminal investigative analysis. It should be noted that
criminal investigative analysis is done by the Behavioral Analysis Unit (Behavioral
Sciences Unit) of the FBI based in Quantico, Virginia. This approach is undoubtedly the
most popular approach. In fact, this approach is fast becoming synonymous with the term
'offender profiling' itself. This does not mean that this is the most reliable approach. This
situation exists because those in law enforcement field see offender profiling as their own
exclusive club, and have virtually succeeded in showcasing themselves as the one and
only group of people who are better placed to produce the best and most accurate
profiles. Are they correct? You will found out for yourself after reading this study.

However, there is no gainsaying the fact that the FBI has given immense popularity to
this crime investigation technique. In line with Kocsis, "this popularization in itself is a
significant accomplishment that should not be underestimated or devalued as without
these efforts it is debatable to what extent, if at all, the practice of profiling would have

81
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evolved beyond the classical circumstance of DE,,82. This technique is undoubtedly the
offshoot of diagnostic evaluation and it was after the work and contributions of Dr. James
Brussel that the FBI began to embrace and develop this technique.

In the 1970's the FBI were frustrated with the fact that physical evidence even when it
was present at a crime scene did not provide clues to the sort of individuals that they
should be looking for. With this in mind, they used data from serious sexual assault and
murder cases and tried to see if they could identify the behavioral characteristics of these
sort of offenders. They also carried out in-depth interviews with 36 convicted serial
killers. As Ainsworth has pointed out, "a careful recording and analysis of the crimes
which these offenders had committed built up a database. Based on this information, the
FBI advocated that important information could be gleaned by: (1) a careful examination
of the various aspects of the crime scene, (2) a study of the nature of the attacks
themselves, (3) careful consideration of the medical examiners report, (4) the
identification of the characteristics of the type of victim selected".83

Under this approach, an offender is classified according to whether the crime scene
appeared to be organized or disorganized. This classification of offenders into organized
or disorganized offenders helps investigators to draw conclusions as to the characteristics
of the likely offenders. The FBI maintained that the organized and disorganized offenders
have different demographic and behavioral characteristics. According to the FBI, the
crime scene of an organized offender shows the following features:
82
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•

Shows signs of some sort of planning.

•

Shows that the offender was in control at the scene.

•

Shows evidence of forensic awareness by the offender (revealed by the lack of
physical traces at the scene).

Ressler et al maintained that organized offenders tend to:

84

* Have a high birth order (often being the firstborn son in a family).

* Their father's work history is generally stable.
* Parental discipline is perceived as inconsistent.
* Have mobility (his car is in good condition).

* Likely to choose a stranger as the victim.
* This type of offender is intelligent and possibly an underachiever.

* Socially skilled.
* Sexually competent.
* Likely to be living with a partner.

* Likely

to be depressed and experiencing a great deal of anger around the time of

attack.

* Likely

to follow news report about the attack and likely to leave the area after the

attack.

On the other hand, the FBI maintained that the crime scene of a disorganized offender
tend to show the following features.
84
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•

Shows evidence of little or no planning.

•

Shows that the attack was random.

•

Shows that the offender carried out the attack when in a frightened or confused
state of mind.

•

Shows evidence of disorganized behavior.

•

The offender chooses any weapon that he or she can find at the scene and is likely
to leave the weapons at the scene.

•

There is little or no attempt made by this type of offender to conceal any clues at
the scene.

It has also been noted that the disorganized offender is:

85

85

•

Likely to live alone.

•

Lives near the scene of crime.

•

Socially and sexually inept.

•

Likely to be of below average intelligence.

•

Suffers from some form of mental illness.

•

Likely to have suffered physical or sexual abuse as a child.

•

Likely to be oflow birth status in the family.

•

Father's work is unstable.

•

This type of offender has poor work history.

•

Likely to have suffered harsh parental discipline.

Id, at 130.
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This classification into organized and disorganized offenders helps to determine at the
outset whether a series of attacks are likely to be the work of one person or more
individuals.

The FBI also classified crime scenes into the organized crime scene, disorganized crime
scene, mixed crime scene and the atypical crime scene. The organized crime scene as we
have seen shows elements of planning and premeditation, as well as attempts to conceal
any physical traces. The disorganized crime scene shows a high level of disorganized and
disoriented behavior; appears to be unplanned and random, and no attempts are made to
conceal any physical traces. The mixed crime scene refers to a crime scene that shows the
characteristics of both the organized and the disorganized. Davies noted that "this could
indicate the presence of two offenders in the crime, or it could indicate that one offender
had planned the crime and then abandoned the plan due to unforeseen circumstances, or it
could indicate that an offender had staged the outcome (made it look like something
else),,86. The atypical crime scene is one where no classification can be made because of
lack of available information. This is usually the case where they crime scene was located
several years later.

The FBI has done considerable specific analysis of offenders who rape. They classified
rapists into two - selfish and unselfish rapists. 87 As Ainsworth has pointed out "the
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distinction refers to the extent to which the rapist showed any consideration towards the
victim during the act,,88. According to the FBI, the selfish rapist tends to be:
•

Violent, shows a high level of aggression.

•

Shows total sexual dominance.

•

Shows self-confidence.

•

Makes no attempt to establish any form of intimacy with the victim.

•

Engages in anal sex, followed by fellatio.

•

Tends to use very offensive, threatening, abusive, profane, demeaning,
humiliating, impersonal and sexually oriented language.

The unselfish rapist on the other hand is seen to show:
•

Lack of self-confidence.

•

Does not appear to be violent in the attack. Tends to use minimal level of force.

•

Not likely to cause any physical harm.

•

Likes to involve the victim in the sexual act, tries to establish some sort of
intimacy.

•

Likely to tell the victim to perform certain sexual acts on him. For instance he
may ask the victim to kiss him, fondle him and so on.

•

Tends to use language that is personal, reassuring, complimentary, non-profane,
concerned and apologetic.
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This classification is useful because it is believed that verbal utterances by the offender
during the attack will reveal a lot of infonnation about him or her. Above all, this
classification helps in choosing an appropriate interviewing/interrogation strategy.

Following the usefulness of the above classification, the FBI made further classification
of rapists. Hazelwood maintained that there are four types of rapists: 89

(1) Power Reassurance Rapist or Compensatory Rapist:

This type of rapist sees rape as a way of showing his masculinity and sexual adequacy,
and shows the signs of an unselfish rapist. This type of rapist sees rape as a way of
removing any doubts about their sexual inadequacy. In fact, "the sexual act goes some
way to reassuring the perpetrator about his insecurity. However, the effect may be short
lived, and the offender might strike again within a few days or weeks, and probably in the
same district. It is not uncommon for such a perpetrator to take an item of clothing or
other possession from his victims as a bizarre 'trophy'. He may also keep careful records
of his conquests. As the primary motivation is the removal of feelings of inadequacy, this
type of perpetrator is unlikely to stop offending until he is caught and incarcerated.,,9o

It has also been noted that this type of rapist usually attacks in late evenings or early

mornings when the victim is likely to be alone or with small children, and that this type
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of rapist also chooses a victim about his own age and his own race. 91 It is also believed
that this type of rapist likes to think that the victim is 'enjoying' the rape and is most
likely to ask the victim to undress on hislher own. They appear to be concerned about the
welfare of the victim and tend to feel some sort of remorse, and likely to apologize to the
victim. Holmes and Holmes maintained that this type of rapist is likely to be single, lives
with one or both parents, non-athletic, quiet, passive, social loner, with limited education,
often employed in a menial job, likes to visit adult bookstores, likely to be a transvestite,
a fetishist, involved in voyeurism, excessive masturbation and exhibitionism, tends to
attack in his own neighborhood, and most likely to have been raised by an aggressive,
seductive and dominating mother. 92

Furthermore, "for this rapist, the sex act validates his position of importance. He
perceives himself as a loser, and by controlling another human being he hopes to make
himself believe that he is important, if only temporarily. For this reason, he uses only
enough force to control his victim,,93. Holmes and Holmes have suggested that when
interviewing this type of rapist that the interviewer should adopt the strategy of appealing
to the rapist's "sense of masculinity", arguing that "the interviewer might indicate to him
that the woman who was raped in the case under investigation has not suffered "undue"
trauma, and that the police realize the rapist had no desire to harm his victim; such a
statement could set the stage for a "sympathetic" relationship that might result in the
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rapiSt's sharing information, not only about the rape currently under investigation, but
about other suspected connected rapes".94

(2) Power-Assertive Rapist or Exploitative Rapist:
The power assertive rapist sees rape as an expression of his masculinity and superiority.
This rapist has no doubts or fears about his sexual adequacy and falls under the selfish
category. Therefore, they tend to use force during the attack. "This type of rapist may
well tear his victim's clothing and discard it. He may also carry out repeated sexual
assaults rather than just one, thus adding to his assailant's feelings of virility and
dominance. If the man has driven the victim to the location of the rape, he may well leave
her there without her clothing, and as a result the victim will be unable to report the
assault swiftly,,95.

This type of rapist is normally athletic and does not see anything wrong with rape. For
them, raping of women is 'normal'. Date rapes fall into this category and they are
normally problematic in prosecuting. It has been observed that this type of rapist is likely
to have been raised in a single parent family, lived in foster homes, suffered physical
abuse as a child, a high school dropout, has domestic problems, unhappy marriages, likes
to visit bars, likely to be employed in macho occupations - construction or police work,
and likely to choose a victim of his own race.
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Holmes and Holmes have suggested that:
It is best for the interviewer to approach the interview
session with all the facts in hand: the placement of the
suspect at the scene, physical evidence that directly
implicates him in the rape (or rapes), and other
pertinent information that shows the interviewer is a
professional. What the police should communicate is,
We know you did it, and this is how we are going to
prove it. If the interviewer is in error about the facts, or
if there is some other reason for the rapist to discount
the interviewer's competence as a professional, it is
unlikely that any cooperation will be gained from the
rapist through any means, including intimidation, ~leas
9
for aid, and appeals based on the victim's welfare.

(3) Anger-Retaliatory Rapist:

As the name suggests, this type of rapist tend to rape as a result of his anger and distaste
of women. This rapist is extremely angry, violent and basically hates women. They
derive sexual excitement by hurting women and see women as the source of their
troubles, and so seeks revenge. As such "this type of rapist appears to commit his assaults
as a way of expressing his own rage and hostility. He appears to possess a great deal of
anger and animosity towards women in general and uses the act of rape as a way of
expressing or releasing this anger. He also appears to derive pleasure from degrading his
victims. The style of the rape will be particularly selfish and the perpetrator will use
extreme amounts of violence,,98.
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Generally speaking, this type of rapist likes to perform degrading sexual acts on the
victims, the attack tends to be unplanned, the victim is likely to be someone who closely
matches the woman the rapist sees as the source of his troubles. The rapist is likely to be
married, have many affairs, and is likely to choose a victim of his own age. This type of
rapist tends to come from a broken home, and is likely to have been physically abused as
a child. Holmes and Holmes maintained that "some 80% have been reared by a single
female parent or other single female caregiver,,99. They suggested that the interviewer
should be male as this type of rapist hates women.

(4) Anger-Excitement Rapist or Sadistic Rapist:
This type of rapist sees rape as a source of pleasure. The idea of torturing the victims
provides this rapist with sexual excitement, and he likes to inflict pain on the victims.
There is general agreement that this is the most dangerous of all rapists. The attack tends
to be planned, violent and could result in murder. This rapist is likely to have a 'rape kit',
which he takes to the location of the attacks. Furthermore, this type of rapist falls under
the selfish category and likes to see the victims suffer; likes to instill fear in the victims
and most likely to choose the type of victim that will fulfill his inner fantasies/desires.
This rapist will continue to rape until he is caught. This rapist is likely to come from a
single - parent family, with divorced parents, lived in foster homes, age range 30 - 39,
physically abused as a child, raised in a sexually deviant home, married, with some
college education, employed in white collar jobs, likely to be a middle class family man,

99

Holmes and Holmes, supra note 18, at 123.

71

has compulsive personality, ritualistic, likely to stalk and eventually kill victims.

loo

Holmes and Holmes noted that there is no interviewing strategy that is effective with this
. 101
type 0 f rapIst.

Having discussed these examples of various classifications of offenders by the FBI, we
noW move on to discussing how a typical criminal profile is produced. Douglas et al have
clearly outlined the various stages involved in the criminal profile generating process thus
_ profiling inputs, decision process models stage, crime scene assessment, criminal
.'
d
h'
102
'
pro fil
1 e, mvestlgatlOn an appre enslOn.

(1) Profiling Inputs: This involves collecting all available information about the
crime, including physical evidence, crime scene photographs, autopsy reports,
witness and victim statements, as well as police reports. Detailed background
information about the victim is noted. It should also be noted at this stage whether
the crime scene is indoors or outdoors. "In homicide cases, the required
information includes a complete synopsis of the crime and a description of the
crime scene, encompassing factors indigenous to that area to the time of the
incident such as weather conditions and the political and social environment,,103.
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(2) Decision Process Models: At this stage, the profiler organizes "the input into
meaningful questions and patterns"IO\ (for example, what type of murder - serial,
mass or spree murder?). What is the primary intent? The location, pattern and acts
that took place before and after the offense will also be noted at this stage. At this
stage, attempt will also be made to ascertain the length of time taken to carry out
the attack.

(3) Crime Scene Assessment: This is arguably the most crucial stage and care should
be taken to note whether the crime scene is staged or not. The profiler at this stage
tries to reconstruct the behavior of the offender and the victim. The aim here is to
try to ascertain what kind of weapon was used and the type of injuries. Here the
profiler also tries to classify the crime scene and the likely offender. Does the
crime scene appear to be the work of organized or disorganized offender? Also to
be determined at this stage are the likely motives of the crime.

(4) Criminal Profile: At this stage, the profiler formulates an initial description of
the most likely suspects. The actual criminal profile is now created and the best
methods of apprehending the unknown offender will be suggested. A criminal
profile usually contains such information as the likely age, race, height, gender,
marital status, job type, education, location, criminal record, military background,
social skills, sexual life as well as use of drugs or alcohol.
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(5) Investigation: At this stage a written report will be presented to the investigators
and they will concentrate on the suspects matching the profile. Any new
information about the crime or other connected crimes will also be put together.

(6) Apprehension: If any suspect is arrested, an interviewing technique will be
chosen. The criminal profile is then evaluated to see how it matches the suspect.

The FBI approach has proved to be very useful in many cases. As Ainsworth has pointed
out this approach constitutes "the first systematic attempt to classify serial and serious
criminals on the basis of behavioral characteristics,,105. Furthermore, "the classification
made it somewhat easier to assess whether a series of crimes which appeared similar in
many respects was likely to have been committed by the same person. If the police were
investigating the abduction and murder of two young girls in the same area, the fact that
one appeared to be the work of a disorganized murderer, and the other the work of an
organized murderer may prove to be helpful. But, more importantly, the ability to assess
whether a series of crimes was likely to be the result of a single perpetrator would be
helpful in allowing the police to pool all the evidence accumulated on each single case in
order to build up a better picture of the offender"

1
06.

The FBI approach has however, been criticized. It has been argued that their approach is
not scientific, that the data sample was insufficient, that their approach is subjective and
the fact that the FBI declines to share information about their methods, so that other
105
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scholars can test their hypothesis. In the words of Ainsworth, "one immediate problem
with this approach was the fact that the classification arose mainly from interviews with
just 36 American, convicted, serial murderers. It was not clear whether the findings
applied only to serial murderers, who are after all a type of offender which is still
statistically extremely rare, even in the USA. The fact that all the interviewees were
convicted murderers also raises the question as to whether more successful murderers
(i.e. those who have not been caught) might have provided different information. It is
also not clear whether any information obtained from this American sample is directly
applicable to offenders in different countries,,107. Ainsworth also maintained that "to base
a major classification on such a small number of specialist offenders is somewhat
questionable" 108. He further argued that the FBI approach lacks clarity, and that "the lack
of clarity is not helped by the fact that the FBI is reluctant to allow social scientists to test
their hypotheses in a systematic and objective way. The situation is confused further
when former FBI employees who have written memoirs of their exploits appear to
contradict each other. (see for example Douglas and Olshaker, 1995 and Ressler and
Shachtman, 1992),,109.

Canter and Alison were also very critical of the FBI approach and they maintained that "a
careful examination of the content of their profiles shows a severe lack in accounts of any
systematic procedures or any substantive theoretical models of behaviour. There is no
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reference to any commonly accepted psychological principles . 1,,110

SOCIa

pathological or

.

Wilson et a1 also argued that "first it is believed that this approach has no real theoretical
basis. It simply reduces human behavior to a few observable parameters which lead to
characteristics of the unknown offender. Second, the various descriptors used in the
classification manual are not weighted or given any order of priority. The typologies
include an extensive range of crime scene indicators and their associated heuristic
inferences, but the formulation of profiles is sti111eft to the subjective interpretation of the
individual compiling them".111

On a similar vein, Muller contended that this approach "relies heavily on the experience
and intuition of the profi1er, both of which are difficult to empirically test. One of the
main problems with a scientific analysis of CSA is that its proponents have never felt the
need to have it scientifically verified" I 12. Muller further argued that:
Many of the claims of CSA sound much like those of
psychoanalysis, with talk of fantasies and sexual motivations,
and like psychoanalysis, these claims do not seem to be
falsifiable in most cases. Take, for example, the following
statement: "Although some of the murderers in our study did
not report fantasies in conscious way, their descriptions of the
murders they committed reveal hidden fantasies of violence"
(Ressler et al., 1988, p.52). We may be left wondering when
FBI agents became experts in interpreting the unconscious
fantasies of others. If one claims that a violent murder is a sign
110
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of violent fantasies - even if the murderer does not report any
violent fantasies - then how is one to falsify the hypothesis that
murderers have violent fantasies?
As it stands, the CSA approach is not a good candidate for
falsifiability, primarily due to the nature of the ideas that it is
based on. A further problem is that those involved have had
little interest in their work being empirically substantiated. One
of the problems is that of operationalizing the variables. I 13

The major problem with the FBI approach relates to the fact that there is no method of
testing the reliability, validity/consistency of their methods. This approach is subjective
and needs to be used with caution. It should be noted however, that their classification of
crime scenes and offenders has been very useful in crime investigations.

The Investigative Psychology (IP) or Environmental Psychology Approach

I quickly realized that 'profiling' lacked any clearly
articulated or scientifically based set of procedures,
findings or theories and that many of the people
following in my footsteps were doing little more than
attempting to live up to a media created fiction. I
therefore set about creating a new discipline that I
named Investigative Psychology that would offer a real
scientific base for the development of our
understanding of criminal behaviour in ways that are
relevant to police investigations. The Centre for
Investigative Psychology that I have set up at The
University of Liverpool now provides a framework for
.. 114
that actIVIty.
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Investigative Psychology approach was developed by Professor David Canter, currently a
professor of psychology at the University of Liverpool. This approach started in 1985 when
Professor Canter said that he was invited by Detective Chief Superintendent Thelma Wagstaff
and Detective Chief Inspector John Grieve to Scotland Yard office to discuss the possibility of
using psychology to assist in police investigations. Canter admitted that at the beginning he had
no experience of police procedurelinvestigations and had just little knowledge of criminal
behavior. However, after more contact with the police detectives, and police investigations,
Canter said that he "felt a start had to be made somewhere to see whether even elementary
psychological principles could be used to help a major police investigation". 1 IS In 1986, Canter
wrote a letter to Detective Chief Superintendent Thelma Wagstaff regarding a series of rapes he
had read about in the local newspaper. In response to the letter, he was invited to Hendon Police
College where an incident room was set up in connection with the rapes (named the Hart
inquiry). Canter stated that it was at this meeting that he was formally asked by Detective Chief
Superintendent Vince McFadden, the head of Surrey CID, to "use whatever skills I might have
as a psychologist to contribute directly to a major inquiry into rape and murder" 116. Canter noted
that this was in effect the beginning of his "personal journey to see if a criminal's actions in a
crime really could reveal systematically his key identifying characteristics" 1 I?

Canter maintained that a criminal leaves not only physical traces at a scene of crime, but also
Psychological traces, and that by examining these psychological traces, investigators can have an

lIS
116

117

Canter, supra note 2, at 29.
Id, at 33.
Id.

78

idea as to the sort of person likely to commit a particular crime. I IS Following the footsteps of the

FBI and drawing from their work, Canter maintained that "the only way open to me to discover
what profiling could be, and how it might relate to the psychological theories and methods that I
knew, was by working alongside an ongoing investigation, trying out ideas as they occurred to
me. This is not the best way to become involved in any area of research, coming up with possible
results without the time or resources to test them thoroughly, but it was the only way forward". I 19

Professor Canter came up with what he called a five-factor model of offender behavior. He based
his work on the five aspects of the interaction between the victim and the offender. According to
Canter, the five aspects of interaction are interpersonal coherence, significance of time and place,
criminal characteristics, criminal career and forensic awareness.

Interpersonal Coherence:

Canter argued that an offender's criminal activity makes sense to them within their own personal
psychology. This involves analyzing an offender's criminal actions to see if it is related to the
way he/she deals with other people in non-criminal situations. It is believed that an offender's
actions at a crime scene mirror his or her actions in non-criminal day to day activities. As such,
"the psychologist should be able to determine something about the offender from the victim and
the way the offender interacted with the victim (where this can be determined, such as with
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rape)".120 "For instance, the offender will select victims that are consistent with the important
characteristics of people who are important to the offender". 121

Significance of Place and Time:

Canter believed that an offender will likely choose to attack at a location that has some sort of
significance to him or her. There is the idea that offenders tend to commit murder and rape in
familiar locations, where they feel in control and comfortable. "Therefore, if all of the crimes are
committed in a certain geographic location, there is a high chance that the offender lives or
works around the area".122 Furthermore, an examination of the place and time of an attack "may
provide valuable information on the constraints of offender's mobility. Addressing the
characteristics of the criminal allows researchers to determine whether the nature of the crime
and the way it is committed can lead to a classification of criminal characteristics. This may lead
to common characteristics of a subgroup of offender and provide some guidance for the direction
of the investigation. The development of a person's criminal behavior may allow the police to
backtrack the probable career of the unidentified offender and narrow the possibilities".123 "A
rudimentary example of this would be the perpetrator who offends while traveling along a major
road or highway - this may indicate that travel is a part of the offender's job, such as a courier or
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trUck driver. Conversely, crime scenes that are proximal may indicate a lack of access to
" 124

tranSport .

Criminal Characteristics:

Here attempt is made to classify offenders, the crimes, and the crime scenes. There are various
ways of classifying offenders and crimes scenes. For instance, the FBI's classification into
organized and disorganized offenders, power reassurance rapists, power assertive rapists, anger
.
d
.
. 125
retaliatory rapIsts an anger excItement rapIsts.

Criminal Career:

It is believed that many offenders do not change their crime patterns. Therefore, attempts should

be made to determine if the likely offender is a career criminal. This involves looking at the
possible skills and occupations of the likely offender.

Forensic Awareness:

Canter also maintained that if a crime scene reveals that the offender took conscious steps to
conceal physical evidence, that such offender is likely to have had previous contact with the
police and knows about crime scene investigation techniques. Therefore, this sort of offender is
likely to have a criminal record, and so investigators are able to narrow their search to suspects
with criminal records.
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Drawing ideas from environmental psychology, Professor David Canter also came up with what
be called the "Circle Theory of Environmental Range" 126. He maintained that there is some sort
of relationship between criminal activity range and the home base of serial offenders. Canter
argued that serial offenders tend to attack and operate in locations where they feel in control and
comfortable. The circle theory emphasizes the study of offenses to find out the offender's home
base. It involves the prediction of an offender's residential area by examining the spatial
distribution of serial offenses.

In his circle theory, Professor Canter came up with two models - The Marauder and the
Commuter. The marauder is the serial offender who commits crime within his home base, while
the commuter travels a distance from his home to commit crime. For Canter, there is a causal
relationship between the marauder and his home base as opposed to the commuter model where
there is no causal relationship.

In order to test the circle theory, Godwin and Canter in 1997 carried out a study in the United
States involving 54 male US serial killers. 127 These 54 serial killers were only those who were
convicted of at least 10 murders on different dates and at different locations. Godwin and Canter
gathered data from various police departments in the US and also studied 540 victims. Their
study was based on the following hypothesis:
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(1) The home operates as a focus for the activities of serial killers in apprehending their victims
and leaving their bodies. The focus is hypothesized as being the most likely center of gravity
of their actions.

(2) There will be differences in the distances traveled to apprehend victims and to leave their
bodies. It is proposed that the dumping of the body carries most evidential implications and
therefore is likely to be a further distance as well as being more likely to be shaped by
buffering processes.

(3) The distances serial killers travel to dump the victims' bodies are likely to change
systematically over time while the victims' points of fatal encounter locations are not. The
counter-intuitive possibility that this change relates to an increasing incorporation of all his
killing activities into his domestic area will also be tested. 128

Their study showed the home as a focus of serial murder, which implies that serial killers
are most likely to apprehend nearly all their victims near their home (serial killer's
home).129 Their study also "indicates that the offenders, on average, tended to make
initial contact with their victims closer to home than the locations in which they
eventually place the bodies"13o. This study further showed that "as the number of murders
increases, killers generally cover a narrower area in which to leave the bodies of their
victims, until the ninth and tenth offenses where the offender may be disposing of bodies
quite close to his home. This pattern contrasts markedly with the locations at which the
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initial contact is made with the victim. All ten of the murders in the sequences studied
here tended to be close to the home base of the offender, typically less than a couple of
miles from his residence" 131. In a nutshell, Godwin and Canter concluded that as the
series of offenses progresses, the sites where the serial offender dumps the bodies of
victims get closer to the offender's home, and that this could be as a result of the serial
offender trying to reduce the risks associated with transporting the body, and could also
be that the offender has gained more confidence.

Obviously, this study by Godwin and Canter is very useful for investigators in making
decisions as to the first areas to search for suspects. This however, has to be approached
with extreme caution. In fact, Godwin and Canter even drew attention to this issue and
they called for more research to explore this process, arguing that "the systematic
changing of locations and distances relative to the home base may be a deliberate ploy to
distract police attention from the killer's home base" \32. Above all, no investigator can
really be sure of the number of victims and the locations in any serial killing case.
Godwin and Canter suggested that "investigative efforts should go into interviewing
people within the neighborhood from which victims go missing in order to pinpoint
precisely the address or location where the victim may have been last seen.,,133
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It should be noted at this point that Investigative Psychology approach uses a statistical
analysis method called Multi-dimensional Scaling (MDS). There are different types of
MDS and IP uses the type called Smallest Space Analysis. "In very simplistic terms
multi-dimensional scaling is a method of statistically analyzing the relationships between
multiple variables simultaneously" 134. For a more detailed discussion of the MDS, please
see the work of Palermo and Kocsis.

135

Data analyzed using MDS enable the creation of a diagram
within which the variables under consideration can be
individually plotted. Where these variables appear within a
diagram (i.e. plotted) denotes the relationship they hold with
each other. Consequently, variables that are plotted in a
region of space close together hold a relationship with each
other. The closer any variables are plotted together, the
stronger their relationship or association. The opposite
applies with variables appearing far apart in a MDS diagram
indicating that the variables hold few similarities in that case.
Furthermore, variables that appear in a location between
other variables can be interpreted as holding some central or
common relationship. In addition to the relationship plotted
variables may have with each other in MDS diagram, their
respective positions also convey some impression of their
distinctiveness. Thus, variables that appear closer to the
center of a MDS diagram are typically found to be commonly
occurring variables, where as those that are plotted in the
outlying rejions of a MDS diagram, are said to be more
distinctive. 1 6

Investigative psychology approach seems to have advantage over the other approaches
and has been well received by many scholars. Muller, for instance, maintained that
134
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"unlike CSA, IP was designed from the beginning with science in mind but this does not
mean that it is a science in itself. Canter and his colleagues have attempted to use
established psychological principles and research methodology to create a discipline that
is empirically sound and open to peer review. IP has a great deal of potential to become a
science, but it still has a long way to go before it will be recognized as a discipline in
itself' 137. Muller further noted that IP has the advantage that it falls under the established
science of psychology or criminology, arguing that "as such, most of the theories that
have been formulated as part of IP are constructed in such a way that can be easily
falsified,,]38. This is in fact where IP appears to be of more value and stronger than the
other approaches. One can safely say therefore, that if any approach is capable of
becoming genuinely scientific on its own, then it is IP.

On a similar vem, Ainsworth maintained that "while Canter's work shares some
commonalities with that developed by the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit, he has tried to
place his approach within an accepted psychological framework. Canter believes that as a
branch of applied psychology, his work goes beyond what is traditionally thought of as
offender profiling. Canter's early work tried to understand the type of crime in which any
one individual might be likely to become involved, and he also considered the way in
which such a crime might be carried out. Most importantly, Canter tried to establish
whether the way in which an offender's behaviour while committing a crime mirrored
their behaviour in everyday life. Canter suggested for example, that in their choice of
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victims, offenders will only select people who, even within non-offending behaviour, are
important to them. Canter supports this viewpoint by reference to the fact that the vast
majority of serial killers target victims within their own ethnic groUp.,,139

The Investigative Psychology approach has undoubtedly been criticized. Egger argued
that IP practitioners lack police/law enforcement experience and also that IP does not
make use of interview data of a wide range of offenders. Egger further argued that this
approach psychology relies heavily upon victim information. 140

Petherick was also critical of IP's model of offender behavior. He noted that "there is
little available to tell the practitioner how to apply this model to an actual investigation.
The original study that was done to develop the model was retrospective, that is, used
solved cases where both the location of the offender's home and crimes were known.
This must bring the practical application of this model into question, as it it would be
practically impossible to know whether you were dealing with a marauder or a commuter
with an unknown offender. The distances defined by the criminal range and home range
are also problematic, as there is no clear relationship between the size or location of the
criminal range and the distance it is from the offender's home,,141.
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Similarly, Ainsworth contended that "if one takes Canter's Circle Theory we can see
some of the difficulties which can be encountered. His theory relies on one being able to
draw a circle around all of an offender's crimes. Given some of the arguments presented
... , we must question how feasible this is. Not all crimes will be reported or recorded, and
even those may be recorded inaccurately. Furthermore, in the real world of police
investigation it will not be particularly easy to establish whether a series of crimes has
been committed by the same individual" 142. The statistical analysis adopted by IP can
only be useful if it is based on accurate data.

Wilson et al were also highly critical of investigative psychology. They argued that:
A weakness of Canter's work is that to date it does not
necessarily offer anything new, although contributions from
the field of environmental psychology do provide new
avenues to explore. What it does do is encouch known
criminological or psychological principles in ways that can
be useful to the crime investigator. It utilizes the same factors
as the FBI but places them firmly within psychological
theory and methodology. It is not yet clear how well Canter's
theories (especially circle theory) will be adapted for use in
the United States with its higher rate of serial crime, its
greater penchant for mobility, and its more vast urban
.
.
.
143
enVIronment In many regIOns.

Muller did not agree with this criticism by Wilson et al. For Muller "this is probably a
somewhat extreme view, as applying the application of psychological knowledge to
criminal investigation potentially has great value. Canter has shown that the application
of psychological principles and methodologies can, for example, help identify where the
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offender might live and what his job might be (e.g., Godwin and Canter, 1997). It is very
easy for those in academia to remain aloof and remote from the real world, yet this is an
attempt to make some practical use of psychology by applying it to genuine social
problems".144 Indeed, the statement by Wilson et al is an overreaction. As we mentioned
earlier on, if any approach to offender profiling has the potential of being generally
accepted as scientific, then it is the IP approach. As we can see from the above
discussion, IP is based on psychological theories. Research in the field of psychology is
peer reviewed and accepted.

The mam difference between the FBI approach and the investigative psychology
approach is that the FBI approach is mainly drawn from crime scene analysis while
investigative psychology approach goes further with the application of psychological
theories/principles .
... whilst sharing some characteristics with the FBI's approach it
does differ in a number of ways. For example, Canter and
Heritage used statistical analysis in order to establish connections
between various elements in rape behaviour. Publication of their
methods and techniques also allowed other researchers to
examine their work. Based on this, those who wished to do so
could replicate the study but perhaps varying the method slightly.
They may, for example, use different type of statistical analysis
in order to test whether the conclusions remained the same under
such conditions. The point is that by disclosing their methods
and findings in an appropriate journal, researchers such as Canter
and Heritage allowed the academic community to scutinize their
work and to comment upon it. One of the reasons why the FBI's
work has come in for so much criticism is that such an
opportunity has never been afforded those who might wish to test
the reliability or validity of their claims. 145
144

145

Muller, supra note 112, at 252.
A'
lllsworth, supra note 6, at 123.

89

In the final analysis, one can safely say that even though Canter's investigative
psychology approach offers a more scientific basis to offender profiling (based on
psychological principles, and the use of statistical analysis), it still does not provide a
way of using the profiles to point to specific offenders. Nevertheless, Canter has made
and is still continuing to make very important contributions to the understanding of the
theory and practice of offender profiling. The main strength of investigative psychology
approach lies in the attempts to predict the location of serial offenders, by analyzing the
spatial distribution of offenses.

Geographic Profiling

Geographic profiling was developed in 1995 by D. Kim Rossmo, a former police officer
with the Vancouver City Police Department. Rossmo sees geographic profiling as "a
strategic information management system used in the investigation of serial violent
crime,,146. He maintained that "this methodology was designed to help alleviate the
problem of information overload that usually accompanies such cases", arguing that "by
knowing the most probable area of offender residence, police agencies can more
effectively utilize their limited resources, and a variety of investigative strategies have
now been developed to maximize the utility of this process for unsolved cases".147
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Drawing ideas from environmental psychology and investigative psychology, geographic
profiling "focuses on the probable spatial behaviour of the offender within the context of
the locations of, and the spatial relationships between the various crime sites.,,)48

Geographic profiling uses a computer program to analyze crime scene locations in an
attempt to predict the likely residence of the offender. This computerized program is
known as Criminal Geographic Targeting (CGT). Rossmo believed that "by examining
the spatial information associated with a series of crime sites, the CGT model produces a
three-dimensional probability distribution termed a 'jeopardy surface', the 'height' of
which at any point represents the likelihood of offender residence or workplace. The
jeopardy surface is then superimposed on a street of the area of the crimes; such maps are
termed 'geoprofiles' and use a range of colours to represent varying probabilities. A
geoprofile can be thought of as a fingerprint of the offender's cognitive map,,)49.
Geographic profiling is made up of two components - quantitative or objective and
qualitative or subjective. "The subjective component of geographic profiling is based
primarily on a reconstruction and interpretation of the offender's mental map") 50.

Geographic profiling approach has been criticized on many grounds. Many scholars have
argued that Geographic profiling is not an approach on its own. Palermo and Kocsis, for
instance, argued that "one pertinent issue to consider is the likely efficacy of geographic
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profiling in contributing beyond what can be ascertained by common knowledge,,15l.
Indeed geographic profiling seems to be more of an aid to the investigative psychology
approach than an approach on its own. Palermo and Kocsis further maintained that
"although geographic profiling as a technique appears potentially useful, it is perhaps
best when supplemented by other investigatory measures that attempt to predict
information that may assist in the detection and apprehension of an offender". 152

Petherick contended that Rossmo "claimed that his profiling method requires a
psychological profile before a geographic profile can be produced, yet he has been noted
to have produced a geographic profile without a psychological profile,,153. As such "the
result of ignoring important behavioral and case context and not utilizing fully drawn
profiles is that geographic profiling does not, and cannot, differentiate between two or
more offenders operating in the same geographic area,,154.

Similarly, McGrath argued that "difficulties would include cases with a small number of
known linked crimes and cases where linked crime scenes have not been identified or
even discovered,,155. "Also, the underlying theories are mostly drawn from databases
related to burglaries and other crimes that may not translate well to the serial murderer or
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rapist, and these theories relate to overall crime patterns, not individual crimes or crime
series. Research on the connection between spatial coordinates and offender and victim
variables continues, but at present, geographic profiling is probably best viewed as an
adjunct to criminal profiling and not as a profiling process in and of itself ,1 56.

Geographic profiling is clearly a useful aid to crime investigation, but whether it qualifies
as an approach on its own is a different matter. It does appear however, that geographic
profiling is best construed as an aspect of the investigative psychology approach.

Behavioral Evidence Analysis (BEA)

Behavioral Evidence Analysis also known as the deductive method of criminal profiling
was developed by Brent E. Turvey, an American forensic scientist. In 1999, and
following his interview with Jerome Brudos, an American serial killer, Turvey noted that
police case files differed from Brudo's own accounts, and therefore concluded that it is
totally wrong to accept the premises on which the earlier profiling approaches based their
profiles, and he came up with his new approach. Behavioral evidence analysis is
primarily based on the availability of physical evidence. Turvey was very critical of the
assumptions and inferences made by the other approaches (i.e. diagnostic evaluation, FBI
approach and investigative psychology), and therefore argued that "a full forensic
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analysis must be perfonned on all available physical evidence before this type of
' can b
' ,,157 .
pro fil1 mg
egm

Fundamentally, Turvey maintained that BEA produces a deductive criminal profile as
opposed to an inductive one. For him, "a deductive criminal profile is a set of offender
characteristics that are reasoned from the convergence of physical and behavioralevidence patterns within a crime or a series of related crimes. Pertinent physical evidence
suggestive of behavior, victimology, and crime scene characteristics are included in the
structure of a written profile to support any arguments regarding offender

,

I~

characteristics" 158. On the other hand, Turvey sees an inductive criminal profile as "any

'I

method that describes, or bases its inferences on the characteristics of a typical offender

I'"

type. This includes the employment of broad generalizations, statistical analysis, or
intuition and experience" I 59.

Turvey maintained that the infonnation used to argue a deductive criminal profile
includes the following. 160
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(1) Forensic and Behavioral Evidence (Equivocal Forensic Analysis)
This involves the examination of any physical evidence that was gathered. It also
includes an examination of victim and witness statements, crime scene photographs as
well as crime scene reports.

(2) Victimology
This involves a detailed examination of background information about the victim. Here,
the profiler should look at the victim's occupation, drug and alcohol use, hobbies, family,
friends, and criminal records. It is believed that by studying the victim characteristics,
that investigators and pro filers may have an idea as to the motives of the crime. Similarly,
the risk assessment level of the victim should also be carried out. It is generally accepted
that prostitutes, for instance, carry a very high risk assessment level.

(3) Crime-scene characteristics
Here the profiler examines the crime scene to try and establish such things as the time of
attack, type of weapons used, method of gaining entry, type of location, and other crime
scene features. Anything that the offender said or did during the attack should also be
noted. The profiler should also try to ascertain whether the crime scene is staged. 161 Then
the criminal profile is produced.

Turvey further argued that deductive criminal profiling has two phases - investigative
phase and the trial phase. "The investigative phase of criminal profiling generally
161

Id, at 29.
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involves behavioral analysis of the patterns of unknown offenders for known crimes,,162,
while the trial phase "involves behavioral evidence analysis of known crimes for which
there is a suspect or a defendant (sometimes a convicted defendant); this takes place in
the preparation for both hearings and trials (criminal, penalty, and/or appeal phases of the
trial are all appropriate times to use profiling technique" 163.

This approach has undoubtedly been criticized. Kocsis maintained that "there are
however, some significant limitations in describing BEA as a distinct approach to
profiling as it does not appear to be informed by a discreet substantive body of original
empirical research. Instead, what BEA offers in some respects is a fusion of previous
criminological literature on various forms of violent crime, the forensic sciences and
philosophical concepts related to modes of reasoning, most

notably, inductive vs

deductive reasoning. BEA seems to hypothesize that a method of analysis is possible,
whereby crimes may be interpreted for the purpose of profiling by adopting deductive
reasoning processes as opposed to inductive ones. Given our current understanding of
how the human mind functions and cognitively processes information in a heterogeneous
fashion, some inherent difficulties exist with such a hypothesis. 164

There is still debate as to whether BEA can be properly seen as an approach on its own.
The point however, remains that BEA still cannot point to a special offender being
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responsible for a certain crime, and also has not established any scientific basis. Turvey
even admitted this and he wrote: "any discipline that involves interpreting the multidimensional nature of human behavior cannot be referred to as a hard science with a
straight face. However, it does demonstrate that the deductive method of profiling can be
informed by the same thinking strategies,,165. Finally, there is an over-reliance on the
availability of physical evidence by BEA.

Crime Action Profiling (CAP)

In an analogous manner the research strands of CAP have
studied both the behavioral patterns inherent to violent
crimes (akin to psychology's study of mental disease) as
well as the structure, processes, accuracy and skills
related to constructing profiles (akin to the clinical
practice of psychology). This is a distinguishing feature
of CAP as other approaches to profiling have
predominately focused solely on the study of offender
typologies and have for the most part, largely ignored
such issues related to the practical concept of
constructing a profile. 166

Crime Action Profiling was developed by Richard N. Kocsis, an Australian forensic
psychologist. Based on his clinical knowledge and research literature, Kocsis maintained
that profiling has its foundation in forensic psychology. "As a consequence, this
conception of profiling assumes knowledge of human behavior and psychology such as
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personality dynamics and human psychopathologies,,167. Kocsis claimed that he became
fully involved in offender profiling when he was approached by the Australian Police to
assist them in a high profile serial murder case.

Crime action profiling, in the words of Kocsis "is used to describe and signify this
process relating to the consideration of crime actions and the prediction, or profiling, of
offender characteristics from those actions" 168 . Basically, crime action profiling tries to
"examine offense behaviors independent of any inferred motivations,,169.

In analyzing patterns of crime behaviors, CAP uses the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS)
method of statistical analysis. MDS is made up of various types and CAP uses the type
called SYSTAT. This approach also uses cluster analysis, conical correlation and
mathematical formulae to "plot the orientation of the offender characteristic vector

Crime action profiling is the newest 'approach' to offender profiling and as such not a lot
of reviews and research has been carried out. Nevertheless, CAP has contributed to the
efforts to find a scientific basis to offender profiling.
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All the different approaches to offender profiling have their strengths and weaknesses,
and it is only when they come together as a team that offender profiling will muster a
scientific basis, gain general recognition in the various disciplines, and easily pass the

Daubert legal admissibility test/standard. The greatest strength of the diagnostic
evaluation approach lies in its ability to provide better explanations on the motivations
underlying certain criminal actions. The FBI approach shows much strength in its various
classification methods. The FBI's classification of offenders into organized and
disorganized offenders and their classification of crime scenes and rapists have proved to
be very useful. Investigative psychology's greatest strength is in its ability to apply
psychological theories, and using statistical analysis, in trying to predict the residential
location of serial offenders.
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Chapter Three
Expert Testimony: The Conflicting Rules and Standards

Under virtually all evidence codes, trial courts must
evaluate the admissibility of proffered expert testimony.
The manner in which they accomplish this task,
however, varies greatly among jurisdictions. This
variability revolves around two basic aspects of the
admissibility determination. The first concerns the
nature and rigor of the legal test to be applied. Courts
differ substantially in the ways they define the judge's
role concerning scientific evidence, with some adopting
an active role in screening the evidence and others
taking little or no responsibility to check the evidence.
The second concerns the criteria used to assess the
expertise under whatever legal test is adopted. Some
courts use criteria that call for deference to the
professional opinion of experts from the respective
field, where as others assume the responsibility
themselves to evaluate the scientific basis of the
proffered opinion.l?l

The admissibility of any form of scientific evidence has always been problematic, full of
controversy and inconsistencies. The introduction of scientific evidence into the
courtroom can sway a case one way or the other. In fact, Peterson et al noted that "about
one quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific
evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have changed their
verdicts - from guilty to not guilty.,,172 The courts are fully aware of this and therefore,
special rules have been adopted by many courts when deciding whether to admit or
exclude any scientific evidence. New scientific techniques and fields of knowledge
171
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emerge and the court must be satisfied, not only that the witness is qualified, but whether
such evidence should be given. 173 In fact, "admitting unreliable, unproven data can be as
prejudicial as excluding sound evidence that is merely unfamiliar to the courts and
society in general. Distinguishing between sound and unreliable evidence is especially
problematic given the rapid developments in scientific knowledge and the possible
appearance to those not educated in the area that scientific results are infallible. To keep
pace with such a progressive area, the courts must be dynamic in their approach and
accept new developments in these specialized areas.,,174

Many scholars have put forward the justifications for these special rules and admissibility
hurdles that have to be overcome before presenting any scientific evidence. Friedland et
aI, for instance, have given four justifications for these special hurdles as follows: (1) an
"aura of infallibility" surrounded the evidence so that a jury was unlikely independently
to evaluate, or to be skeptical of, its worth; (2) scientific evidence relies on such arcane
information that it will be very difficult for jurors to evaluate its worth, even if they are
not "overawed" by any view of science as infallible; therefore, jurors just won't try, it
being easier simply to take the expert's word; (3) the evidence is so unfamiliar to the
courts that judges will have difficulty guiding juries on how fairly to evaluate it; and (4)
the evidence "invades the province of the jury in a particularly powerful way, such as liedetector test results determining for the jury who speaks "truth" and who does not".175
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Frye v. United States

In United States, the decision in Frye v. United States 176 (also known as the General
Acceptance Rule) was the main rule that governed the admissibility of scientific evidence
for seventy years (1923 - 1993). Frye is a 1923 decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a case that involved the admissibility of opinion
evidence derived from a systolic blood pressure deception test.

In this case, the defendant, James Alphonzo Frye was convicted of the murder of Dr.
Robert W. Brown, in the second degree. During the trial, the defendant sought to
introduce testimony based on systolic blood pressure deception test. This is the early
form of the polygraph lie-detector test. The systolic blood pressure deception test is based
on the theory that "truth is spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the
utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood
pressure. The rise thus produced is easily detected and distinguished from the rise
produced by mere fear of the examination itself. In the former instance, the pressure rises
higher than in the latter, and is more pronounced as the examination proceeds, while in
the latter case, if the subject is telling the truth, the pressure registers highest at the
beginning of the examination, and gradually diminishes as the examination proceeds.,,177

It should be noted that before the trial, the defendant was subjected to this test and it

showed that he was telling the truth when he denied that he committed the murder. He
176
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therefore, prayed the court to accept the testimony of Dr. William Moulton Martson (the
inventor of the test), which supported his plea of innocence. The government counsel
raised an objection which was sustained. The defense counsel further offered to have Dr.
Martson conduct a new test in the presence of the jury, the government counsel again
raised an objection, which was also sustained. The trial court excluded the testimony. The
defendant was convicted and he appealed.

In their brief, counsel for the defendant, Richard V. Mattingly and Foster Wood, stated
that:
The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled
witnesses are admissible in evidence in those
cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that
inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove
capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for
the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes
of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous
habit or experience or study of it, in order to
acquire a knowledge of it. When the question
involved does not lie within the range of common
experience or common knowledge, but requires
special experience or common knowledge, then
the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular
science, art, or trade to which the question relates
' 'bl'
are admISSI
e III eVI'd ence. 178

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the
testimony and held that "the systolic blood pressure deception has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as
would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
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development, and experiments thus far made.,,179 Fundamentally, the court stated that
scientific evidence is admissible if is generally accepted that the methods and principles
underlying it had achieved widespread acceptance in the relevant discipline. Justice Van
Orsdel, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses
the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs. 180

The Court in Frye did not cite any authority in formulating the new rule. This decision
raised several questions. What exactly was the "thing" that must be sufficiently
established? What is the "relevant scientific community"? Who defines it? How do
judges determine "general acceptance"? Does Frye require that general acceptance within
the scientific community be established by disinterested scientists? 181

The Frye test became the main rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence but
courts and scholars battled with answers to the above questions. Starrs maintained that
"the Frye court does not inform us in what way the expert testimony proffered in the trial
court was defective. Surely it was unacceptable for lack of general acceptance. But what
179
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precisely was not generally accepted? Was it the validity of the principle that deception is
reflected in discernible changes in the blood pressure of the prevaricator? Or was it,
rather, the validity of the systolic blood pressure test (the sphygmomanometer) to detect
such alterations in blood pressure?,,182.

Identifying what relevant community a technique falls also proved very problematic, and
courts battled to arrive at an acceptable way. The identification of the discipline to which
the "thing" falls is a very determinative factor in any trial involving scientific evidence.
Thus, "if the relevant scientific field requirement is construed broadly, the Frye test acts
as a formidable barrier to admissibility. In Cornet v. State,183 for example, the relevant
scientific community for purposes of spectrograph (voiceprint) analysis was held to
include engineers, linguists, and psychologists, as well as those who use voice
spectrography for identification purposes. Because different disciplines do not share a
common view of a particular scientific method, the burden of establishing general
acceptance is undoubtedly onerous. Consequently, the broader the construction of the
relevant scientific field, the less likely the party will be able to utilize the novel scientific
evidence,,184.

On a similar vein, Moenssens noted that "some courts have determined the proper field
without difficulty, but other courts have had difficulty with this step of the analysis.
182 James E. Starrs, "A Still-Life Watercolor: Frye v. United States", Journal of Forensic Sciences, Vol. 27,
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Occasionally, new techniques compound the problem by combining elements of several
disciplines, with no discipline claiming the novel process as its own. An imaginative
expert who develops a new technique may be considered radical by his conservative
peers, who may reject the technique regardless of its validity. Alternatively, a discipline
may accept a new technique simply because the technique promotes the overall
objectives of the discipline. The discipline might accept the new technique, therefore,
without requiring objective scientific validation of the underlying postulates.,,185
Moenssens gave the example of sound spectrographic voice identification technique
where there were arguments as to which field the technique should be generally accepted.
Is it the field of radio communications, speech and audiology, fingerprint identification,
or voice examination? 186

As we mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals in Frye did not cite any authority or give
any explanations/justifications for formulating the general acceptance rule. Other courts
however, have defended the decision and offered some justifications. In fact, three major
court rulings have justified Frye and stated the advantages of the rule.

First, in United States v. Addison,187 the Court stated that the Frye test ensures that there
exist a minimal reserve of experts who can examine the validity of any scientific
evidence. The case involved two defendants - Roland Addison and Henry Raymond, who
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were both convicted by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
They were both convicted of assault with intent to kill while armed, and assault on a
member of the police force with a dangerous weapon. Henry Raymond was additionally
charged and convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon.

During the trial, the government counsel proffered evidence of voice print analysis
(spectrographic identification) that proved that the defendant, Raymond made the
telephone call to which a police officer, Sergeant Wilkins was responding when he was
shot. Lieutenant Ernest Nash, a voice technician at the Michigan State Police
Department, gave expert testimony that the voice print analysis showed that Raymond
made the call that led the police officer to the scene where he was shot. It should be noted
that Raymond raised an objection to the order requiring him to submit his voice sample
for analysis. He argued that the order violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. He
also contended that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his
counsel was denied adequate time to consider the new scientific technique and the
associated novel issues.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in admitting the voice
print analysis evidence. The Court also ruled, however, that the jury's judgment was not
substantially swayed by the error and therefore affirmed the conviction. The Court held
that "spectrographic identification of defendant as maker of telephone call to which
police officer was responding when shot was not sufficiently accepted by scientific
community as a whole to form a basis for jury's determination of guilt or innocence, and
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was inadmissible, but erroneous admission of testimony based on spectrogram did not
fatally infect jury's verdict and did not require reversal, in light of overwhelming
evidence of guilt.,,188

Circuit Judge, McGowan, stated that the decision in Frye v. United States was "the
standard by which questions of admissibility of expert testimony based on new methods
of scientific measurements are to be resolved.,,189 The Court defended Frye and stated
that:
The requirement of general acceptance in the scientific
community assures that those most qualified to assess the
general validity of a scientific method will have the
determinative voice. Additionally, the Frye test protects
prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal
reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the
validity of a scientific determination in a particular case.
Since scientific proof may in some instances assume a
posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of
laymen, the ability to produce rebuttal experts, equally
conversant with the mechanics and methods of a
. I ar techmque,
.
' I .190
partlcu
may prove to b
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In People v. Kelly, 191 another case that involved voice print analysis, the Supreme Court
of California also justified the decision in Frye, stating that the Frye test ensures
uniformity of judicial decisions. The case involved Robert Emmett Kelly who was
convicted of extortion by the Superior Court, Orange County, California. The extortion
arose from several anonymous and threatening telephone calls that the defendant made to
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Terry Waskin. The police, with Waskin's consent, tape-recorded two of the telephone
calls. A police informant later identified the defendant as the person whose voice was on
the tapes. The defendant's voice examplar and the two tape recorded calls were sent to
Lieutenant Ernest Nash, the voice print analysis technician at Michigan State Police
Department for analysis. Lt. Nash concluded that the voices on the tapes were that of the
defendant, and he was allowed to testify. The trial court ruled that voice print analysis has
achieved sufficient scientific acceptance and therefore the expert's testimony was
admissible. Kelly was convicted and he appealed.

The defendant argued that (1) Lieutenant Nash, the VOIce print expert, failed to
sufficiently establish that the technique has achieved general acceptance in the scientific
community; (2) that Lt. Nash was not qualified as an expert, and, (3) that the procedure
was not carried out in a fair and impartial manner. In its ruling, the Supreme Court of
California stated that voice print analysis had not achieved general scientific acceptance
as a reliable technique and that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony. The Court
therefore, reversed the judgment of conviction. The Court held that the "testimony by
police officer who was head of voice identification unit for a state police force and who
had extensive experience with voice print analysis was insufficient to establish that the
voice print was generally regarded as reliable in the scientific community; and that error

.
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The Supreme Court of California, in reversing the judgment also stated that, "we have
expressly adopted the foregoing Frye test and California courts, when faced with a novel
method of proof, have required a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new
technique in the relevant scientific community. . .. we are satisfied that there is ample
justification for the exercise of considerable judicial caution in the acceptance of
evidence developed by new scientific techniques.,,193

The Court re-stated the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's
decision in United States v. Addison

194

and added that:

Moreover, a beneficial consequence of the Frye test is
that it may well promote a degree of uniformity of
decision. Individual judges whose particular
conclusions may differ regarding the reliability of a
particular scientific evidence, may discover
substantial agreement and consensus in the scientific
community." 195

Hence, "for all the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded by the wisdom of, and reaffirm
our allegiance to, the Frye decision and the "general acceptance" rule which that case
mandates." 196

The third major case where a court justified the decision in Frye was in Reed v. State, 197
where the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that Frye ensures judicial economy, by
193
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avoiding the time-consuming examination and cross-examination of witnesses. In this
case, the defendant James Reed was convicted of rape, unnatural and perverted sex acts,
robbery, verbal threats, and unlawful use of telephone, by the Circuit Court, Montgomery
County in Maryland. The facts of the case are that in September 1974, a woman was
raped outside her home in Montgomery County, Maryland. She reported the rape to the
police. The following day, she received a telephone call from a man saying that he was
the person who raped her. She immediately called the police, and it was decided that her
telephone calls should be tape-recorded in case the assailant called again. As the police
predicted, the assailant called several times within three days. During one of the
telephone calls, the assailant told the woman that he would like to have sexual intercourse
with her again, but the woman said no, and offered to pay the assailant $1,000 dollars so
that he can leave her alone. The assailant called again to accept the offer and instructed
her to go and leave the money inside one of the lockers in the locker room of the
Greyhound Bus Station in the District of Columbia. By this time, the police put the locker
room under surveillance and when the assailant came to collect the money, he was
arrested.

DUring the trial, the defendant was ordered to submit a voice examplar, which was then
sent to the voice identification unit at Michigan State Police Department for analysis. The
defendant's voice examplar was compared to those recorded on the tapes, but the results
were deemed inconclusive. The defendant was ordered to submit another voice examplar
and the second voice print analysis showed that there is a match. The voice print expert
Was allowed to testify in court identifying Reed as the person who made the calls. The

III

jury could not reach a decision after two and half days of deliberation, and a mistrial was
declared. However, there was a retrial in March 1976 and Reed was convicted. The
defendant appealed, arguing that the voice print analysis should not have been admitted
because the technique is not generally accepted by the scientific community as being
sufficiently reliable; and also that the second request for his voice examplar is a violation
of the Best Evidence Rule.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded
with directions. It was held that "testimony based on "voiceprints" or spectrograph is
inadmissible in Maryland courts as evidence of voice identification because, at the
present time, such technique has not reached the required standard of acceptance in the
scientific community.,,198 The Court went on to justify the Frye test and stated that:
Without the Frye test or something similar, the reliability of
an experimental scientific technique is likely to become a
central issue in each trial in which it is introduced, as long
as there remains serious disagreement in the scientific
community over its reliability. Again and again, the
examination and cross-examination of expert witnesses will
be as protracted and time-consuming as it was at the trial in
the instant case, and proceedings may well degenerate into
trials of the technique itself. The Frye test is designed to
forestall this difficulty as well. 199

The Frye test standard has been adopted by many states. It should be noted however, that
Frye has faced a lot of criticisms. First, Frye has been criticized because it did not "cite
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any policy justification for the general acceptance standard: the court merely mandated
the standard as ipse dixit.,,200

"Another asserted weakness of the Frye approach concerns the difficulty of ascertaining
when a scientific proposition has been generally accepted. The test does not specify what
proportion of experts constitute general acceptance. Courts have never required
unanimity, and anything less than full consensus in science can quickly resemble
substantial disagreement. In fact, the most rigorous fields with the healthiest scientific
discourse might fail the Frye test with the greatest frequency. In light of the skeptical
perspective of good scientific investigation, judges should be cautious when they
approach a field in which there is too much agreement.,,201

Moreover, the Frye test requires general acceptance in the
particular field. But there are no standards defining which
field to consult. Courts have had considerable difficulty
assessing scientific information under this standard because
it often extends into more than one academic or
professional discipline. Furthermore, each field may
contain subspecialities. This difficulty leads to paradoxical
results. General acceptance, often criticized for being the
most conservative test of admissibility, in practice can
produce the most liberal standards of admission. The more
narrowly a court defines the pertinent field, the more
agreement it is likely to find. The general acceptance test
thus degenerates into a process of deciding whose noses to
count. The definition of the pertinent field can be overinclusive or under-inclusive. Because the pertinent field can

Edward 1. Imwinkelried, "The Importance of Daubert in Frye Jurisdictions", 42 Crim. Law Bulletin 5
(March - April 2006).
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be so readily manipulated, the test by itself grovides courts
with little protection against shoddy science. 02

Faigman et al further argued that "under the Frye variant, because the courts have to rely
on the standards set within each field, they find themselves accepting more readily the
offerings of less rigorous fields and less readily the offerings of more rigorous fields.
Fields that set higher thresholds will place a smaller proportion of their knowledge over
the threshold. ,,203

Frye has also been criticized as being conservative. Frye appeared to exclude relevant

and reliable expert evidence until it has been generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community. Maletskos and Spielman argued that "a literal reading of Frye v. United
States would require that the courts always await the passing of a 'cultural lag' during

which period the new method will have had sufficient time to diffuse through scientific
discipline and create a requisite body of scientific opinion needed for acceptability. ,,204

Faigman et al also argued that Frye "imposes a protracted waiting period that valid
scientific evidence and techniques must endure before gaining legal acceptance.,,205 They
argued that "this criticism highlights the fact that all significant scientific findings gestate
before they are accepted by the general scientific community: During this time period
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courts and the parties before them are deprived of this work. Moreover, many critics also
note the "nature" of the scientific enterprise which sometimes responds negatively to
revolutionary findings, because they might threaten entrenched "paradigms" and thus
entrenched scientists. Proponents of this view observe that the opinions of a scientist
heralded today as brilliant, but dismissed in his day as misguided or worse, would be
excluded under a general acceptance test. Galileo, for example, or Einstein early in his
career, would not have been allowed to testify because of the radical nature of his
views. ,,206

In a similar vein, Giannelli maintained that:
Frye envisions an evolutionary process leading to the
admissibility of scientific evidence. A novel
technique must pass through an "experimental" stage
in which it is scrutinized by the scientific community.
Only after the technique has been tested successfully
in this stage and has passed into the "demonstrable"
stage will it receive judicial recognition. What is
unique about the Frye opinion is the standard it
establishes
for
distinguishing
between
the
experimental and demonstrable stages. In contrast to
the relevancy approach, it is not enough that a
qualified expert, or even several experts, believes that
a particular technique has entered the demonstrable
stage; Frye imposes a special burden - the technique
must be generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community. 207

206

Id.
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A case in point is Coppolino v. State,208 where the Court of Appeals of Florida rejected
the Frye test and was critical of the general acceptance rule. The defendant, Dr Carl
Coppolino, an anesthesiologist, was charged with the murder of his wife Carmela
Coppolino by poisoning. From the beginning, there was evidence showing that
Coppolino had bought some quantity of a substance called succinylcholine chloride,
about three months before the murder of his wife. During the trial, both the defense and
prosecution offered medical and scientific witnesses regarding the cause of death. The
expert witnesses for the State included Dr. Helpem (a pathologist), Dr. Umberger (a
toxicologist), Dr. La Du, and Dr. Cleveland. In his testimony, Dr. Helpem said that his
autopsy on the victim showed that she was in good health at the time of death. He also
said that even though the autopsy was inconclusive as to the cause of death, that he found
a needle injection tract in the left buttock of the deceased. He therefore, called Dr.
Umberger to perform chemical analysis and tests on the body tissues.

At the time of the trial, there were no known medical or scientific methods for detecting
the substance (succinic acid) in body tissues, but Dr. Umberger used various procedures
and was able for the first time in medical history to detect succinic acid in the body
tissue.
Dr. Umberger testified that he first performed a "general
unknown" test which was designed to disclose the
presence of certain drugs and poisons in the body tissue.
The results of this "general unknown" test were negative.
Dr Umberger then attempted to establish a method
whereby he could determine if unusual amounts of the
component parts of succinylcholine chloride were present
in the body issue. Dr. Umberger testified that some of his
tests and procedures were standard ones and that some
208
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were new. As a result of his tests Dr. Umberger reached
the conclusion, so testified, that Carmela Co~polino
received a toxic dose of succinylcholine chloride. 2 9

It should be noted that when Dr. Helpem was recalled, he testified that based on the

autopsy and on Dr. Umberger's findings that he concluded that the victim died from an
overdose of succinylcholine chloride. Dr. La Du also testified that he found a minute
quantity of succinylcholine chloride at the needle injection tract on the victim's left
buttocks, and therefore, was of the opinion that the victim died as a result of the
succinylcholine chloride. Dr. Cleveland also testified that based on the negative findings
in Dr. Helpem's autopsy report and the positive findings of Dr. Umberger, he was of the
opinion that the victim died as a result of an overdose of succinylcholine chloride.

It should also be noted that the State called Marjorie Farber to testify. She was Dr. Carl

Coppolino's lover between 1962 and 1964 during which time the defendant was married
to the victim. She testified that the defendant made certain incriminating statements
regarding the death of his wife during the time they had an affair. The defense raised an
objection but it was denied, and the testimony was admitted. The defendant called several
expert witnesses who testified that it was "impossible by medical scientists to
demonstrate the presence of succinylcholine chloride or its component parts in the body".
The defendant was however, convicted and he appealed. The defendant argued among
other things that:
(1) The scientific tests performed by Dr. Umberger were unreliable and scientifically

unacceptable, that their admission into evidence was error.
209

rd, at 69.
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(2) The trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury on second and
third degree murder and manslaughter.
(3) The trial judge erred by admitting into evidence the testimony given by Marjorie
Farber.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Florida, Second District, affirmed the trial court's
judgment and held that the defendant had failed to show that the trial judge abused his
discretion. It was also held that the trial court's instruction of the jury on the second and
third degree murder and manslaughter was not an error because under the authority of
Fla. Stat. Ch. 919.14, the jury was permitted to find defendant guilty of the degree
charged or lesser degree. The Court however, held that the trial court erred by admitting
the testimony given by Marjorie Farber. The Court stated that "we believe that the
testimony in question was irrelevant to the proper issues of the case, that its sole effect
was to attack the character of the accused and that the trial court erred by admitting it into
evidence. However, the fact that an error was committed in admitting testimony does not
automatically result in reversal, there must be a showing that such error was harmfully
prejudiced. ,,21 0

The Court of Appeal further stated that:
The tests by which the medical examiner sought to
determine whether death was caused by
succinylcholine chloride were novel and devised
specifically for this case. This does not render the
210

Id, at 72.
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evidence inadmissible. Society need not tolerate
homicide until there develops a body of medical
literature about some particular lethal agent. The
expert witnesses were examined and cross-examined
at great length and the jury could either believe or
doubt the prosecution's testimony as it chose. 211

The Frye test has also been criticized for leading to inconsistencies. Moenssens argued
that "the Frye rule has different meanings for forensic scientists, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges. To forensic scientists and prosecutors, the Frye rule is an obstacle
that often excludes evidence based on novel scientific techniques. Although the Frye rule
also prevents the defendants' novel scientific evidence from reaching the jury, defense
attorneys and the few forensic scientists who work with the defense bar see the rule as an
ineffective barrier to unreliable prosecution evidence. The meaning of the Frye rule to
judges is less clear. Many judges do not perceive the rule as a significant issue.,,212

Another criticism leveled against the Frye test is its inflexibility, confusion of issues, and
superfluity.213 McCormick argued that "procedures that operate within the framework of
general relevancy and expert testimony rules offer a more meaningful and effective
alternative. The values sought to be protected by Frye can be preserved without the cost
of its disadvantages. Factors that directly address the merit of new scientific
developments can be identified and delineated. They incorporate concepts that judges
understand and routinely use. At the same time, the rules allow necessary flexibility by
211

212
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turning the decision on the characteristics of the evidence as well as the characteristics of
the particular case. The relevant factors sharpen and define precise issues that should
affect the admissibility decision.,,214

It has also been argued that by focusing particularly on general acceptance, Frye obscures

other critical problems in the use of a particular technique. 215 Giannelli gave the
admissibility of neutron activation analysis (NAA) as an example, arguing that "under the

Frye courts have concentrated primarily on the general acceptance of NAA" and that
"this approach tends to conceal the most critical aspects of NAA - whether, as
interpreted, the results of the test are relevant to the issues in dispute.,,216

Following the criticisms of the Frye test, some scholars have suggested alternative rules
for admitting scientific evidence. Professor McCormick for instance, argued that the
"relevancy test" is an appropriate standard. He maintained that:
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition upon
the court's taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but
not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified expert witness should be received unless there
are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, its probative
value may be overborne by the familiar dangers of
prejudicing or misleading the jury, unfair surprise and
undue consumption of time. On this footing the novelty
and want of acceptance at that time of the lie-detector
lessened the probative value of the test and probably
heightened the danger of misleading the jury. If the courts
had used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed
214
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requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere
imposed, they might have arrived at some practical way
of utilizing a technique of investigation which has proved
so fertile as a means of ascertaining truth. 217

Fundamentally, McCormick argued that any scientific evidence should be admitted if it is
relevant to the facts of the case and if an expert testifies to its validity. Many scholars and
courts were very critical of this suggestion. In fact, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Reed v. State

218

addressed this suggestion from Professor McCormick. The Court stated

that judges and jurors are not equipped to assess the reliability of scientific techniques
when scientists disagree on the issue. The Court stated that:
This view seems to us unacceptable. It fails to recognize
that laymen should not on a case by case basis resolve a
dispute in the scientific community concerning the validity
of a new scientific technique. When the positions of the
contending factions are fixed in the scientific community, it
is evident that controversies will be resolved only by
further scientific analysis, studies and experiments. Juries
and judges, however, cannot experiment. If a judge or
jurors have no foundation, either in their experience or in
the accepted principles of scientists, on which they might
base an informed judgment, they will be left to follow their
fancy. Thus, courts should be properly reluctant to resolve
the disputes of science. "It is not for the law to experiment
but for science to do so," State v. Cary, supra, 99 N. J.
Super. at 332, 239 A. 2d at 684?19

Professor Richardson also called for the substitution of "general acceptance" by
"substantial acceptance." "Is the basis of admissibility to be universal acceptance by

217
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scientific thought? Is it to be general acceptance by science? Or is it to be substantial
acceptance which gives a reliable degree of credibility?,,22o Many scholars are not in
support of substituting "general acceptance with "substantial acceptance'. Murphy argued
that substantial acceptance is not any less amorphous or difficult to define as general
acceptance.

221

The establishment of a "Science Court" has also been suggested by Dr. Arthur
Kantrowitz, an American Scientist. He called for the establishment of a "Science Court"
to screen any new scientific technique before it is introduced into the courtroom?22 The
reasons for creating a science court are the "need for accurate information to serve as a
basis for deciding basic policy questions,,223 and the need for an institution that will "limit
to the power exercised by scientists.,,224 The science court will also "eliminate the
opportunity for policymakers to hide policy decisions behind scientific conclusions,,,225
as well as helping to ensure that "discredited claims should be identified, especially when
they arise in the course of public debate. ,,226
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Professor Giannelli maintained that the advantages of such a panel of experts and
tribunals are that the screening will be done by a group of scientists, that their evaluations
would be carried out by a group of scientists who have no financial or professional
interests in the technique, thereby solving the problem ofpartiality.227

However, the creation of a science court has been described as time consuming and
inconclusive.

228

Justice Bazelon supports the goals of a science court but finds some of

the court's features worrying. He maintained that a science court will be time consuming,
arguing that "a lengthy adversary proceeding, limited solely to factual issues, might well
exaggerate the importance of those issues, and might tend to diminish the importance of
the underlying value choices. A factual decision by a Science Court, surrounded by all
the mystique of both science and the law, might well have enormous, and unwarranted,
political impact.,,229 "Moreover, it is not entirely clear to me that all disputes among
either could or should be "resolved." Experts usually disagree not so much about the
objectively verifiable facts, but about the inferences that can be drawn from those facts.
And they disagree precisely because it is impossible to say with certainty which of those
. c

mlerences are "correct."
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In the final analysis, it should be noted that none of these suggested alternatives to Frye
was adopted. It seems that the Frye test has come to stay. In fact, Frye remained the main
rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence even after the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. As at today Frye is still the main admissibility rule in
many states. It is also noteworthy to point out that Frye has been adopted by arguably all
the highly litigious states like California, New York and Florida. 231

The Federal Rules of Evidence

The Federal Rules of Evidence goes as far back as 1961 when Chief Justice Earl Warren
appointed a Special Committee on Evidence, charged with the responsibility of finding
out how feasible and desirable a uniform code of evidence will be for federal courts. In
1962, the Special Committee recommended the adoption of federal rules of evidence.
Chief Justice Earl Warren therefore, appointed an Advisory Committee in 1965 to draft
the rules of evidence. In 1969, the first draft was published. A revised draft was also
published in 1971. In 1972, the United States Supreme Court promulgated the Federal
Rules of Evidence. It should be noted that:
Unlike prior procedural Rules, however, when the Supreme
Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Evidence on
November 20, 1972, questions were raised concerning the
Court's authority to prescribe certain Rules. The Rules
were promulgated pursuant to congressional enabling
231 For full details of all the states and the rules they have adopted, please see; David E. Berstein., and
Jeffrey D. Jackson, "The Daubert Trilogy in the States", 44 Jurimetrics 351 (2004).351 - 366., Joseph R.
Meaney, "From Frye to Daubert: Is a Pattern Unfolding?", 35 Jurimetrics J. 191 (1995) 191- 199., Heather
G. Hamilton, "The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where do the States Stand?", 38 Jurimetrics 201
(1998) 201 - 213.
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authority granting the Supreme Court the power to
prescribe rules governing the practice and procedure of
federal courts, provided that such Rules did not "abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right". Critics closely
scrutinized several of the Rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court in an effort to determine whether the Court
had exceeded its authority under the Enabling Act by
prescribing rules that were outside the scope of "practice
and procedure". The debate over whether the Supreme
Court had exceeded its power became moot, however,
when Congress intervened in the process with legislation
stipulating that the Federal Rules of Evidence would not
take effect until they were expressly approved by Congress.
While Congress thereafter revised the Supreme Court's
version of the Rules in specific, isolated provisions, it did
not reconstruct the design of the Rules. Its modifications
were limited to the revision of the specific text of discreet
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the vast
majority of the Supreme Court's version of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, as well as the integrity of the structure
of the Rules, were left intact by Congress when the rules
became effective on January 1975 ?32

Congressional hearings took place between

1973

and

1974. The House of

Representatives completed their hearings in February 1974 and the Senate in November
1974. It was then sent to President Gerald Ford who signed the Rules into law on January
2,1975. The Federal Rules of Evidence took effect on July 1,1975.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony.
Rule 702 states that:-

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert

Glen Weissenberger, "The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence", 53
Ohio St. L. J. 1307,1319 (1992).
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by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise?33

Rules 401, 402, 403, 703, 704 and 705 also affect the admissibility of expert scientific
testimony. It is therefore, very important to cite them at length.

234

Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence". "Relevant evidence" means evidence

having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. ,,235

Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.

"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.,,236

Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste

of Time. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the Issues,
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These Rules are also very important to our subsequent discussions.
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misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an
accused and admitted under Rule 404 (a)(2), evidence of the same trait of
character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the alleged of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the

127

prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.,,237

Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. "The facts or data in the particular

case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences, upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be
admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury
by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.,,238

Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue. (a) "Except as provided in subdivision (b),

testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(c) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element
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of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for
the trier of fact alone. ,,239

Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion. "The expert may
testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to
the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any
event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.,,24o

The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 raised one key question - did the
Federal Rules supersede the Frye test? This question was not addressed either in the
Advisory Committee Notes, the Congressional Hearing Committee Reports or during the
Congressional hearings. Trial courts were left to decide for themselves. Many courts
continued with Frye, some adopted the new Federal Rules, and some combined the two
rules.

In United States v. Smith,241 for instance, the court continued with the Frye test while at
the same time recognized the authority of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Delivering the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, Circuit Judge, Kanne said: "although the validity of the
judge-made rule in Frye has been criticized by some courts and commentators for
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numerous reasons, this circuit has continued to affirm (and to apply) the Frye
,,242
standar d .

In United States v. Downing,243 the court rejected Frye and adopted the new Federal
Rules of Evidence. The Third Circuit Court stated that Frye was inconsistent with the
Federal Rules of Evidence based upon the Rules' broad scope of relevance. In this case,
the Court of Appeals, through Circuit Judge Becker, held that, "the balance of this section
is devoted to a discussion of the perceived evidentiary problems posed by novel forms of
scientific expertise, generally, and to an analysis of the test announced in Frye v. United
States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), as a way of dealing with those test problems. We

conclude that the status of the Frye test under Rule 702 is somewhat uncertain, but reject
that test for reasons of policy. In section 1Y, we set forth an alternative standard for
evaluating novel scientific evidence that we believe comports with the language and
policy of Rule 702.,,244 "We reject the Frye test.,,245

The Court of Appeals further stated that:
In sum, the Frye test suffers from serious flaws. The test has
proved to be too malleable to provide the method for orderly
and uniform decision-making envisioned by some of its
proponents. Moreover, in its pristine form the general
acceptance standard reflects a conservative approach to the
admissibility of scientific evidence that is at odds with the
spirit, if not the precise language, of the Federal Rules of
242
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Evidence. For these reasons, we conclude that "general
acceptance in the particular field to which [a scientific
technique] belong," should be rejected as an independent
controlling standard of admissibility. Accordingly, we hold
that a particular degree of acceptance of a scientific
technique within the scientific community is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for admissibility; it is,
however, one factor that a district court normally should
consider in deciding whether to admit evidence based upon
246
the technique.
In State v. Kersting,247 it was held that "scientific evidence which is not generally
accepted may nevertheless be admitted if there is credible evidence on which the trial
judge can rely in making the initial determination that the technique is reasonably
reliable." The case involved Dennis Dean Kersting who was convicted of murder by the
Circuit Court, Multnomah County, Oregon, and he appealed. At the trial, the State
presented an expert who testified that certain hairs obtained from the defendant were
indistinguishable from or similar to hairs found on the victim. The defendant argued that
that this was irrelevant to the case.

At the Court of Appeals, the defendant argued that the scientific techniques used by the
State's expert were not generally accepted in the scientific community as being
reasonably reliable, therefore, the trial court erred by admitting the expert's testimony.
In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated that "where judicial notice may not be
taken properly because relatively new scientific techniques are involved, some
foundation is required as a prerequisite to admission of such evidence; however, only
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foundation required is that there be credible evidence on which the trial judge may make
the initial determination that the technique is reasonably reliable and, if so, the evidence
may be admitted and the weight to be given it is for the jury, who may consider evidence
as to its reliability.,,248 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and
granted review.

The case reached the Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc, which affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision. Delivering the judgment, Chief Justice Denecke, stated that "we
granted review solely to consider one contention made by the defendant. That contention
was that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the "reliability" test for the admission of
scientific testimony rather than the standard that scientific testimony must be based upon
methods generally accepted in the scientific community. Upon review of the record we
find that we cannot reach this issue. ,,249

The above case is quite in contrast to Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,250 where
both the Frye test and Federal Rules of Evidence were combined. The case involved
Rosemarie Christophersen (the surviving spouse of Albert Roy Christophersen,
deceased), and Steven Roy Christophersen, who sued Allied-Signal Corporation, alleging
that Albert Christophersen's death was as a result of exposure to fumes that contained
particles of nickel and cadmium, which caused the small-cell cancer that led to his death
in 1986. Albert Christophersen worked for fourteen consecutive years prior to his death,
248
249

250
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for the corporation at their plant based in Waco, Texas, where nickel and cadmium
batteries were produced.

During the trial, the plaintiffs proffered expert testimony that exposure to cadmium and
nickel fumes caused Albert's death. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' expert
testimony did not meet the Frye test, because the expert did not follow the generally
accepted methods in reaching his conclusion, and that the basis for the expert's opinion
was insufficiently reliable. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas excluded the expert testimony. The Court stated that the plaintiffs' expert
testimony did not meet the Frye criteria and granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. There was an appeal. The issue centered on the appropriate criteria for
admitting expert testimony.

The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment. The Court of Appeals in its ruling combined the Frye test and the Federal
Rules of Evidence. The Court stated that:
"The Federal Rules of Evidence, combined with Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C
Cir. 1993), provide a framework for trial judges struggling with proffered expert

testimony. The signals are not neatly cabined categories, and we disentangle them only to
accent the independent significance of each.
(1) whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion, Fed. R. Evid. 702.
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as are relied upon

by other experts in the field, Fed. R. Evid. 703.
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(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-founded methodology,
Frye; and

(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702 and 703, and the Frye test,
whether under Fed. R. Evid. 403 the testimony's potential for unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value.
These four signals or inquiries introduce no new concepts to our jurisprudence. They are
only guideposts drawn from the Federal Rules of Evidence and our cases. We list these
inquiries, but in doing so we do not intend that they be applied mechanically. At the same
time, they often will naturally lend themselves to sequential application. The reality is
that trials are too varied for fixed mold; we construct none today.,,251

The Federal Rules of Evidence was criticized. As we stated earlier on, the Rule did not
mention the Frye general acceptance criteria. It did not state whether expert evidence
must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.

The Federal Rules of Evidence is also too loose, too liberal and less stringent than Frye.
Rule 702, for instance states that an expert can be qualified by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education. This in effect means that almost anybody can qualify as
an expert witness.

Many scholars were also concerned about the appropriate interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Should the Rules be interpreted as a statute? Professor Weissenberger,
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for instance, argued that The Federal Rules of Evidence is not a statute. He maintained
that:

In actuality, the Federal Rules of Evidence have very little in
common with a typical statute. Most fundamentally, the
Federal Rules of Evidence originated in, and were designed by,
the judicial branch and not the legislative branch. In addition,
the role of Congress in the process that generated the Federal
Rules of Evidence was largely passive. Congress's primary
function was to enact into law the will and intent of the
Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee. Moreover, the
judicial branch designed the Federal Rules of Evidence to
operate as guidance for the exercise of discretion within the
federal judiciary, and consequently, the Rules' intended
function is very much unlike that of most statutes. Based on all
of these considerations, the primary thesis of this ... is that
application of the doctrine of "legislative intent" is functionally
and substantially misplaced in the interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 252

Professor Weissenberger further argued that "contrary to the typical statutory enactment,
however, the Federal Rules of Evidence were developed by a multibranch process in
which the subjective intent of the drafters is predominately traceable to the judicial
branch. In the case of most of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress's role was
primarily to review and ratify the intent of a coordinate branch of government in its
design of rules intended to operate internally within that branch. Only in isolated
instances, did Congress actually modify the version of the Rules submitted to it by the
Supreme Court.,,253 He contended that the "principle of legislative supremacy does not
comport with the unique and extraordinary process which produced the Federal Rules of
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Evidence",254 arguing that the Rules "were never intended to operate as a statute which
would have plain meaning. Rather than being designed as specific mandates, the Federal
Rules of Evidence were consciously drawn with a recognition that the federal judiciary
possess substantial inherent discretion in interpreting, expanding upon, and applying the
Rules.,,255

Fundamentally, Professor Weissenberger maintained that the Federal Rules of Evidence
"should not be interpreted as a typical statute, but should rather be subject to a unique set
of hermeneutics that reflects the Rules' identity as a codification of the common law.,,256
"Ultimately, however, treating the Federal Rules of Evidence as a stature will result in
courts abdicating their time-honored role in crafting the law of evidence. If courts treat
the Federal Rules of Evidence as a stature, they will defer to the legislative branch as the
arbiter of evidentiary policy when confronted with the inevitable indeterminacy of the
text of the Rules. ,,257
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On the other hand, Professor Imwinkelried argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence is a
statute and should be interpreted according to moderate textual principles of statutory
.
258 ImWl'nk eIne
. d mamtame
. . d that:
constructIOn.

In most of the cases construing the Federal Rules of Evidence,
a majority of the justices have adopted a moderate textual
approach. On the one hand, the justices have rejected a strict
textual approach that would allow a judge to consider extrinsic
legislative history material only if the judge cannot discern a
"plain meaning" on the face of the statute. Instead, the justices
routinely consider extrinsic material such as the Advisory
Committee Notes and relevant congressional committee
reports. On the other hand, a majority of the justices also have
abandoned the traditional "legal process" approach to statutory
construction. Under that approach, a judge should not only
consider the extrinsic material; more importantly, he or she
should attach great weight to the material. The legal process
approach often yields the conclusion that an intent expressed
only in the extrinsic material trumps any apparent plain
meaning of the statutory text. In contrast, textualists assign
great primacy to the specific language of the statute. They
argue that the text is "all that Congress enacts into law" and
that the extrinsic material is subject to manipulation by special
interest groups. Moderate textualists thus recognize a strong,
albeit rebuttable, presumption that the text prevails over any
contrary meaning suggested by the extrinsic material. I have
written in defense of this brand of moderate textualism?59

This argument amongst scholars as to the proper interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and whether the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test continued
until the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 26o In Daubert,261 the Supreme Court stated that the Federal Rules

Edward J. Imwinkelried, "Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence should be Conceived as a Perpetual
Index Code: Blindness is Worse than Myopia.", 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1595, 1596 (1999).
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579 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

of Evidence is a statute. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun said: "we
interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute.,,262
The Supreme Court also stated that the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of
EVI'd ence. 263

It should be noted that on April 17, 2000, United States Chief Justice, William H.
Rehnquist, wrote to the speaker of the United States House of Representatives proposing
an amendment of Rule 702. Thus, on December 1, 2000, Rule 702 was amended and
three crucial requirements were added:If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case. 264

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Following the criticisms of Frye and the confusion on whether the Federal Rules of
Evidence replaced Frye, The United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 Us. 579 S. Ct. 2794 (J 993).
Id, at 2793.
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Pharmaceuticals,265 overturned the Frye test and stated that it had been superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The facts of the case are that the petitioners, two minor
children (Jason Daubert, Eric Schuller were born with severe birth defects) and their
parents sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceutials Company, alleging that the birth defects were
caused by the mothers' use of Bendictin, an anti-nausea drug marketed by the company.
At the trial, the respondents offered expert testimony to prove that the use of Bendictin
during pregnancy does not cause birth defects in humans. They called Dr. Steven H.
Lamm, a physician and epidemiologist who testified that "he had reviewed all literature
on Bendictin and human birth defects, more than thirty published studies involving over
130,000 patients, and that none of them found any link between Bendictin and
malformations in fetuses.,,266 Dr Lamm therefore, concluded that based on these, that the
mothers's use of Bendictin during the first trimester of the pregnancy did not cause the
birth defects.

The petitioners on the other hand, called eight experts who testified and concluded that
Bendictin can cause birth defects. Their experts included Dr. Shanna Helen Swan and Dr.
Stuart A. Newman. The experts drew their conclusions from (1) "in vitro" (test tube),
and "in vivo" (live) animal studies that found a link between Bendictin and
malformations, (2) pharmacological studies of the chemical structure of Bendictin which
found similarities between the chemical structure of Bendictin and that of other
SUbstances that cause birth defects, (3) they carried out a "reanalysis" of previously
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published epidemiological (human statistical) studies, which also found a link between
Bendictin and birth defects.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California, in their ruling,
granted company's motion for summary judgment. The District Court stated that
scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is
"sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs.,,267
The Court held that the testimony given by the petitioners' expert witnesses did not meet
the applicable "general acceptance" standard for the admission of expert testimony. It
was also held that expert opinion not based on epidemiological (human statistical) studies
is not admissible to establish causation. 268 "Thus, the animal-cell studies, live animal
studies, and chemical-structure analyses on which petitioners had relied could not raise
by themselves a reasonably disputable jury issue regarding causation. Petitioners'
epidemiological analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data in previously
published studies that had found no causal link between the drug and birth defects, were
ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been published or subjected to peer
review.,,269 The District Court therefore, granted company's motion for summary
judgment and the petitioners appealed.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
decision and stated that "expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible
unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific
community. ,,270 The Court of Appeals also stated that expert opinion based on a
methodology that diverges "significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized
authorities in the field cannot be shown to be 'generally accepted as a reliable
technique' .,,271

The Court of Appeals rejected the "reanalysis" of the epidemiological studies presented
by the petitioners' experts and stated that "reanalysis is generally accepted by the
scientific community only when it is subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in
the field.,,272 In affirming the District Court's decision, the Court of Appeals further
stated that the reanalyses was "unpublished, not subjected to the normal peer review
process and generated solely for use in litigation,,,273 and that the petitioners' experts
provided insufficient foundation to prove that Bendictin caused the birth defects.

The case reached the United States Supreme Court. Michael H. Gottesman, counsel for
the petitioners, argued that Frye's "general acceptance" criteria has been superseded by
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court in its ruling, agreed with the
petitioners and stated that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye provide the standard
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for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal tria1.

274

The Supreme Court stated

that Frye's "general acceptance" test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 275 It was held that "nothing in the Rules as a whole or in the text and
drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any
indication that "general acceptance" is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules'
liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion
testimony. ,,276

The Supreme Court further stated that:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under
Rule 702, the trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make
a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony's
underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid
and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many
considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the
theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested,
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication,
its known or potential error rate and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and
whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a
relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one,
and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on conclusions that they generate. Throughout, the judge
should also be mindful of other applicable Rules. 277
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Justice Blackmun stated that trial judges have the function to act as "gatekeepers" and
determine whether the testimony being presented is reliable and scientifically valid. On
the issue of whether the Federal Rules of Evidence is a statute, the Supreme Court stated
that, "we interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any
statute. Rule 402 provides the baseline: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.,,278

The Supreme Court went on to say that "given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their
inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention "general
acceptance", the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing.
Frye made "general acceptance" the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific

testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. ,,279

The United States Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded
the case for further proceedings.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert has been criticized extensively. The opinion in
Daubert created difficult burdens for trial judges, the opinion is still ambiguous, it did not

address crucial questions, and did not provide specific guidelines to trial courts. Above
all, it did not state whether the Daubert criteria also applied to nonscientific evidence.
Under Daubert, trial judges became "gatekeepers" who have to decide what is a reliable
or an unreliable scientific technique. As Justice Feldman has pointed out "judges are
trained lawyers and only rarely trained scientists, which explains their failure to provide
coherent guidelines on how to accomplish this task. ,,281 In fact, "the dilemma for the trial
judge is how to separate the accurate, reliable testimony that aids the fact-finding process
from the so-called "junk science" that contorts the fact-finding process. But whether
Daubert does much to help is another challenge for the trial bench and bar.,,282 Justice

Feldman further argued that "the impact of the Court's newly elaborated standard is
unclear. Daubert could be viewed as something of a disappointment. The Court declared
that the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and thereby
outwardly relaxed the standard for admission of scientific evidence. However, the fact
that the four Daubert criteria are substantially similar to the factors commonly employed
by those courts that applied Frye suggests that the practical impact of Daubert could be
minimal and confusing. Indeed, one critic has predicted that the Daubert standard will
suffer the same problems that critics directed at Frye.,,283 Justice Feldman therefore
concluded that:

Justice Martin L. C. Feldman, "May I Have the Next Dance, Mrs. Frye?", 69 Tul. L. Rev. 793 (February
1995).
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At best, Daubert offers an awkward analytical model.
The Court failed to provide trial judges with a welldefined standard for separating unreliable scientific
evidence from reliable scientific evidence. Perhaps none
exists. Daubert specifically ruled out the general
acceptance standard as a precondition of admissibility,
but offered only "general observations" in return. The
Court failed to clarify whether Daubert expands or
contrasts the role of the trial judge in considering the
admissibility of scientific evidence. After all, we all
already knew that we are the "gatekeepers". Moreover,
the Court sent conflicting signals to trial courts by
abandoning Frye's general acceptance test, only to
resurrect it as one consideration under the new
standard. 284

On a similar vein, Professor Milich maintained that Daubert "requires nonscientist trial
judges to evaluate science in a way that may exceed their scientific abilities" and also that
"it is too vague on the degree of reliability that the trial judges are supposed to be looking
for. ,,285

Professor Jonakait was also highly critical of the Daubert decision which he also
described as being unclear. He contended that Daubert is based on unarticulated
assumptions. 286 "The opinion commands trial courts to determine whether something is
"scientific", not whether it is physics, chemistry, biology, epidemiology, psychology,
accidentology, clinical ecology, or forensic science. This can be done only if there are
general standards and methods applicable to all fields of science that distinguish genuine
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science from pseudoscience. Furthennore, the court's command can only be followed if
trial courts can understand those standards and use them to identify real science. These
premises, however, were not stated. It would have been better if they had been to help
insure that trial courts would begin their analyses at the proper starting point.,,287

Professor Jonakait further argued that Daubert failed to address crucial questions; "for
example, what if the error rate is unknown? Does it matter if it is ascertainable, but no
one has bothered to ascertain it? What does it mean for the reliability of a scientific
technique if its error rate is not knowable? If the error rate is known, does it matter? If the
error rate is less than fifty percent does it satisfy a preponderance of the evidence notion
of reliability? Or does the error rate have to be small enough to confonn to "scientific"
notions of confidence? Is there a connection between error rates and the statistical tests
that nonnally require scientists to reach a ninety-five percent confidence level?,,288 These
questions and many more were left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Daubert.

Professor Jonakait cautioned that courts should not reach a conclusion on a scientific
method or technique simply because it has been peer reviewed or published, arguing that
"peer review is hardly a perfect system - it is often less than demanding because
scientists are busy or because of conflicts of interest.,,289 "Furthennore, strict scrutiny
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does not necessarily follow from the fact of publication. Too much scientific literature is
published for scientists to scrutinize most of it.,,29o
Polentz also maintained that Daubert is ambiguous and full of confusing contradictions.
He argued that the "Daubert decision did not resolve how to correlate the Federal Rules
of Evidence with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nor did Daubert ameliorate the
conflict between the Frye test and the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition, Daubert's
ambiguity created new splits among the lower courts because of the potential for multiple
interpretations of the decision. In short, the decision in Daubert is flawed, as it breeds
confusion rather than clarity.,,291

It has also been argued that "the Supreme Court provided only abstract, general guidance
about how the lower courts should handle admissibility of scientific evidence under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court did not apply the general guidelines it outlined to
the facts of the case. Instead, it chose to remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for a
determination of whether the testimony was grounded on a reliable foundation and was
relevant. ,,292

Moenssens was also very critical of the Daubert decision. He argued that Daubert
"rather than protecting the fact finding process from contamination by unreliable expert
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opinion, may have actually increased the likelihood of such contamination, especially in
criminal cases.,,293 Moenssens contended that "the Supreme Court in Daubert did not see
fit to create distinctions between proof in criminal versus civil cases, as far as reliability
is concerned, even though literature and case law frequently cautioned that in criminal
cases, where a person's freedom is at stake, courts ought to be more reluctant to admit
evidence based on new, as yet unproven, techniques when such evidence is being offered
by the prosecution. ,,294 He suggested extra judicial caution, and the reasons for extra
judicial caution include the following - most witnesses are not truly scientists but are
technicians, pro-prosecution bias may impair scientific impartiality, experts tend to testify
beyond their expertise, experts prevaricate on their credentials, there are doubts as to the
proficiency of crime laboratories, human errors which can result in reaching wrong
.
conc IUSIOns,
among oth er reasons. 295

Some states rejected Daubert and continued with Frye. In People v. Leahy,296 for instance
97

the Supreme Court of California rejected Daubert stating that Kell/ /Frye remained the
standard for the admissibility of new scientific evidence. The case involved William
Michael Leahy who was convicted by the Municipal Court, West Orange County Judicial
District, of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with blood alcohol level in
excess of 0.08 percent. On the day he was arrested, the police officer gave the defendant
293 Andre A. Moenssens, "Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution", 84 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 4 (Spring 1993).
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some field sobriety tests, including the HGN (horizontal gaze nystagmus) test. "An
inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they turned from side to side (in other
words, jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN".298 At the
trial, the court admitted the HGN test without a Kelly/Frye hearing. The defendant was
convicted and he appealed, arguing that the HGN test should not have been admitted
without a Kelly/Frye hearing.

At the Court of Appeals, the issue centered on whether HGN tests are admissible without
a Kelly/Frye hearing. In their ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction because the court failed to apply the Kelly/Frye standard. The
Supreme Court of California granted review to decide whether the Kelly/Frye standard
should be modified in view of the United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert.

Delivering the opmIOn of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lucas stated that "the

Kelly/Frye formulation (or now more accurately, the Kelly formulation) should remain a
prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony regarding new scientific methodology
in this state. We further conclude, consistent with the Court of Appeal's conclusion
herein, that the HGN test is a "new scientific technique" within the scope of Kelly, and
that the trial court improperly admitted police testimony regarding that technique without
first requiring compliance with Kelly".299 Chief Justice Lucas also stated that "Daubert
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affords no compelling reason for abandoning Kelly in favor of the more "flexible"
approach outlined in Daubert".30o

The Supreme Court of California held that:
In sum, Kelly sets forth the various reasons why the more
"conservative" Frye approach to determining the reliability
of expert testimony regarding scientific techniques represents
an appropriate one. Daubert, which avoided the issue of
Frye's "merits", presents no justification for reconsidering
that aspect of our holding in Kelly. Thus, we conclude that
the Kelly formulation survived Daubert in this state, and that
none of the above described authorities critical of that
formulation persuades us to reconsider or modify it at this
time. 30 )

Therefore, "our Kelly doctrine survived Daubert and continues to represent the standard
by which new scientific techniques should be measured before evidence derived
therefrom may be admitted in court.,,302 Chief Justice Lucas also stated that "general
acceptance" under Kelly means a consensus drawn from a typical cross-section of the
relevant, qualified scientific community".303
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General Electric Co. v. Joiner

It should be noted that in General Electric v. JOiner,304 the United States Supreme Court

restated the function of the trial judge to determine when to admit or exclude scientific
evidence. It was held that the abuse-of-discretion is the proper standard for appellate
review regarding trial court decisions on the admissibility of evidence. Robert Joiner, an
electrician and his wife, sued General Electric and Westinghouse Electric, where Joiner
worked, alleging that his lung cancer was "promoted" by his exposure to polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) and their derivatives - "furans" and "dioxins". PCBs are hazardous
substances that were banned by Congress in 1978, with limited exceptions.

Joiner called expert witnesses (Dr. Arnold Schecter and Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum), who
testified that PCBs, furans and dioxins can "promote" lung cancer and therefore,
concluded that Joiner's lung cancer was likely to have been caused by his exposure to
PCBs at his workplace. The experts based their conclusions on the following.
(1) studies that showed that an infant mice developed cancer after being injected with
massive doses of PCBs.
(2) an epidemiological study that involved workers who were exposed to PCBs at an
Italian electrical plant. The study by Bertazzi, Riboldi, Pesatori, Radice and
Zocchetti (1987), found that lung cancer deaths among the ex-workers at the
Italian plant were higher than expected. It should be noted however, that these
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authors were unwilling to state that PCBs had caused the lung cancer in the exworkers.
(3) an epidemiological study that involved ex-employees at Monsanto's PCB

production plant in Sauget, Illinios. The authors of the study (J. Zack and D.
Musch, 1979), also found that lung cancer deaths among the ex-employees were
higher than expected. The authors noted however, that their finding was not
statistically significant and so could not suggest a link between the increase in
lung cancer deaths and exposure to PCBs.
(4) an epidemiological study involving workers at a Norwegian Cable manufacturing
company, who were exposed to mineral oil. The authors of the study (Ronneberg, Andersen and Skyberg (1988)), found a statistically significant
increase in lung cancer in the workers, but the study did not mention PCBs.
(5) an epidemiological study involving workers exposed to PCBs in Japan. The
authors - (Kuratsune, Nakamura, Ikeda and Hirohata 1987), found a statistically
significant increase in lung cancer among the workers, but the workers were
exposed to numerous potential carcinogens. The workers were also exposed to
toxic rice oil.

Based on the above studies, Joiner's expert witness, Dr Schecter testified that it is "more
likely than not that Mr. Joiner's lung cancer was causally linked to cigarette smoking and
PCB exposure.,,30S Dr. Teitelbaum also testified that Joiner's lung cancer was caused by
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or contributed to a significant degree by his exposure to the substances at the plant where
he worked.

The petitioners on the other hand argued that the experts' conclusions were mere
speculation, not supported by appropriate epidemiological studies, and was based on
studies with laboratory animals.

In its ruling, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
excluded the experts' testimony and stated that the animal studies that the experts relied
on, did not support his contention that the PCBs promoted his small cell cancer. 306 The
District Court stated that the study involving infant mice that was injected with highly
concentrated and massive doses of PCBs was different from the case of Robert Joiner,
who is an adult human, and who was only exposed to PCBs on a small scale. The Court
also rejected the four epidemiological studies presented by Joiner's experts. It was held
that the studies did not provide a sufficient basis for an expert's opinion, since the authors
of the studies were unwilling to suggest a link between increases in lung cancer and
exposure to PCBs. The Court stated that the third epidemiological study that involved
workers who were exposed to mineral oil was not relevant to the case. Similarly, the
District Court also rejected the fourth study that involved workers exposed to many
carcinogens, plus PCBs. The study was not specific to PCBs. The Court therefore,
granted summary judgment to the petitioners and stated that "there was no genuine issue
as to whether he had been exposed to furans and dioxins, and his experts' testimony had
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failed to show that there was a link between exposure to PCBs and small-cell lung cancer
and was therefore inadmissible because it did not rise above "subjective belief or
unsupported speculation. ,,307

There was an appeal. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 308 reversed the judgment
and ruled that the District Court erred in excluding the testimony of the respondent's
expert witnesses. The Court of Appeals held that "because the Federal Rules of Evidence
governing expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a particularly
stringent standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of expert testimony.,,309

The case reached the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine "what standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's
decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert.,,3l0 The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Delivering the judgment, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, said: "we hold that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard. We apply
this standard and conclude that the District Court in this case did not abuse its discretion
when it excluded certain proffered expert testimony.,,3ll Chief Justice Rehnquist further
said that "we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in its review of the exclusion of
Joiner's experts' testimony. In applying an overly "stringent" review to that ruling, it
307
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failed to give the trial court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion
.

reVIew.

,,312

Chief Justice Rehnquist also stated that:
Respondent points to Daubert's language that the "focus,
of course, must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions that they generate." ... He claims
that because the District Court's disagreement was with the
conclusion that the experts drew from the studies, the
District Court committed legal error and was properly
reversed by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions and
methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered .... That is what the District Court did here, and
we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing. 313

In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court said:
We hold, therefore, that abuse of discretion is the proper
standard by which to review a district court's decision to
admit or exclude scientific evidence. We further hold
that, because it was within the District Court discretion to
conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied
were not sufficient, whether individually or in
combination, to support their conclusions that Joiner's
exposure to PCBs contributed to his cancer, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding their
testimony. These conclusions, however, do not dispose of
this entire case. 314
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The Supreme Court therefore, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case for "proceedings consistent with this opinion.,,315 The Supreme
Court's decision in this case has been criticized. Professor Giannelli, for instance, argued
that the decision "seems to support the theme of liberal admissibility.,,316 "The Court
ruled that the proper standard for reviewing a trial court's admissibility decision under
Daubert was an abuse-of-discretion, a standard adopted without even considering the

principal alternative standard: de novo review. This standard suggests that admissibility
decisions would not be second guessed on appeal - i.e., giving the trial court more
leeway in admitting evidence. In contrast, a de novo review standard would have given
appellate courts more authority to control junk science. ,,317

Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael

As we mentioned earlier on in this chapter, the Daubert decision was criticized on several
issues. There was the unresolved issue of whether the Daubert criteria also applied to non
scientific testimony. Thus, on March 23, 1999, the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,318 stated that the function of trial judges to act as
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"gatekeepers", reqUITIng an inquiry into both the relevance and reliability of expert
testimony, "applies not only to "scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony.,,319

On July 6, 1993, Patrick Carmichael was driving his minivan when the right rear tire on
the van blew out and the van overturned. One passenger died while others sustained
serious injuries. Carmichael and the others sued the tire manufacturer and distributor
(collectively called Kumho Tire Co.), for the death and the injuries. They claimed that the
tire failed because it was defective. They called a tire failure analyst, Dennis Carlson, Jr.,
who testified that he had examined the failed tire, and was of the opinion that a defect in
the tire's manufacture or the design caused the tire to blowout. He said that his analysis
of the failed tire showed that the tread of the tire separated from the steel-belted carcass,
which means that the separation was caused by either a defect or from overdeflection,
which is a type of tire abuse. Carlson based his conclusions on (1) a visual and tactile
inspection of the failed tire, and (2) on his own theory that "in the absence of at least two
of four specific, physical symptoms indicating tire abuse, the tire failure of the sort that
occurred here was caused by a defect. ,,320 According to Carlson, "these symptoms include
(a) tread wear on the tire's shoulder that is greater than the tread wear along the tire's
center, (b) signs of a "bead groove", where the beads have been pushed too hard against
the bead seat on the inside of the tire's rim, (c) sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of
deterioration, such as discoloration, and/or (d) marks on the tire's rim flange.,,321
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During his testimony, Carlson noted that (1) the failed tire was made in 1988 and was
installed before Carmichael bought the van in March 1993, (2) the Carmichaels had
driven the van approximately 7,000 additional miles in the two months that he owned the
van, and (3) that the tire tread had at least two punctures that had been repaired
inadequatel y. 322

Counsel for Kumho Tire Co., argued that the expert's testimony should be excluded
because the methodology used by the expert in reaching his conclusion was unreliable.

Kumho Tire Co. also argued that the methodology did not satisfy the Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 which requires expert testimony to be both relevant and reliable. They also
argued that the methodology did not satisfy the Daubert criteria.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama,323 excluded the
expert's testimony and granted summary judgment for defendants. In excluding the
testimony, the District Court stated that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "imposes a
special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that scientific testimony is not only
relevant but reliable. The District Court also recognized the fact that Daubert required
trial judges to act as "gatekeepers" and should consider four factors when deciding
whether to admit or exclude expert testimony. In the Court's view, Carlson's testimony
did not satisfy Daubert's four factors - testability, peer review and publication, error rate
and general acceptance.
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The plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration, stating that the Daubert factors
should be applied flexibly. The District Court granted their motion for reconsideration
and agreed that "Daubert should be applied flexibly, that its four factors were simply
illustrative, and that other factors could argue in favor of admissibility.,,324 The District
Court however, affirmed its earlier decision, stating that it "found insufficient indications
of the reliability of Carlson's methodology. ,,325 The plaintiffs appealed.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded. The
Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred as a matter of law in applying the
Daubert standard. Following a de novo review of the District Court's decision to apply

the Daubert criteria, the Court of Appeals stated that Daubert only applied to "scientific"
testimony, and that Carlson's testimony was not scientific and therefore falls outside the
scope of Daubert. 326

The case reached the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and reversed
the Court of Appeals decision. The issue centered on whether the Daubert factors also
applied to nonscientific expert testimony. The Supreme Court held that the District
Court's decision to exclude Carlson's testimony was within its discretion and was lawful.
The Supreme Court also noted that there was no reference to any articles or papers that
validates Carlson's methodology. The Supreme Court stated that:
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The Daubert "gatekeeping" obligation applies not only to
"scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony. Rule 702
does not distinguish between "scientific" knowledge and
"technical" or "other specialized" knowledge, but makes
clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of
expert testimony. It is the Rule's word "knowledge", not
the words (like "scientific") that modify that word, that
establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. Daubert
referred only to "scientific" knowledge because that was
the nature of the expertise there at issue. Neither is the
evidentiary rationale underlying Daubert's "gatekeeping"
determination limited to "scientific" knowledge. Rules 702
and 703 grant all expert witnesses, not just "scientific"
ones, testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on
the assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable
basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.
Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for
judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a
"gatekeeping" obligation depended upon a distinction
between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other
specialized" knowledge, since there is no clear line
dividing the one from the others and no convincing need to
make such distinctions. 327

The Supreme Court further stated that a trial judge may consider one or more of the
Daubert factors when deciding whether to admit or exclude expert testimony. The

Supreme Court therefore, held that "the Court of Appeals erred insofar as it ruled those
factors out in such cases. In determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable,
the trial court should consider the specific Daubert factors where they are reasonable
measures of reliability.,,328
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Justice Breyer, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, also stated that "a court of
appeals must apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it reviews a trial court's
decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.,,329 Justice Breyer further stated that:

We must therefore disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's
holding that a trial judge may ask questions of the sort
Daubert mentioned only where an expert "relies on the
application of scientific principles", but not where an
expert relies "on skill - or experience-based observation".
We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that
segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of
questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal
cases that it generates are too complex to warrant so
33o
definitive a match.

In a nutshell, the Supreme Court recognized the fact that not all the Daubert factors
applied to all fonns of expert testimony; and that the Daubert factors did not constitute
mandates but are flexible guidelines, and that trial judges must look at other factors
bearing in mind the circumstances of each case.

The Supreme Court's decision in this case has faced some criticisms. Professor
Weissenberger, for instance, argued that "a closer examination of the reasoning m

Kumho, however, reveals limits to the applicability of the more specific holdings m
Daubert to non-scientific expert testimony. The court declined to limit the trial court's
detennination of the reliability of expert testimony to the celebrated (or notorious,
depending upon one's adversarial posture), list of factors set forth in Daubert, and the
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court also stated that an application of those factors was not necessary in every case.
After Kumho, it is clear that factors other than those listed in Daubert may be considered
by trial courts in determining the reliability of proffered testimony, and certain Daubert
factors may simply be inapplicable to certain kinds of expert testimony.,,33!

In summary, this chapter has revealed the confusion, controversy and inconsistencies
surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony. We have discussed the three main
rules guiding the admissibility of expert testimony, bringing out their various strengths
and weaknesses. The Frye test emphasizes general acceptance of a technique in the
relevant discipline. The Federal Rule of Evidence 702 emphasizes relevance and
reliability of a technique. The Rule also stresses that a method or technique can be
scientific, technical or other specialized field of knowledge. Rule 702 further stresses that
if a method or technique can assist judges and jurors, then an expert qualified by
knowledge, skill, experience or training should be allowed to give expert testimony.
Daubert emphasizes relevance, reliability, and validity. Daubert stresses that trial judges

have the function to act as "gatekeepers." Above all, Daubert also emphasizes that there
are four factors that trial judges should be looking at when deciding to admit or exclude
expert testimony (testability, peer review, error rate and general acceptance). In essence,
this chapter has revealed the problems resulting from the adoption of the three rules. In
the next chapter, we discuss the admissibility of offender profiling and the impact these
three rules have on the trial outcome of cases involving offender profiling.
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Chapter Four
Offender Profiling in the Courtroom

Though courts have generally rejected testimony concerning
profiling frankly so offered, they have often bent over
backwards to admit profiling-based testimony, or testimony
by profilers, when it could be labeled differently. 332

Offender profiling is a crime investigation technique based on probabilities, stereotypes,
suspicion and assumptions. It does not point to a specific offender as being responsible
for a specific offense. Offender profiling only generalizes. As such it is not a method
sufficiently reliable to prove the guilt or innocence of an accused. There are no questions
as to the usefulness of offender profiling in crime investigations. Where there are
question marks and problems are when it is being introduced into the courtroom as
evidence. The reliability and validity of offender profiling cannot be ascertained at the
moment by any objective method.

The nature of offender profiling does not lend this technique to any form of reliable
testing. There is the problem of replicating a crime scene. No one can state with certainty
that one offender will commit all crimes in the same manner or exhibit the same
characteristics at subsequent crimes. Offenders, especially serial offenders, will learn
from experiences, media, from victim responses, and then may change their method of
operation. They may also develop new fantasies; hence the signature aspects of their
crime may change.
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The current position in United States courts is that offender profiling and its derivatives
have been admitted in many cases and also have been excluded in many others. There has
been a lot of inconsistencies. Hence, in this chapter, the central problems of offender
profiling evidence are discussed. In some of the cases where offender profiling or its
derivatives were admitted, it is surprising that the reliability of this technique was never
questioned. Some of the courts appeared to have been taken in by the credentials of the
profilers at the expense of assessing the reliability and validity of this technique. The fact
that a technique is useful in crime investigation does not render it a reliable tool for
courtroom use. Utility does not equal/amount to reliability.

Is Offender Profiling Impermissible Character Evidence?

There are many problems with the introduction of offender profiling in the courtroom.
The first relates to whether offender profiling constitutes impermissible character
evidence.

There is general disagreement amongst scholars and courts as to whether

offender profiling is impermissible character evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence,
Rule 404 deals with character evidence and provides the guideline. Rule 405 and 406 also
affects character evidence. It is therefore, important to cite the Rules at length.

164

Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other
Crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. - Evidence of a person's character or trait of character

is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. - In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of

character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if
evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an
accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of
the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. - In a criminal case, and subject to the limitations
imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. - Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 333

Rule 405. Methods of Proving Character
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
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reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or trait of character of a
person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be
made of specific instances of that person's conduct. 334

Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether
corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove
that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity
with the habit or routine practice. 335

In general terms, offender profiling deals with the character traits of individuals. As such
it is character evidence. However, whether it will be seen as permissible or impermissible
character evidence largely depends on two things. First, for it to be admissible the
defendant must first put his character at issue. If the prosecution offers character evidence
before the defendant, it will be ruled inadmissible. Second, whether it will be ruled
admissible or inadmissible also depends on the purpose of its introduction. By purpose,
we mean - is it being introduced to show criminal intent, criminal propensity or is it
simply to assist the fact-finders? It is generally permissible where it is being used to show
criminal intent as opposed to where it is being offered to show criminal propensity.
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Cleary et al maintained that "when the plaintiff or the government offers evidence that
the defendant fits an incriminating profile, it may be excluded under the rule that
prohibits evidence of character to show conduct on a particular occasion. Yet, arguably
the rule should not bar admission in all such cases. After all, the rule rests on the premise
that the marginal probative value of character evidence generally is low while the
potential for distribution, time-consumption and prejudice is high. If it were shown that
the profile was both valid and revealing - that it distinguishes between offenders and
non-offenders with great accuracy - then the balance might favor admissibility. It is far
from clear, however, that any existing profile is this powerful. ,,336

Thus, "when the profile evidence is used defensively (to show good character, to restore
credibility, or to prove apprehension in connection with a claim of self-defense), it falls
under an exception to the rule against character evidence. Admissibility then should tum
on the extent to which the expert testimony would assist the jury viewed in the light of
the usual counterweights. The qualifications of the expert, the reliability and validity of
using the profile, and the need for the evidence thus affect the admissibility and of course
the weight of the profile evidence.,,337

In State v. Haynes,338 the expert testimony of a criminal profiler was seen as
impermissible character evidence, and therefore inadmissible. Richard Haynes was
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charged with murder and grand theft of a motor vehicle, and was convicted by the
Common Pleas Court, County of Lorain, Ohio. Richard Haynes claimed that on October
20, 1986, he went to Douglas Fauver's horne to fill out a job application form and was
offered some drinks and some pills (speed). He claimed that at 11.30 pm he woke up
from sleep and found out that he was still at Fauver's horne and that Fauver was sitting
across from him, stark naked. 339 Fauver then told him that he had sexual intercourse with
him and wanted to know if he enjoyed it. 340 Haynes said that he then went to the
bathroom to clean up. Then Fauver carne at him with a small knife and they engaged in a
fight. Haynes also stated that he stabbed Fauver twice in the chest and once in the back,
after Fauver had cut his (Haynes) wrist. Haynes claimed that he then waited for two hours
for the police to arrive, but they did not. He said that he thought the neighbors had called
the police when they heard the noise during the fight. Haynes later used a stolen car to get
away and was arrested in Arizona for another crime. It should be noted that Fauver died
in his horne and his body was discovered the next day.

At the trial, the State called Robert Walter, a psychologist and criminal pro filer, to testify
in support of the State's argument that the murder was anger-retaliatory and "not a
homophobic murder done out of panic after an unsolicited homosexual encounter.,,341
The State believed and argued that the timing of the events, along with other factors,
implied that Fauver's murder was anger-retaliatory.342 Walter testified that there is what
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he called homophobic murder and anger-retaliatory murder and that each type has
distinctive patterns. He stated that his analysis of the crime scene characteristics and
reports revealed patterns consistent with anger-retaliatory murders. Therefore, he was of
the opinion that the murder was not committed as a result of panic. Haynes claimed that
he acted in self-defense and that the State "set up the theory of homophobic murder as a
strawman argument and then set out to attack it.,,343 The expert's testimony was however,
admitted.

Haynes was convicted and sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life for the murder and a
consecutive term of two years for the theft. He appealed his conviction. The defendant
argued that Walter's theory was not generally accepted and was not scientifically reliable
and should not have been admitted. The defense also argued that the prejudicial effect of
the expert testimony far outweighed its probative value. Furthermore, the defendant
argued that "the State has overlooked the principle that unless scientific evidence and/or
theory can be considered reliable, it cannot be of assistance to the trier of fact. ,,344

The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Ninth District., Lorain County, ruled that the "admission
of Walter's testimony conflicts with several evidentiary rules,,345 and therefore its
admission was error. The Court did not see offender profiling as being reliable and stated
that "although this testimony may indicate that profiles may be a reliable investigative
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tool, there is little indication in the record that they can be said to be reliable for the
purposes for which they were used by the state in the instant case.,,346

On the issue of whether the criminal profiling testimony assisted the trier of fact, the
Court of Appeals stated that "the relevancy/admissibility analysis of novel scientific
evidence also requires that the expert's testimony assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or determine a fact in issue. If the subject of the testimony is within the
understanding of the jury, it is inadmissible. It appears that the main point made by expert
testimony in the instant case was well within the understanding of the average juror, as
demonstrated by the following colloquy on direct examination.,,347

Delivering the judgment, Justice Cacioppo, stated that the expert testimony was more
prejudicial than probative, and stated that:
The issues of timing and sudden panic are directly related
to the distinction between voluntary manslaughter and
murder. From the defendant's confession, a jury could
decide for themselves that he did not kill Fauver
immediately after discovering that he had been assaulted,
but that a period of time had elapsed in which he could
have "cooled off'. The use of expert testimony for this
purpose was improper; the prejudicial impact outweighed
probative value, as it tended to "sensationalize" the facts
348
and issues.
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Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the testimony relating to "timing and panic
embraced the ultimate issue of intent to be decided by the jury. ,,349 It was also held that
the expert's testimony confused the issues and/or misled the jury, by setting up the
strawman argument. 350

Interestingly, the Court of Appeals also held that the admission of the expert testimony
violated Evid. R. 404(A)(l), regarding character evidence. Justice Cacioppo stated that
"in the instant case, Walter testified that the appellant's version of the killing and his
subsequent actions were classically typical of an anger-retaliatory murder. In fact, Walter
testified at great length and in great detail as to the traits and characteristics of such a type
of murderer, and found that the appellant's actions and motivations matched that
profile.,,351 Hence, "the possibility of stereotyping also brings up the possibility that
admission of the expert testimony violated Evid.R. 404(A)(1).,,352

The Court of Appeals further stated that since the defendant did not testify, he did not
put his character in issue. 353 The Court also stated that "Walter's testimony on angerretaliatory profile was laden with references to personality and character traits of the
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accused that matched the profile of a deliberate killer. The testimony therefore, can be
considered inadmissible solely on the basis ofEvid.R. 404(A)(1).,,354

The Court also held that the expert testimony was inadmissible based on the hearsay rule.
Walter testified on cross-examination that he based his
opinion on police reports, the autopsy report, and
conversations with the prosecutor and the police. Only
the autopsy report was admitted into evidence. "Pursuant
to Evid.R. 703, an expert may not base his opinion on
hearsay but must rely upon his own personal knowledge
of facts and data submitted as evidence in the case." ...
The conversations Walter had with the police and the
prosecutor are clearly hearsay.355

The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that "there exists a reasonable possibility that
the admission of Walter's expert testimony contributed to the appellant's conviction, and
therefore the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable.,,356 Haynes's conviction was
therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial.

In State v. Roquemore,357 the opinion testimony of an offender profiler was ruled
inadmissible. It was seen to be impermissible character evidence. The court stated that
such testimony which stereotypes the defendant violates the Federal Rule of Evidence
404(A)(1).358 The defendant, Dennis Roquemore was convicted of two counts of rape
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and one count of involuntary manslaughter by the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas, Ohio. The defendant knew the victim (Yvonne Mathis) for ten years and they lived
together for one year in 1990. Roquemore claimed that on September 1, 1990, they both
went to a friend's house where they drank and socialized with other people and that on
their way back to their home, Mathis was angry because of certain jokes at the friend's
house. Roquemore claimed that later on he 'wrestled' with Mathis and they had 'rough'
sexual intercourse, and that afterwards he noticed that Mathis was unconscious. He also
claimed that "he attempted to revive her and then carried her into the bathroom and
placed her in the bathtub to run water over her. He began to panic and left the house.,,359
Roquemore further claimed that he then went to an ex-girlfriend's house but there was no
answer. He therefore, telephoned her and told her what happened and she called the
police. Roquemore said that the police went to the wrong house and he went to Alum
Creek Reservoir to kill himself but he could not, and then he went back to the house and
called the police.

At the trial, the State argued that Roquemore raped Mathis and that Mathis died as a
result of rape trauma. The State therefore, called a criminal profiler, Richard Walter, who
testified that his review of the crime scene, the crime scene photographs, police reports
and pathological reports showed that rape occurred. The main reason that the State called
the profiler was to give testimony on the crime scene assessment which will bolster their
argument that the defendant raped the victim and that the victim died as a result of heart
stoppage from the rape trauma. Walter testified that the crime scene showed patterns of
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violent rape behavior. In his testimony, Walter stated that the crime scene fell into
patterns of known violent behavior that he had studied in the past. 360 It should be noted
that during cross-examination, Walter was asked if he was going to give an opinion on
whether rape occurred and he answered in the affirmative. 361

The defense argued that the expert's testimony should be excluded. The defendant
acknowledged that they had rough sex that night and that they have had rough sex in the
past, and that he did not rape Mathis. The State argued that Walter'$ testimony should be
admitted because he was testifying about the patterns of violent behavior that occurred,
and not to the conduct of the defendant. The State further presented the medical
examiner, who testified that Mathis's death was "related to the rectal and vaginal trauma
that she had suffered and subsequent, due to pain, emotional disability from this
abnormality, that she had sudden cardiac stoppage on the basis of a neurogenic response
to the trauma that she suffered and this caused her heart to stop beating and she
subsequently expired because it did not start beating again.,,362 The medical examiner
further stated that "if the nerve response had not occurred, the injuries received by the
victim would not have caused death.,,363

The expert's testimony was admitted. The defendant was convicted and he appealed.
Among other issues, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting the
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profile testimony. He argued that the testimony was inadmissible because it violated
Evid. R. 402, 403, and 703. Hence, he was denied due process of law. The defendant
also argued that the profile testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, held that even though the
expert's testimony was relevant, it ought to have been excluded because it violated other
evidence rules. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Whiteside said: "the witness's
testimony appears to be relevant, since it indicates a pattern of violence and makes the
determination that a rape occurred more probable than without the evidence. However,
even though the evidence may be relevant, it must be excluded, since it conflicts with
other evidence rules which provide that it must be excluded. For example, excludable
hearsay is inadmissible because it is relevant but unreliable.,,364

Justice Whiteside went on to say that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 "establishes the
requirement that expert testimony is admissible only if it will assist the trier of fact. This
means that the expert testimony must have both a sufficient basis and a sufficient factual
foundation in the record that can reasonably be relied upon.,,365 Justice Whiteside
therefore, ruled that "although the witness stated that the assessment is probability based,
he does not keep files on all the cases he reviews (only approximately twenty-five percent
of them), nor does he keep statistics about them. He stated that he used statistics from
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other sources, including the FBI, but there is no indication as to how he reaches his

·
,,366
conc1uSlOns.

Hence, the Court of Appeals held that "in this case, there is a distinct possibility of
stereotyping the defendant. The witness testified only concerning the "typical" crime
scene pattern and the "typical" violence associated with such a crime scene. The witness
did not interview or evaluate the defendant or "profile" a specific person. He profiles for
a type of person who would do a particular crime that has been assessed as a member of
that group. This stereotyping of the defendant has several problems. First, the
stereotyping can prejudice the jury.,,367 The Court therefore, ruled that assuming aguendo
that the testimony satisfied the relevancy requirement it must still be excluded if its
prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. 368 The Court concluded
that "these generalities and typical facts rather than specific facts tend to place the
defendant into a stereotype. ,,369

The Court of Appeals held that the profile testimony, which stereotypes the defendant
violated Evid. R. 404 (a)(l) on character evidence. The Court of Appeals restated the fact
that, "this rule does not allow the prosecution to procure testimony about character traits
of the defendant unless the defendant first put his character in issue in the case. In this
case, the witness discussed anger, revenge, hostility and difficulty in relationships with
366

367
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women, all in relation to the motivational structure on which he classified this case. This
type of character evidence is inadmissible at least unless the defendant has first put his
character at issue and probably not even then.,,37o

Justice Whiteside further stated that the profile testimony has to be excluded as it is in
conflict with Evid. R. 703, which provides that "the facts or data in the particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by him or
admitted in evidence at the hearing.,,371 Justice Whiteside said:

In this case, the witness based his opinions on the crime
scene photos, the police reports and the pathological
report. When a direct opinion based solely on the police
report was about to be given, the court instructed the jury
not to accept or consider the opinion of this witness
based on the police report in this case. This instruction is
a curative one and we assume the jury followed the
instruction. However, to the extent any other opinions of
this witness, such as how he determined in which
classification these events belonged, were based on the
police report, these opinions are inadmissible based upon
Evid. R. 703, since the police reports were not admissible
.
mto
eVl'd ence. 372

It was also held that "since the witness purported to base his opinion on his own "studies"
rather than upon an accepted scientific basis, the opinion testimony is not admissible.,,373
In the Court's view: "without the witness's testimony, the evidence admitted is far short
of being overwhelming of defendant's guilt. It may be reasonable to find either that a
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rape did or did not occur that evening, but it is for the jury to decide which version of the
events to believe. The weight given to and the credibility of the witness are questions for
the trier of fact to determine .... There exists a reasonable possibility, actual probability,
that the witness's testimony contributed to the defendant's conviction, thereby
prejudicing him. This prejudice affected a substantial right and the error is not harmless.
Since admission of the opinion evidence was prejudicial error, defendant's first
assignment of error is well taken.,,374

The Court of Appeals therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the
case for further proceedings.

Offender profile evidence was also ruled to be impermissible character evidence in State

v. Parkinson,375 where sex offender profile testimony by a psychologist, and by a former
FBI agent, was ruled inadmissible. The experts offered expert opinion that the defendant
did not fit the profile of a sex offender. Kelly Parkinson was charged and convicted of
sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. On March 28, 1992, Parkinson's niece,
E.F. (13 years) and her brother, B.F. (12 years), visited Parkinson and spent the night at
his house. The two children and their cousin slept in one of the bedrooms; E.F. slept in
the bed, while her brother and her cousin slept on the floor. It was reported that Parkinson
went into the bedroom where the three children were sleeping three times that night and
each time he sexually abused E.F. E.F. said that first, she woke up and found Parkinson
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rubbing her buttocks.

376

About two hours later, Parkinson came back and was "rubbing

her breast and pulling at her nightgown.,,377 That Parkinson came back around 6.30 am
and again came to the bed and began rubbing her buttocks. E.F said that her brother B.F.
was awaken and was stirring at what was happening and Parkinson then left the bedroom.
E.F. then started crying and told her brother what happened that night. On March 31,
1992, they told their mother what happened and she called the police.

At the trial, Parkinson called two expert witnesses, Dr. Marcel Chappuis (a psychologist)
and Mr. Peter M. Welch (a former FBI agent). The defendant sought to introduce the
experts to testify that he did not fit the psychological profile of a sex offender, and
therefore, would not have committed the crime.

The trial judge denied the motion to introduce the testimony by the two experts. The trial
court stated that; (1) the profile evidence was offered to bolster Parkinson's credibility
and was thus impermissible because veracity is not a "fact in issue" subject to expert
opinion; (2) the evidence at issue would not assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence; and (3) the expert opinion evidence would constitute a direct comment on the
guilt or innocence of Parkinson and replace, rather than aid, the jury's function.,,378 The
trial court also stated that an adequate foundation had not been made for the admission of
the testimony.379

376

Id, at 32.

317

Id.

378

Id.

379

Id, at 33.

179

Parkinson was convicted by the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Madison
County, Idaho. He appealed. Among many issues, the defendant argued that the trial
court erred by excluding the testimony by Dr. Chappuis and Mr. Welch. In its ruling, the
Court of Appeals of Idaho stated that there was no error in the exclusion of the testimony
by the two expert witnesses. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Lansing stated
that "it was not error for a trial court to exclude from evidence testimony dealing with a
scientific theory for which an adequate foundation has not been laid.,,38o The Court of
Appeals held that there was no showing of the reliability of Dr. Chappuis' assessment
technique sufficient to meet standards for admission of the testimony under Rule 702. 381
"Dr Chappuis did not: describe the personality or psychological characteristics that made
up the profile; describe the methodology by which the profile was derived; state whether
or how the technique had been tested; describe the profile's level of accuracy in
distinguishing between offenders and non-offenders; or state whether the profile and the
assessment technique utilized by Dr. Chappuis had attracted widespread acceptance
within the psychological community.,,382 On Agent Welch's testimony, Justice Lansing
also stated that:
Mr. Welch's proffered testimony suffers from similar defects
in foundation. Mr. Welch acknowledged that the F.B.I. sex
offender profile which he utilized was developed for use by
law enforcement officials and that its application was more
of an art than science. He did not identify the components of
the profile or explain how it was developed, other than
noting that its development involved interviews with
convicted sex offenders. Mr. Welch did not state whether or
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how the resulting profile had been tested for accuracy or
identify the technique's error rate. Although Mr. Welch
testified that the profile is widely used in the law
enforcement community, it is not apparent whether that use
is primarily for devising profiles of perpetrators of unsolved
crimes or for the purpose for which it was offered in the
present case - to determine whether an accused identified by
the alleged victim did in fact commit the crime. In short, Mr.
Welch's testimony did not provide information from which it
could reasonably be ascertained that the profile technique
was trustworthy, that it was based upon valid scientific
principles, or that it could properly be applied in the manner
advocated by Parkinson. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding Mr. Welch's testimony.383

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

In Penson v. State,384 offender profiling testimony was also ruled to be impermissible
character evidence. Allen Wayne Penson was charged with burglary and two counts of
arson, for entering and setting fire to the Walker County Rescue Building and a vehicle.
The prosecution stated that a person carrying a sandy-colored bag and fitting the
description of the defendant was seen loitering near the building before the fire outbreak.
When the police went to search Penson's house, which was about 500 feet from the scene
of the arson, they found a sheet of notebook paper (which belonged to one of the
members of the rescue building). This member identified the sheet and stated that it must
have been taken by Penson at the time of the arson. A sandy-colored bag was also found
at Penson's house. Penson also had cuts and scratches on his arm.
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At the trial, the State introduced a State fire investigator, Ken Palmer, who testified as an
expert on arson. Palmer based his testimony on an FBI serial arsonist profile, titled
"Record on Essential Findings of the Study of Serial Arsonists.,,385 "Palmer testified that
serial arsonists share certain common characteristics including the following: white males
between 18-27, loners, educational failures, homosexuals, or bisexuals, history of
criminal activity, medical or mental problems, poor employment records, alcohol and
drug abuse, and dysfunctional family backgrounds. According to the profile, serial
arsonists are mainly walkers who set fires within two miles of their home and act on the
spur of the moment, usually for revenge.,,386

The defense raised an objection to this testimony. The defendant argued that the
prejudicial effect of the testimony far outweighed its probative value. The defendant also
contended that the testimony should be excluded because he was not charged as a serial
arsonist and that the profile was not used during the investigation. The motion to exclude
Palmer's testimony was denied. The trial judge however, instructed the State not to apply
the profile to the defendant, and that the expert should not give an opinion that the
defendant was a serial arsonist.

Penson called two witnesses. Daphne Young, who testified that Penson was at her
birthday party on the night of the arson. Jeffrey Cameron also testified that Penson was at
his house after the party and was there when they heard the fire alarm.
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At the Walker Superior Court, Georgia, Penson was convicted of burglary and two counts
of arson and he appealed. The defendant argued that the trial judge erred by admitting the
FBI serial arsonist profile. The Court of Appeals of Georgia ruled that the trial court erred
by admitting the serial arsonist profile. In the opinion delivered by Justice Harold R.
Banke, it was held that the profile evidence was impermissible character evidence. Citing
Sanders v. State, 387 Justice Banke stated that:
Unless a defendant has placed his character in issue or
has raised some defense which the profile is relevant to
rebut, the state may not introduce character evidence
showing a defendant's personality traits and personal
history as its foundation for demonstrating the defendant
has the characteristics of a typical arsonist." ... In this
case, the profile did not rebut Penson's alibi defense that
he was attending a birthday party at the time the fire
originated or aid the jury in determining whether Penson
was at the birthday on the night of the fire. Nor had
Penson placed his character in issue. 388

Justice Banke further stated that "the trial court's directive to the State that it not apply
the serial arsonist profile to Penson was meaningless given the State's extensive
exploration of Penson's personal history and personality traits and the State's transparent
efforts to subtly correlate this information to the serial arsonist profile. Even before the
State's expert testified, the prosecutor acknowledged that certain seemingly irrelevant
exhibits would later become relevant in light of the profile. The admission of the serial
arsonist profile was plainly error, and Penson's conviction must be reversed unless it was
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.,,389

387

388

389

Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 76 (3),303 SE.2d 13 (1983)
Penson v. State, 222 Ga. App.253, 474 SE.2d 104, 106 (Ga. 1996).

Id.

183

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. Justice Banke
stated that they were "unable to conclude that it is highly probable that the profile
evidence did not contribute to the verdict.,,39o

One thing about this case is that the prosecution did not have overwhelming evidence to
prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the decision to reverse the trial court's
judgment was warranted.

Finally, it should be noted that many states have statutes that provides additional
guidelines on the use of character evidence in cases involving sexual offenses. For
instance, the California Evidence Code provides that:
(a) Except as provided in this section and in sections 1102 and 1103, evidence of a
person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an
opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his of her
conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified
occasIOn.
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact
(such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an
unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in
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good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to
commit such an act.
(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence offered to support or
attack the credibility of a witness. 391

Who is Qualified to give Expert Offender Profiling Testimony?

As we mentioned in chapter two, offender profiling is a multi-disciplinary practice.
Profilers come from different backgrounds, different academic areas, with varying
degrees of experience and knowledge. Hence, there is general disagreement amongst
scholars as to who is qualified to give offender profiling testimony. Ultimately, it is the
judge who decides who is qualified to give evidence. In United States, the Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 provides the guideline for the trial judges. Rule 702 states that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and method
reliably to the facts of the case. 392

The problems with this Rule have been discussed in the previous chapter. The main
problem being the fact that the rule is too loose that almost everybody can qualify as an
391
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expert, either by knowledge, skill, expenence, training, or education. There is no
acceptable professional body for profilers. This is as a result of the uneasy relationship
amongst profilers. Each segment thinks that offender profiling is their exclusive club.
Hence, it has been difficult for the different segments to come together as one and move
the field forward. Hence, the difficulty with establishing a professional body that will be
acceptable by all the different segments.

There are two issues to be borne in mind when discussing the question of who is qualified
to give expert profiling testimony. The first is the fact that offender profiling is a multidisciplinary practice that cuts across many disciplines. The second is the fact that the
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has created a huge dilemma for trial judges. As trial
judges have been given the ultimate responsibility to decide who is qualified as an expert
testimony, we need to assist them in making that difficult decision. Allowing an
unqualified expert to give testimony will/may result in a reversal, plus other dangers
associated with that. Therefore, it is important to get it right from the onset.

Brunson v. State 393 is one of the cases that highlight the problem with admitting expert
testimony by an unqualified expert. This case also highlights the need to assist trial
judges in this regard. Furthennore, this case clearly reveals and supports my argument
that the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is too loose, too liberal. In this case, the defendant,
Larry Darnell Brunson was charged with two counts of first-degree murder of his wife
(Gloria Brunson) and her lover (Frankie Shaw) in 1999. The State presented several
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witnesses - Gloria's children, law enforcement officers, Gloria's friends and co-workers.
The State also presented Barbara Ann Neiss, who was qualified by the trial court as an
expert on predictability that a batterer would become a murderer. 394 During her
testimony, Neiss stated that she is an expert on profiling batterers and can determine
when they are likely to tum into murderers. She testified that there are ten risk
factors/characteristics of these sorts of individuals. "She stated that she had taken the ten
risk factors from the work of a police officer, Anne O'Dell, who surveyed 70,000 cases
and assembled what she thought were ten warning signs that a domestic-violence
offender would commit murder.,,395 The article by Ms. O'Dell was entitled "Assessing
Whether Batterers Will Kill." Ms. Neiss used a three page summary of this article
prepared by an attorney, Barbara Hart, and obtained from an internet, in used it in her
testimony.396 Ms. Neiss testified that if more than three of the factors are met, then there
is an "incredible duty" to warn a woman of the threat to her safety.397 According to Neiss,
the ten risk factors are as follows:
(1) Threats of homicide against his spouse or children or threats of suicide.

(2) Fantasies of homicide or suicide.
(3) Depression.

(4) Access to weapons.
(5) Obsessive behavior about his wife or family.
(6) Centrality of the battered woman to the batterer's life.
394
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(7) Rage against the battered woman.
(8) Drug or alcohol consumption
(9) Abuse of the battered woman's pet animal.
(10) Access to the battered woman. 398

Neiss gave her qualifications as:
(1) A bachelor's degree in political science and journalism.
(2) A master's degree in public administration.
(3) Studying for a second master's degree in social work.
(4) Have attended several seminars on domestic violence.
(5) Worked for one year with the Arkansas Commission on Child Abuse, Rape and
Domestic Violence.
(6) Almost three years employment as an Executive Director for Advocates for
Battered Women.
(7) Ten years voluntary work with the Battered Women's Shelter.
(8) Worked at a Mediation Center for battered women and their husbands.
(9) Other work experiences in the domestic violence center.
(10) That she had testified once in a circuit court, several times in a chancery court in

. orders, but not as an expert. 399
support 0 f protectIve
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Neiss testified that her analysis showed that the defendant met eight of these ten risk
factors. The defendant raised an objection to the admission of this testimony, arguing
that (1) Ms. Neiss was not qualified to render an opinion that he has the
characteristics of batterers who may eventually kill, (2) that the testimony embraced
the ultimate issue, and (3) that the testimony was unduly prejudicial.

In his ruling, Justice Berlin C. Jones, for the Circuit Court, Jefferson County,
Arkansas, qualified Ms. Neiss as an expert, and stated that "she was qualified under
Ark.R.Evid. 702, because she possessed specialized knowledge that would assist the
jury in understanding the evidence in this case.,,400 Neiss's testimony was admitted.
The defendant was convicted for the murders and sentenced to two terms of life
imprisonment.

The case reached the Supreme Court of Arkansas, where the defendant argued that
the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Neiss's testimony as an expert. That
the testimony placed him within the characteristics ofbatterers who kill, and therefore
it was unduly prejudicial. The defendant also argued that the testimony fell into the
ultimate issue.

Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Justice Robert L. Brown,
agreed with the defendant that Neiss was not qualified to render an expert opinion on
the predictability that a batterer will become a murderer. Justice Brown said:
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The State responds that Ms. Neiss's testimony was
helpful to the jury and thus, it qualifies as expert
testimony. Yet, in doing so the State only addresses one
facet of Rule 702 and never squarely addresses the other
facet of whether Ms. Neiss was qualified by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education to give an
opinion that was helpful to the jury. The problem we see
with the State's argument is that testimony may be
helpful to a jury but still may be properly excluded if that
testimony is offered by a person who is not qualified to
render the opinion. The trial court, in its ruling, appears
to have similarly conflated the issue of a person's
qualifications and the "helpfulness of the testimony".401

The Supreme Court, citing its prior decision in Dillion v. State,402 reiterated the fact
that "while a proffered expert's experience might have been beyond that of persons
who had no experience at all in the general area to which he would testify, it was not
error to refuse to qualify him as an expert when his knowledge was below the
standards of most recognized experts in the subject field.,,403

The Supreme Court also stated that:
We have no doubt that predicting human behavior, and
specifically whether a person has a proclivity to murder
based on certain risk factors, requires a highly
specialized psychological expertise. Ms. Neiss, while a
bona fide expert on domestic abuse, exceeded her
expertise by profiling batterers who kill and by
conveying to the jury that Brunson fell within that
profile. A case in point of Ms. Neiss testifying far
beyond her range of expertise was her conclusion that
Brunson suffered from depression - one of the ten risk
factors. Ms. Neiss did not possess the necessary
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psychiatric background to render such a diagnosis. The
trial court abused its discretion in qualifying her to so
testify.404

The Supreme Court further ruled that Neiss's testimony violated Rule 403 of the
Arkansas Rules of Evidence because its prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative
value, and also fell on the ultimate issue. 405

Justice Brown stated that "we believe that her testimony both mandated a conclusion
and was unduly prejudicial. After a description of each one of the ten risk factors
Mrs. Neiss borrowed from the article by Ms. O'Dell, the prosecutor elicited an
opinion from her regarding whether she thought that Brunson met the factors in this
case. For eight of the ten factors, Ms. Neiss answered affirmatively.,,406 "It is true that
the prosecutor did not ask Ms. Neiss specifically whether Brunson killed the victims.
Nevertheless, her profile about abusers-turned-murderers and Brunson in particular
placed Brunson squarely in the murderer category. This is particularly concerning,
since the State's only proof in this case was circumstantial and its theory centered
around Brunson's history of domestic abuse and his motive to kill an unfaithful wife
and her lover. Ms. Neiss's testimony, in effect, was clear indication to the jury that
Brunson was the culprit.,,407
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In reversing the judgment and conviction, the Supreme Court of Arkansas concluded
that "the profiling of batterers likely to become killers and then placing Brunson
within that category was unduly prejudicial to his case and, thus violated Rule
403.,,408

The above case has highlighted the problem that arises when profilers testify beyond
their expertise. This is because offender profiling is not well understood by many
people including judges. This is compounded by the fact that many criminal profilers
have what Professor Risinger and Loop described as "intimidating credentials from
the F.B.I.,,409 Judges and Jurors seem to be seduced by impressive qualifications. The
reliability of such testimony is thereby overlooked. Judges therefore, need
assistance/further guidelines when deciding to qualify a criminal profiler as an expert.

Professor Risinger and Loop have suggested that a pro filer with intimidating
credentials should "not be allowed to reveal his "pro filer credentials" to the jury
beyond saying that he had worked for many years for the FBI (or other organization)
as a specialist in the investigation of sexually driven crimes like rape and sexual
homicide, and that in the course of his career, both through research and through
involvement in actual cases, he or she had seen the details of many cases.,,410 Risinger
and Loop also maintained that "such a witness would only testify in regard to
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characteristics which

In

his expenence were truly rare

In

the type of crime

involved.,,411

In deciding whether an expert is qualified to give offender profiling testimony, it is
submitted that trial judges should first examine closely the purpose why the expert is
being called. From there the judge will have better idea as to whether such expert is
qualified in the area, assuming the testimony is relevant, and will assist the trier of
fact. For example, if an expert is needed on crime scene characteristics, or on modus
operandi, then a profiler with law enforcement background will be the best qualified
person in this area. If expert testimony is needed to show elements of motives and
fantasies, especially in sexual offenses, a forensic psychologist or a clinical
psychiatrist will be better placedlbest qualified to give testimony in this area. A
forensic psychiatrist, forensic psychologist or a criminologist is also better qualified
to give expert testimony on victimology. Similarly, a profiler with forensic science
background will be better placed to testify in cases where there were physical traces
and inferences can be drawn from them. However, as we suggested in chapter two, a
profiling team made up of the different segments provides the best alternative. In fact
this was the case in the early days when DNA profiling was being introduced into the
courtroom. Many experts, including geneticists, microbiologists, statisticians,
biologists, all came together, and courts began to accept DNA.

It is submitted that in all cases where offender profiling testimony is involved, the

trial judge should give a jury directive. The trial judge should inform the jury about
411
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the level of reliability and validity of offender profiling. This will assist them in
determining the weight (if any) to be accorded to the testimony.

Is Offender Profiling too Prejudicial than Probative?

As we mentioned earlier on, offender profiling is a technique based on probability,
suspicion, assumption and stereotypes. Stereotyping in particular creates prejudice.
Offender profiling involves creating a list of characteristics or character traits and
then an individual is placed within that category. This invariably leads judges and
jurors into reaching a certain conclusion. Hence, the prejudicial effect usually
outweighs its probative value.

Indeed as Professor Ormerod has pointed out, "profile evidence generates great
prejudice for the accused who possesses the stated characteristics, yet it is
insufficiently probative to point to the accused as being the guilty man rather than
someone who has the characteristics of the perpetrator.,,412 Professor Ormerod further
argued that:
This clear potential to generate great prejudice triggers
some familiar alarm bells. Jurors could choose to convict
a defendant who is a paedophile for that reason alone.
They may assign a disproportionate weight to the
evidence of the paedophilia, or deny the accused the
benefit of the doubt and convict on less than the full
standard of proof. There is also a very real and even
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more sinister danger: that the evidence of such traits
leads the police to "round up the usual suspects". If the
profiler relies on a statistic that, say, paedophiles who
murder are usually Caucasian and aged between 45 and
55, there is a risk that the police will only direct their
enquiries towards such people, therefore leading to
proportionally higher conviction rates of people who fit
the bill. This in tum feeds back into and distorts the
statistical data from which we began. 413

It has also been argued that "evidence of discreditable traits of the offender will be

transposed in the minds of the jury to the accused. We know that previous
convictions, or other discreditable conduct not amounting to a crime, also create in
the minds of the jury sinister prejudices.,,414 In fact "the most important of these
prejudices have recently been described as 'moral prejudice' and 'reasoning
prejudice' .,,415 Professor Ormerod concluded that the prejudicial effect of profile
evidence will in almost all cases substantially outweigh its limited probative value. 416

Courts are divided on this issue. While many courts have ruled that offender profiling
is too prejudicial and therefore inadmissible, many others believe that even if it is
prejudicial, that the prejudicial effect does not far outweigh its probative value. It is
submitted that the prejudicial effect of offender profiling far outweighs its probative
value and therefore, should be ruled inadmissible.
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In State v. Roquemore,417 offender profiling testimony was ruled to be too prejudicial
to the accused. The Court of Appeals of Ohio stated that profile evidence is based on
generalities and typical facts, and that these generalities and typical facts tend to place
the defendant into a stereotype. 418 It was held that this stereotyping causes the jury to
be prejudiced. 419 Hence, jurors "could decide the facts based on typical, and not the
actual, facts.,,42o

Similarly, in Brunson v. State,421 the Supreme Court of Arkansas, ruled that "allowing
expert to give profiling testimony both improperly mandated a legal conclusion
before jury, and constituted prejudicial error.,,422 The Supreme Court of Arkansas
further stated that "even assuming that profile testimony is in some degree relevant to
the issues at trial, the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused has generally been
found to outweigh the probative value.,,423

In People v. Robbie,424 the Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California, also
held that rapist profile testimony resulted in unfair prejudice. Walter Vincent Robbie
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was charged with and convicted by the Superior Court, Contra Costa County,
California, of kidnapping Jane Doe, for sexual purposes, oral copulation and
penetration with a foreign object. 425

At the trial, the defendant called witnesses who testified that he is an honest and nonviolent man. The defendant also called Jane's ex-boyfriend and Jane's three
classmates who testified that Jane was untruthful. Two other witnesses also testified
that Jane used drugs. On the other hand, the prosecution called Sharon Pagaling, a
special agent with the violent crime profiling unit, in the California Department of
Justice, to testify that the defendant's conduct was consistent with a certain type of
rapist (the type alleged in this case). The defense raised an objection to the admission
of this testimony. The defense argued that the testimony must be "limited to general
misconceptions about sex offenders, and that an expert cannot render an opinion as to
whether a defendant committed the charged crimes.,,426 Pagaling informed the court
that her testimony was "to disabuse the jury of common misconceptions about
conduct of a rapist. ,,427

The trial judge ruled that the testimony was admissible. It is noteworthy to point out
that during her testimony, Pagaling acknowledged the fact that the behaviors and
conduct that she stated were typical of rape cases, may also be found in non-rape
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cases. Robbie was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate term of fifteen years
to life and he appealed.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Pagaling's testimony was profile evidence and that
profile evidence is generally inadmissible to prove guilt.

Justice Corrigan, in the

opinion, stated that:
... profile evidence is inherently prejudicial because it
requires the jury to accept an erroneous starting point in
its consideration of the evidence. We illustrate the
problem by examining the syllogism underlying profile
evidence: criminals act in a certain way; the defendant
acted that way; therefore, the defendant is a criminal.
Guilt flows ineluctably from the major premise through
the minor one to the conclusion. The problem is the
major premise is faulty. It implies that criminals, and
only criminals act in a given way. In fact, certain
behavior may be consistent with both innocent and
illegal behavior, as the People's expert conceded here.
This flawed syllogism lay at the heart of Pagaling's
testimony. She was asked hypothetical questions
assuming certain behavior that had been attributed to the
defendant and was allowed to opine that it was the most
prevalent kind of sex offender conduct. The jury was
invited to conclude that if defendant engaged in the
conduct described, he was indeed a sex offender. 428

The Court of Appeals further stated that "profile evidence is unfairly relied upon to
affirmatively prove a defendant's guilt based on his match with the profile. The jury
is improperly invited to conclude that, because the defendant manifested some
characteristics, he committed a crime. ,,429 The Court ruled that the trial court erred by
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admitting the expert testimony. That profile evidence was inadmissible. It was held
that the erroneous admission of this testimony was not harmless. Therefore, the Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial. In
reversing the judgment, the Court of Appeals stated that "given the highly prejudicial
nature of the expert's testimony and the prosecutor's argument, we must conclude
there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a result more
favorable to defendant had the court excluded Pagaling's testimony.,,43o

In the above cases, profile evidence was inadmissible because of its unfair prejudice.
However, in several cases, some courts have admitted such evidence even though it
was clear that the prejudicial effect far outweighed the probative value. For instance,
in United States v. Webb,431 expert testimony on modus operandi was admitted and
ruled not prejudicial. The United States District Court for the Central District of
California convicted Marty Webb of possession of ammunition by a felon. Following
an informant's tip off, the Los Angeles Law enforcement officers, on October 17,
1995 arrested the defendant. When the officers searched the defendant's car, they
found a loaded gun wrapped in a shirt and concealed in the car's engine
compartment. 432 Webb claimed that he did not know that the gun was there.
The State presented a police expert at the trial, who testified on modus operandi,
"regarding the reasons people typically hide guns in the engine compartment of
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cars.,,433 The expert testified that people typically conceal guns in the engme
compartment of a car so that they have ready access to them, but police would not
easily find them and also to disclaim knowledge of the gun when the police find it.
The defendant objected to this testimony, arguing that it was improper and unduly
prejudicial and was also inadmissible based on the Evid.R. 704(b), which prohibits an
expert's opinion on the ultimate issue. The trial judge permitted the testimony and
stated that the police expert witness used the word "people" instead of the word
"criminals", hence it was not prejudicial. Furthermore, the trial judge ruled that the
expert did not give an opinion on whether the defendant knew that a gun was in his
car. Therefore, he ruled that the testimony was admissible. Webb was convicted and
he appealed.

At the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Webb contended that the trial
court erred by admitting the expert testimony. The defendant also argued that the
testimony ought to have been excluded because it was similar to a drug courier profile
evidence and also was an opinion on the ultimate issue. 434 The defendant also argued
that the trial court ought to have applied the Daubert criteria, which would have ruled
that the testimony was inadmissible because it was unreliable.

The Court of Appeals, through Justice Trott, ruled that the testimony on modus
operandi "was relevant to and probative of Webb's knowledge of the gun's presence.
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Moreover, the testimony explained evidence about the gun's whereabouts that easily
could have been beyond the knowledge of an average jurOr.,,435 Justice Trott further
stated that:

In addition, the trial court and the Government took
steps to mitigate the testimony's potential prejudicial
effect. The Government focused its questions on the
practices of "persons" rather than criminals or gang
members. Moreover, even if the jury drew the adverse
inference that Webb was a criminal, that inference
would not prejudice him because the jury already knew
that Webb was a criminal: Webb had stipulated that he
had been convicted of three prior felonies.

In light of the above, the district court properly
determined that the testimony'S prejudicial effect did
. 11 y outwelg
. h'ItS prob'
not substantla
atlve va1ue. 436

On the defendant's contention that the testimony was similar to a drug courier profile
evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that "none of the expert testimony in this case
was admitted to demonstrate that Webb was guilty because he fit the characteristics
of a certain drug-courier profile. Instead, the expert testimony was properly admitted
to assist the jury in understanding the reasons why a person would conceal a weapon
in the engine compartment of a car.,,437 Justice Trott also stated that the testimony did
not violate Evid.R. 704(b) which prohibits expert opinion on the ultimate issue.

The Court of Appeals further ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by not applying the Daubert criteria in this case. It was held that "because the expert
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testimony in this case constitutes specialized knowledge of law enforcement, not
scientific knowledge, the Daubert standards for admission simply do not apply.,,438

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the testimony on modus operandi and therefore, affirmed the judgment of
conviction. It should be noted that this case took place before the United States
Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co. in 1999, where it was held that the
Daubert criteria applied to all forms of expert testimony.

In Simmons v. State,439 offender profile testimony by a crime scene analyst was also
ruled not prejudicial. In this case, Clarence Leland Simmons was convicted of
intentional murder and capital murder by the Circuit Court, Jefferson County,
Alabama. On January 3, 1996 the nude body of a sixty-five year old woman (M.A.)
was discovered by a security guard at Highland Manor Apartments in Alabama. The
security guard, Alma Underwood, was instructed by the victim's daughter to check on
her because she had not heard from her and was worried. When the police arrived,
they discovered that M.A. had been stabbed to death and disemboweled.

44o

Police

investigation revealed that the last person seen with the victim was the defendant and
he was arrested for the murder.
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A piece of human tissue found on Simmon's pants was analyzed and the DNA from
the tissue matched M.A. 's blood sample.,,441 Several items were also collected from
the defendant's home. The autopsy was carried out by Dr. Robert Brissie.
According to Dr. Brissie, M.A's body had been cut by the
offender from the upper part of the abdomen, down the
front of the abdomen, down across the pubic bone, with
several extensive slicing wounds between the legs, then
upward on the back of M.A's buttocks, to the back.
Additionally, M.A. had been stabbed 73 times; these stab
wounds were approximately an inch and half in depth and
had marks indicating that the knife used to stab M.A. had a
hilt. He testified that six of these incised wounds extended
across the front ofM.A's neck. Many of these wounds had
been inflicted before M.A. died and, according to Dr.
Brissie, were probably intimidation wounds and not fatal.
Twenty-three of these wounds were concentrated in the
chest area, at least five of these wounds did not penetrate
the chest cavity and Dr. Brissie opined that some of these
wounds were inflicted while M.A. was alive. 442

Dr. Brissie also testified that "most of M.A's internal organs had been removed from
her body. Her left lung was separated into two pieces; her spleen and liver had been
cut; most of her large and small intestines were missing.,,443

At the trial, the State called several witnesses. First, Jack Neely testified that he met
the defendant and the victim the day before her murder at the South Place Pool Hall,
where he had an argument with the defendant and that the defendant threatened to cut
him into pieces. Loretta Chambers, a bartender at the Pool Hall, also testified that she
witnessed the confrontation and that Simmons was with the victim on that day
441
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(January 2, 1996). Betty Harper also testified that she saw Simmons and M.A. getting
into the elevator at M.A's apartment on January 2, 1996. Jerry Trousdale and Alma
Underwood who were the maintenance person and security guard at the apartment
building respectively, also testified that they saw Simmons enter the apartment with
M.A. the day before her murder and that Simmons was the last person seen with M.A.

In order to bolster their claim that the defendant should be convicted of capital
offense of murder committed during sexual assault, the prosecution decided to call
FBI agent Thomas Neer, who testified that the crime scene analysis showed that the
murder was sexually motivated. Neer was qualified by the trial court as an expert on
crime scene analysis and victimology. Neer testified that his analysis of the crime
scene and the autopsy report showed that the "offense was sexually motivated and
that the person who committed the offense did so for sexual gratification.,,444 The
defendant raised an objection to the admission of this testimony but it was denied.

Simmons was convicted of intentional murder and capital murder and sentenced to
death by electrocution. He appealed. Among other claims, the defendant argued that
the admission of Neer's testimony by the trial court was error. The defendant argued
that Neer's testimony was a novel scientific evidence and therefore, failed to meet
Frye criteria, which required such testimony to have gained general acceptance in the
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relevant scientific community.445 The defendant also contended that the testimony
was unduly prejudicial and violated the ultimate issue rule.

In its ruling, the Court of Appeals of Alabama disagreed with the appellant.
Delivering the opinion, Justice Fry said:
We reject Simmon's argument that Neer's testimony
was based on novel scientific evidence. Crime scene
analysis and victimology do not rest on scientific
principles like those contemplated in Frye; these fields
constitute
specialized
knowledge.
Specialized
knowledge offers subjective observations and
comparisons based on the expert's training, skill, or
experience that may be helpful to the jury in
understanding or determining the facts. Crime scene
analysis which involves the gathering and analysis of
physical evidence, is generally recognized as a body of
specialized knowledge. ... Therefore, because crime
scene analysis is not scientific evidence, we conclude
that we are not bound by the test enunciated by Frye. 446

Justice Fry further stated that Rule 702, Ala.R.Evid., was the proper standard for
admitting Neer's testimony. Justice Fry went on to say that:
Alabama Rule of Evidence 702 is identical to the
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Fairness to a party
seems to dictate that before evidence based on
specialized knowledge can be admitted against a party
at trial, the party is entitled to a determination that the
specialized knowledge is reliable and that it is relevant
to a material issue. Once the trial court determines that
the testimony involves a legitimate specialized
knowledge, that the witness is an expert in that field,
and that the expert testimony would assist the jury, a
party's rights are adequately protected by the ability to

445

Id.

446

Id, at 1151.

205

subject witnesses to cross-examination and to attack
the basis and methods used in developing the opinion.
Therefore, with the principles enunciated in Daubert
and Kumho in mind, we must determine whether the
fields of victimology and crime-scene analysis
constitute reliable specialized knowledge; whether
Neer is an expert within these fields; and whether the
subject matter of his testimony is relevant and assists
the trier of fact in this case. 447

"During defense counsel's cross-examination of Neer, Neer testified that crime-scene
analysis of homicides that appear to be sexually motivated began developing as a
specialized field in the late 1970s and that the research has been published within the
field and subjected to peer review. Neer established the general acceptance of
victimology when he testified that numerous law enforcement agencies relied upon
crime-scene analysis and victimology when conducting their investigations. Neer
detailed the theories supporting crime scene analysis and victimology, the way the
theories are applied by others with the same "specialized knowledge," and the way
the specialized knowledge was applied in this particular case. He further explained
the method in which he conducted his investigation and the factors considered in
reaching his determination. We recognize that through interviews, case studies, and
research a person may acquire superior knowledge concerning characteristics of an
offense. Thus, based on the record before us, adequate evidence was presented to
establish the reliability of crime-scene analysis and victimology as fields of
specialized knowledge. 448
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The Court of Appeals further held that "the jury in this case was presented with a
homicide trial at which no eyewitnesses testified. M.A.'s body was discovered in a
horrifying, mutilated condition. The method and motivation for killing an elderly
female presented serious questions for the jury to resolve. Whether the offender
received sexual gratification while committing the offense was a critical issue of the
case, and Neer's testimony was probative on that issue. Inferences had to be drawn
from the physical evidence presented at the crime scene. Neer offered observations of
the crime scene and the elderly female victim that would assist the jury in evaluating
the circumstances surrounding the murder and the reasons for the method employed
by the offender. "A homicide and its crime scene, after all, are not matters likely to be
within the knowledge of an average trier of fact" (United States v. deSoto, 885 F.2d
354,359 (i h Cir.1989).

,,449

In a nutshell, the Court of Appeals ruled that the expert testimony assisted the jury
and so its admission by the trial court was not error. The Court also ruled that the
testimony was more probative than prejudicial, and did not violate the ultimate rule
issue. The Court of Appeals stated that "in this case, Neer frankly conceded the
limitations of his testimony. He unequivocally testified that he was not saying that
Simmons committed the murder, only that in his opinion the physical evidence from
the crime scene and from M.A.' s body indicated that the offense itself was sexually
motivated. Neer did not reach a "diagnosis" of sexual abuse and certainly did not
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identify the offender; thus, we do not perceive Neer's testimony as testimony on the
ultimate issue. ,,450

Justice Fry concluded that even if the admission of the expert testimony was error, it
would still be ruled as harmless error. 451 The Court of Appeals affirmed the death
sentence on the capital murder charge, but "remanded with directions as to sentencing
for count 111; and reversed as to conviction and sentence imposed pursuant to count
11. ,,452

This case clearly demonstrates my argument that the outcome of any trial involving
offender profiling testimony to a great extent is determined by the admissibility
standard applied by the trial court. In this case, the Court of Appeals stated that Rule
702 Ala. R.Evid., was the appropriate standard and applied it in this case. On the
other hand, the defendant/appellant contended that the Frye test standard, which
presumably would have excluded the testimony, was the proper standard that ought to
have been applied. In this case, the reliability of the testimony seems to have been
loosely interpreted by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The Courts
placed more emphasis on relevance and assistance to the trier of fact, without much
enquiry into whether the basis of such testimony was generally accepted by the
relevant community. The trial court particularly believed that crime scene analysis
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and victimology were reliable because "numerous law enforcement agencies relied
upon crime-scene analysis and victimology when conducting their investigations.,,453
This is a dangerous basis to guage the reliability of any technique. The trial court
simply took the expert's words ipse dixit and seemed to have been seduced by Neer's
impressive qualifications. The usefulness of a technique in assisting in crime
investigation should not be taken as an indication that the technique will be
sufficiently reliable as to be admissible in the courtroom.

State v. Sorabella 454 contrasts with the above case. In Sorabella, the court recognized

the fact that profile evidence is prejudicial, but believed that the prejudicial effect can
be minimized by limiting the scope of the testimony. In January 2000, the New
Britain Police Department, in Connecticut, decided to launch an undercover operation
in an attempt to stop the increased violations of the state's child pornography laws via
the internet. Detective James Wardwell was one of the detectives assigned to the
operation, and on January 4, 2000, he logged onto the America Online (AOL) chat
room and posed as a thirteen year old girl, under the screen name "Danutta333. 455 He
received an instant message from a man with a screen name - "JoSkotr.,,456 They
started to exchange instant messages during which "JoeSkotr" asked the thirteen year
old girl to meet up with him for sexual relations, telling the girl how she should dress
and what he wanted her to do to him and vice versa. He told the girl that he lived in
453
454
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Massachusetts but will come to Connecticut to meet her at a donut shop. "JoeSkotr"
sent pornographic materials to the girl within this time. On March 8, 2000, they
agreed to meet up at a donut shop, but "JoeSkotr" went to the wrong shop. He
arranged another meeting on March 14, 2000 at a shopping mall. On arrival at the
shopping mall, he was arrested by the police.

"JoeSkotr" was identified as John Sorabella, and he was charged with (1) two counts
of attempt to commit sexual assault in the second degree, (2) two counts of attempt to
commit risk of injury to a child by sexual contact, (3) three counts of attempt to
commit risk of injury to a child, (4) one count of attempt to entice a minor to engage
in sexual activity, (5) one count of importing child pornography, and (6) one count of
.

ob scemty.

457

At the trial, the State called Kenneth Lanning, a former FBI agent, who testified that
the defendant possessed the psychological and behavioral characteristics of child sex
offenders. In his testimony, Lanning stated that Sorabella falls under the category of
sex offenders called "preferential offenders". Lanning testified that there are what he
referred to, as the "customs and habits" of preferential sex offenders and situational
sex offenders.

458

According to Lanning, situational sex offenders take
advantage of opportunistic situations to engage in sex
offenses and are typically thought-driven, undertaking
action without consideration of getting caught. Lanning
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testified further that preferential sex offenders are
individuals who have specific sexual preferences for
certain activities or victims and whose behavior is
normally need-driven or fantasy-driven. Preferential
sex offenders typically collect pornography, erotica and
mementos relating to their sexual interest or preference
and spend a great deal of time and money in fulfilling
their sexual needs or fantasies. With respect to
preferential sex offenders with an interest in children,
they may use child pornography to rationalize
abhorrent behavior, fuel and reinforce their sexual
arousal or lower a potential victim's inhibitions by
conveying the message that other children are doing it.
Preferential sex offenders typically will engage in a
prolonged and elaborate grooming or seduction process
that is designed to exploit and manipulate vulnerable
children. Preferential sex offenders may lessen the
grooming time by targeting a child who is sexually
experienced. 459

The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony, but it was denied.
The defense counsel argued that the State failed to demonstrate the admissibility of
the testimony as required in the decision in State v. Porter,460 when a scientific
evidence is being presented. The defense also argued that the testimony should not be
admitted because of its prejudicial effect. Denying the motion, the trial court stated
that Lanning's testimony was not scientific, and so Porter does not apply. However,
the court instructed the expert to limit his testimony only to 'customs and habits' of
preferential sex offenders. That the expert should not state his opinion on the
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defendant's state of mind or whether he fits the characteristics of the preferential sex
offenders. 461

The trial court admitted the testimony and stated that its probative value outweighed
its prejudicial effect. The trial court also stated that the testimony was relevant to "the
defendant's intent in engaging in the behavior, his belief as to the age of Danuta333
and whether his conduct was corroborative of his purpose as at least the start of a line
of conduct leading naturally to the crime.,,462

The defendant was convicted by the jury on all counts and was sentenced to ten years
imprisonment, execution suspended after five years, and fifteen years probation. 463
The defendant appealed and the case reached the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Among other issues, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
not subjecting Agent Lanning's testimony to a Porter hearing. The defendant also
argued that the prejudicial effect of the testimony far outweighed its probative value.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the lower court's judgment and stated
that the expert testimony was not scientific. Therefore, a Porter hearing was not
required. The Supreme Court stated that:
The trial court reasonably concluded that Lanning's
testimony was relevant and likely to assist the jury in
461
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light of the nature of the charges and Lanning's
experience and expertise in matters relating to the
victimization of children. The court also carefully
evaluated the potential prejudicial effect of the testimony
and reasonably concluded that its probative value
outweighed any such effect. Moreover, the court guarded
against the possibility of undue prejudice by limiting the
scope of Lanning's testimony to 'customs and habits' of
preferential sex offenders in general and by prohibiting
Lanning from expressing any opinion either about the
defendant's mental state or about whether the defendant
fit the profile of a preferential sex offender. We
conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the probative value of
Lannin~s'
testimony outweighed any prejudicial
44
effect.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut therefore, affinned the judgment of conviction.

Is Offender Profiling an Opinion on the Ultimate Issue?

First, what is ultimate issue rule? The Ultimate Issue Rule is a rule which prohibits an
expert, lay or expert, from giving an opinion on an issue of law or fact which is for
the court to decide. Hence, "ultimate issues in criminal trials may be defined as the
ultimate, sometimes called material facts which must be proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt before a defendant can be found guilty of a particular
offence and those facts, if any, which must be proved by the defendant in order to
avoid guilt for that offence. ,,465 All witnesses are barred from testifying on the
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ultimate issue to be decided by the court, which is the issue of guilt or innocence.
Testifying on the ultimate issue is seen as usurping the function of the trier of fact, an
invasion of the province/ken of the jury.

The ultimate issue rule has faced a lot of criticism. McCormick was very critical of
the ultimate issue rule. He maintained that "this general rule is unduly restrictive, is
pregnant with close questions of application, and often unfairly obstructs the party's
presentation of his case.,,466 McCormick further argued that "even the courts which
profess adherence to the rule fail to apply it with consistency. All such courts, for
example, disregard the supposed rule, usually without explanation as to why it should
not be applied, when value, sanity, handwriting and identity are in issue.,,467

Wigmore also maintained that the phrase "usurping the function of the jury" is "a
mere bit of empty rhetoric." He contended that:
There is no such reason for the rule, because the witness,
in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to "usurp"
the jury's functions; nor could if he desired. He is not
attempting it, because his error (if it were one) consists
merely in offering to the jury a piece of testimony which
ought not to go there; and he could not usurp it if he
would, because the jury may still reject his opinion and
accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the
judge's order, can compel them to accept the witness'
. . agamst
. th'
opmIOn
elf own. ,,468
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"Furthermore, the rule if carried out strictly and invariably would exclude the most
necessary testimony. When all is said, it remains simply one of those impracticable
and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in principle.,,469

Friedland et al argued that the ultimate issue rule "often made it unreasonably
difficult for advocates to present their cases, forcing the witnesses into verbal
contortions to avoid the disfavored magic phrasing.,,47o Similarly, Jackson maintained
that the "the rule is superfluous and that cases which have recently excluded evidence
on the grounds of the rule can be supported on other grounds.,,471 Keane also argued
that "the objection of undue influence makes no allowance for cases in which the
tribunal of facts is a professional judge rather than a jury, overlooks the frequency of
conflicts in expert testimony and is largely incompatible with the very justification for
admitting expert evidence, that the drawing of inferences from the facts in question
calls for an expertise which the tribunal of facts does not possess. ,,472

Following the criticisms, the ultimate Issue rule has been abolished in many
jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions added certain exceptions to the rule. In United
States, the Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides the guideline on the ultimate issue.
The Rule states that:
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Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of
the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier
of fact alone. 473

Courts have been inconsistent with their decisions on the ultimate issue when it
comes to offender profiling evidence. In some cases, offender profile evidence has
been ruled inadmissible based on the ultimate issue, while in many others, it has been
seen as not an opinion on the ultimate issue.

In State v. Armstrong,474 the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, ruled that
expert testimony regarding the "psychological dynamics" of the defendant was
"inadmissible expression of opinion as to defendant's innocence." Craigory A.
Armstrong was charged with aggravated rape of his eight year old cousin. On the day
of the rape, the girl was sleeping in her mother's house, when the defendant

(who

also lived there), raped her. The victim told her twelve year old sister about the rape
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but they did not tell their mother. It was reported that two days later, the girl
complained of stomach cramps and was taken to Dr. Gregory Molden's clinic. The
medical tests showed that the girl had gonorrhea. Dr. Molden therefore, contacted the
child protection bureau of New Orleans Police Department. Interviews with the
victim and her sister revealed the rape and Armstrong was arrested.

During police interrogation, Armstrong admitted having sexual intercourse with the
eight year old girl, but claimed that the girl initiated it.

475

He also claimed that he

once had gonorrhea, but thought that it had been cured. At trial, he called three
witnesses who attested to his credibility. He also called a clinical psychologist who
testified that his "psychological dynamics would not support the view of him being a
child sexual perpetrator.,,476

The prosecution objected to the admission of this testimony. In its ruling, the
Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans, excluded the testimony. Justice George v.
Perez stated that "the testimony of Armstrong's expert would have been an
expression of opinion as to Armstrong's innocence.,,477 The petit jury convicted
Armstrong of forcible rape and he was sentenced to twenty-five years, at hard
labor. 478 He appealed his conviction and contended that (1) the trial court erred by
excluding the testimony by the clinical psychologist which showed that he did not
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have the 'psychological dynamics' of child sex offenders; (2) that the trial court also
erred by making his confession known to the jury.

The Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, ruled that the exclusion of expert
testimony by the clinical psychologist was not error. The Court of Appeals stated that
under the Louisiana Code of Evidence Art.704, regarding opinion on ultimate issue,
that "an expert shall not express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused.,,479 Delivering the judgment, Justice Ward said: "In this case, where the
expert would give an opinion as to the innocence of Armstrong, the trial court did not
abuse that discretion. As a matter of fact, that testimony was not admissible.,,48o The
Court of Appeals therefore, affirmed the trial court's judgment and sentence.

Other cases where profile testimony was ruled inadmissible based on the ultimate
issue include State v. Haynes,481 where it was held that:
The testimony as to timing and panic embraced the
ultimate issue of intent to be decided by the jury. Under
Evid.R. 704, "opinion testimony on an ultimate issue is
admissible if it assists the trier of the fact, otherwise it
is not admissible. The competency of the trier of the
fact to resolve the factual issue determines whether or
not the opinion testimony is of assistance." For this
reason, an ultimate issue opinion by an expert should
be excluded in extreme cases where that opinion IS
482
inherently misleading or unduly prejudicia1.
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Similarly, in State v. Parkinson,483 the Court of Appeals of Idaho ruled that the
admission of expert testimony on sex offender profiles was an opinion on the ultimate
issue. The Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's ruling that "the expert opinion
evidence would constitute a direct comment on the guilt or innocence of Parkinson
and replace, rather than aid, the jury's function.,,484

The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Brunson v. State 485 also ruled that expert
testimony on the predictability of batterers who would become murderers was an
opinion on the ultimate issue. In this case, The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that
the "profile testimony both mandated a conclusion and was unduly prejudicial.,,486

It should be noted however, that in United States v. Webb,487 the United States Court

of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, ruled that expert testimony on modus operandi, regarding
the reasons why people conceal weapons in the engine compartment of cars was not
impermissible opinion on the ultimate issue. In this case, the United States Court of
Appeals said:
Webb next argues that the expert testimony was
inadmissible because it constitutes testimony on his state
of mind, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).
Rule 704(b) prohibits an expert from stating his opinion
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on the ultimate issue of whether a defendant had the
particular mental state at issue.
The expert in this case described a typical situation, and
never offered any opinion about whether Webb knew the
weapon was hidden in his car. The expert testified about
a typical way people conceal weapons in cars and the
typical reasons for their concealment. In fact, on crossexamination, the expert admitted that he had no
information that Webb knew the weapon was in the
engine compartment. Under these circumstances, it was
left to the jury to determine whether Webb knew the gun
was hidden in the car. Thus, the expert did not give an
impermissible opinion under Rule 704(b).488

In Simmons v. State,489 expert testimony by an FBI agent that the crime scene
characteristics indicated that the murder was sexually motivated and so the offender
received sexual gratification from the acts was ruled not a violation of the ultimate
issue rule. The court said: "in this case, Neer frankly conceded the limitations of his
testimony. He unequivocally testified that he was not saying that Simmons committed
the murder, only that in his opinion the physical evidence from the crime scene and
from M.A. 's body indicated that the offense itself was sexually motivated. Neer did
not reach a "diagnosis" of sexual abuse and certainly did not identify the offender;
thus we do not perceive Neer's testimony as testimony on the ultimate issue.,,49o

In the final analysis, it does appear that ultimate issue is in-built in all forms of
offender profile evidence. By that we mean that no matter how or which form or
shape offender profile is being presented, there is the over-lapping tendency to touch
488
489
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on the ultimate issue. Offender profile testimony and its derivatives are generally
geared towards one thing - pointing to the accused as being either guilty or innocent.
In effect, profile evidence is a 'leading' evidence. It leads to a certain conclusion. It
should be noted however, that with appropriate jury instruction by the trial judge, this
problem can at least be minimized. The trial judge should in all cases, limit the scope
of the testimony and remind the witnesses of their role to testify and not to decide the
case. We are in support of the ultimate issue rule, at least in cases involving offender
profiling, as without it witnesses will go beyond their function to assist with their
testimony, and extend their role into that of final arbiters. The result will then be a
trial by witnesses rather than trial by judges and jurors.

Is Offender Profiling Sufficiently Reliable as to be Admissible?

Offender profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. Offender profiling
involves gathering information from various sources - from the crime scene,
witnesses, victim statements, autopsy reports, offender's physical characteristics, age,
race, criminal records, and so on. The question then is - how reliable is information
gathered in this manner/from these sources? Should it be tendered in court as an
indication or proof of guilt or innocence? Offender profiling does not point to specific
offenders. It cannot determine that a given defendant committed a specific act.
Offender profiling only predicts, it suggests, but it cannot prove. We should also bear
in mind the problem posed by crime scene 'staging', which could lead to profiling
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being based on inaccurate crime scene analysis. Fundamentally, offender profiling is
very useful in narrowing down the suspects during crime investigation, but it has not
reached the level of reliability necessary for courtroom use. The modus operandi of
offenders may assist judges and jurors in understanding the behavioral patterns in
some cases, but that alone is not a sufficient basis to warrant its admission in court,
nor is that an adequate proof that the technique is reliable.

Many scholars agree that offender profiling is not a reliable technique. It is a
technique whose foundation or scientific basis cannot be ascertained at the moment.
Godwin maintained that, "Nine out often profiles are vapid. They play at blind man's
bluff, groping in all directions in the hope of touching a sleeve. Occasionally they do,
but not firmly enough to seize it, for the behaviourists producing them must
necessarily deal in generalities and types. But policemen can't arrest a type. They
require hard data: names, dates, none of which the psychiatrists [or others involved in
creating profile evidence] can offer.,,491

Alison et al noted that "there remains no evidence that the scientific community has
accepted the technique as an accurate or reliable indicator of identification of an
offender. Therefore, it would probably not be surprising to learn that police officers
remain relatively unaware of the benefits and limitations of profiling and of the ways
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in which they should or should not be utilized. It is incumbent upon the profi1er to
outline the expectations that officers had of the account.,,492

Professor Risinger and Loop maintained that "while still a valuable investigatory tool
perhaps, the existing data does not indicate that process of offender profiling results
in sufficiently reliable information to support evidentiary admissibility.,,493

On a similar vem, Professor Ormerod and Sturman maintained that "the
psychological profile has serious limitations: it is practiced in an inconsistent manner,
often from unverified base of material by a body of individuals with diverse levels of
training and experience, and inadequate independent monitoring and review.,,494
They concluded that "psychologists face the struggle of demonstrating the reliability
of the technique and of the people who practice it.,,495

Snook et a1 carried out a narrative review of 130 articles on criminal profiling and
meta-analytic reviews and concluded that criminal profiling "appears at this juncture
to be an extraneous and redundant technique for use in criminal investigations.,,496
They also concluded that criminal profiling "will persist as a pseudoscientific
492 Alison, L., West, A, and Goodwill A, "The Academic and the Practitioner Pragmatists' Views of
Offender Profiling", 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 78 (2004).
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technique until such time as empirical and reproducible studies are conducted on the
abilities of large groups of active profilers to predict, with more precision and greater
magnitude, the characteristics of offenders.,,497

As we stated in chapter three, the rules guiding the admissibility of expert testimony
in United States, emphasize the reliability of any expert evidence. Yet, in many cases
involving offender profiling the reliability of the technique was not questioned, as in

State v. Pennell. 498 However, some courts agree that offender profiling is unreliable
and have ruled it inadmissible.

In State v. Cavallo 499 for instance, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that the
technique is not generally accepted as being reliable. In this case, two defendants,
Michael Cavallo and David R. Murro were convicted of rape, abduction and private
lewdness. On June 16, 1977 the two defendants met the victim (S.T.) at the Pittstown
bar in Hunterdon, New Jersey. The victim who was two months pregnant at the time
of the alleged rape, claimed that the defendants abducted her from the bar and took
her to an empty field where she was raped. The defendants on the other hand, claimed
that they had consensual sexual encounter with S.T. The two sides gave conflicting
versions of events that took place that night. There were no eye witnesses.
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At the trial, Cavallo sought to introduce testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. Kuris
which will show that he does not have the psychological traits of a rapist. 500 The
defense informed the court that Dr. Kuris was being proffered to testify as to "Mr.
Cavallo's character which is that he knows right from wrong, that he is a wellmeaning individual, he would not willfully do a wrong, he recognizes the force and
violence of rape are wrongful acts, he is non-violent, non-aggressive person and he
will also testify to the fact the physical or the characteristics exhibited by rapists in
his experience as a psychiatrist are these people are aggressive, violent people and
that Mr. Cavallo does not fit within this mold.,,501

The prosecution argued that the testimony should be excluded because it was
irrelevant and not reliable. The prosecution contended that the expert character
evidence was irrelevant "since regardless of whether Cavallo has the characteristics
of a "rapist", he may indeed have committed rape on this particular occasion.,,502 The
Hunterdon County Superior Court ruled that the testimony was inadmissible. The
defendants were convicted. Cavallo was sentenced to three to five years for
abduction, one to two years for lewdness and ten to twenty years for rape. Murro was
sentenced to three to seven years for abduction, two to three years for lewdness and
twelve to twenty years for rape. 503 Their request for a new trial was denied. The case
went to the Superior Court, Appellant Division.
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The appellate division agreed with the trial court's decision to exclude the expert
testimony. It was held that the expert character testimony was inadmissible under
Rule 47, which governs the admissibility of character evidence. so4 The appellate
division stated that "the rule could not contemplate testimony of the kind proffered in
this case"sos, and that the admission of such testimony "could divert the attention of
the jury from factual guilt or innocence to the defendant's propensities."so6 The
appellate division affirmed the convictions but remanded the trial for re-sentencing,
as the court deemed the sentences excessive. The defendants each later received ten to
fifteen years for rape and lesser sentences on the abduction and private lewdness
charges.

The case reached the Supreme Court of New Jersey where the defendants argued that
the exclusion of the expert character evidence was error. In their ruling, the Supreme
Court stated that the evidence by Dr. Kuris was not generally accepted as being
reliable. Delivering the judgment, Justice Pashrnan stated that the "defendants have
thus failed to persuade us that the proffered evidence has been accepted as reliable by
other jurisdictions, or for other purposes in the New Jersey legal system. Defendants
therefore have not met their burden under Rule 56 of showing that Dr. Kuris'
testimony is based on reasonably reliable scientific prernises."so7 In a footnote, the
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Supreme Court noted that "even if psychiatric testimony of this nature were found to
be generally admissible, we would have serious questions about whether the
foundation for Dr. Kuris' testimony - only two meetings with Cavallo - is sufficient
to support the conclusions drawn about his personality and propensities.,,508

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the appellate division's judgment and
concluded that the "defendants have not met their burden of showing that the
scientific community generally accepts the existence of identifiable character traits
common to rapists. They also have not demonstrated that psychiatrists possess any
special ability to discern whether an individual is likely to be a rapist. Until the
scientific reliability of this type of evidence is established, it is not admissible.,,509

In State v. Lowe,510expert testimony on offender's behavioral motivations was also
ruled inadmissible. The defendant, Terry Lowe was charged with two counts of
aggravated murder of Phyllis Mullet and Murray Griffin. On July 5, 1986, Phyllis
Mullet was at her home in Belle Center, Ohio, when she was stabbed to death,
multiple times, with her throat cut. 511 Murray Griffin, a Belle Center Marshall was at
the scene, attending to the victim, when the perpetrator shot him and he also died at
the scene. When the trial began, the State filed a notice of intention to call FBI agents
who will testify on crime scene characteristics, which will assist in the identification
508
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of Lowe as the person who committed the murders. The State informed the court that
the FBI agents will testify regarding the psychological profile of the offender. That
FBI Agent John Douglas will testify on criminal investigative analysis and death
threat analysis. That Agent Douglas will testify regarding the offender's motivation
for the murder of Mullet, as well as the motivation behind a certain document that
Lowe had written. S12 It was reported that this document contained a list of women and
the names of their immediate family members and that the document contained sexual
languages and that Mullet's name was on the list. S13

In his testimony, Agent Douglas stated that based on his review of the crime scene
photographs, autopsy reports, police reports and the document written by Lowe, that
he was of the opinion that the murder of Phyllis Mullet was sexually motivated. He
testified that his opinion was based on (1) "the fact Mullet's hands and feet were
bound with ligatures that had been brought to the scene by the perpetrator of the
crime," the "presence of the ligatures indicated preplanning on the part of the
perpetrator," and that preplanning is one of the characteristics of sexually motivated
murders. Sl4 Agent Douglas further stated that the document written by Lowe was
sexually motivated and represented the perpetrator's plan or mission for power. SIS It
should be pointed out that during cross-examination, Agent Douglas acknowledged
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the fact that his testimony on the motivations could not be "stated to a reasonable
scientific certainty.,,516

The defendant presented Dr. Solomon Ful ero , a psychologist, to rebut Douglas's
testimony. In his testimony, Dr. Fulero also acknowledged the fact that "opinions
based on criminal-investigative analysis do not rise to the level of reasonable
scientific certainty that is a prerequisite to consideration as expert opinion
testimony. ,,517

In its ruling, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress Agent
Douglas' testimony. The State appealed, after certification of its inability to proceed
to trial without the suppressed testimony. The State argued that the trial court erred in
granting the motion to suppress the testimony.

The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, reiterated the fact that a trial judge has
the discretion to decide whether any evidence is relevant and will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The Court of Appeals
said:
In this case before us, the trial court suppressed the
testimony of Douglas upon finding, inter alia, that "Mr.
Douglas' opinion is an investigative tool like a
polygraph; it might be used to investigate, but it does not
have the reliability to be evidence." Having given careful
consideration to the testimony elicited in this matter, we
conclude that there is evidence in the record to support
516
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the trial court's finding that the opinion testimony of
Douglas is not reliable evidence.
As a whole, the record reflects that Douglas's opinion for
the most part is based on the behavioral science of
clinical psychology, an area in which he has no formal
education, training or license. In short, the purported
scientific analytical processes to which Douglas testified
are based on intuitiveness honed by his considerable
experience in the field of homicide investigation. While
we in no way trivialize the importance of Douglas' work
in the field of crime detection and criminal apprehension,
we do not find that there was sufficient evidence of
reliability adduced to demonstrate the relevancy of the
testimony or to qualify Douglas as an expert witness.
Accordingl~, the error as assigned by the state is
overruled. S 8

The Court of Appeals therefore, affirmed the trial court's decision to suppress Agent
Douglas'testimony.

Similarly, in State v. Stevens,519 the Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a trial
court's decision to exclude expert testimony on crime scene analysis. In excluding the
testimony, the trial court stated that it was not "convinced that this type of analysis
has been subject to adequate objective testing, or that it is based upon longstanding,
reliable, scientific principles."s2o In Stevens, the defendant William Richard Stevens
was charged with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder of his wife, Sandi
Stevens and his mother-in-law Myrtle Wilson. He was also charged with one count of
aggravated robbery. On December 22, 1997 the defendant called the police and when
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the police arrived at his mobile home in Nashville, Tennessee, they found the
defendant, his friend Corey Milliken and the bodies of the victims. It was reported
that Mrs. Stevens' nude body was "left in a "displayed" position, which is, lying on
her back with her legs spread apart.,,52J Pornographic magazines and Sandi's own
nude photographs were also found around her body.522 Wilson's nightgown was
pulled above her waist. The police found no sign of a forced entry into the apartment.
The police suspected that the house showed signs of "staging" and so Stevens and
Milliken were the immediate suspects. While the police were questioning Milliken,
they noticed blood stains on his shirt, under his nails and gouge marks on his wrist
and cheek. 523 Milliken confessed that Stevens had hired him to kill his wife and make
it look like a robbery. The medical examination revealed that Sandi Stevens died as a
result of ligature strangulation. That she also had a tear in her vagina. The medical
examination showed that Wilson died as a result of stab wounds and manual
strangulation.

At the trial, the State presented several witnesses, including Shawn Austin Milliken,
the junior brother of Corey Milliken, who testified that in 1997 Stevens offered him
and his brother $2,500 each to kill his wife. He testified that he later decided not to go
on with the plan and so Corey accepted $5,000 to carry out the murder on his own.
The State also presented evidence of Steven's conviction in 1997 for second degree
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murder. During the trial, Stevens claimed that Corey Milliken killed Sandi and Myrtle
during his sexual assault on them. He argued that he did not hire Corey to kill the two
women. The defense decided to call Mr. Gregg McCrary, a former FBI Agent and an
expert on crime scene analysis. McCrary was called to testify that "Milliken
committed sexual murder as an act of aggression precipitated by an argument with his
mother and step-father the night before the crimes."S24 "Mr. McCrary testified that the
display of pornographic magazines around Mrs. Stevens could "best be interpreted as
an attempt to further humiliate or degrade" the victim, which goes to the motive of a
sex crime." He defined a sex crime as primarily a crime of violence in which the
perpetrator uses sex to punish, humiliate, and degrade the victim."s2s McCrary
testified outside the jury. He stated that from his analysis of the crime scene photos,
the crime scene video tapes, the autopsy report and Sandi Steven's diary, he was of
the opinion that the crime scene indicated characteristics of a "disorganized sexual
homicide."s26 As such, that the murders were sexually motivated. In his testimony,
McCrary also made distinctions between the characteristics of "disorganized sexual
homicide crime scene" and a "contract murder crime scene."S27 McCrary said:
The crime scene is quite sloppy and in great disarray.
There is minimal use of restraints. The sexual acts tend
to occur after death; so, there is post-mortem injury to
the victim ... indication of post-mortem sexual activity.
The body is left at the death scene and is typically left
in view. There's a good deal of physical evidence
that's - that's left at the scene. And, anytime just a
524

Id, at 827.

525

Id, at 828.

526

Id, at 830.

527

I d.

232

weapon of opportunity that the offender uses, and by
that, I mean a weapon that is contained at the scene,
uses it and then, it's not uncommon for the offender to
leave that weapon either at or near-near the scene. 528
McCrary further testified that "criminals usually commit disorganized violent crimes
as a result of some "precipitating stressors, or stressful event" in the criminal's life.
Such an event invokes a lot of anger in the offender, and that anger - transferred onto
the victim - triggers this violent behavior.,,529 He also stated that his crime scene
analysis indicated that more than one person committed the murders and that the
crime scene also showed elements of 'staging.'

The reliability of McCrary's testimony was questioned during cross-examination.
On cross-examination, Mr. McCrary testified that the
FBI had conducted a study to determine the accuracy rate
of its crime scene analysis. The results of that study
yielded a seventy-five to eight percent accuracy rate. He
presented as further evidence of the reliability of crime
scene analysis the FBI's increased number of trained
agents in this field from seven to forty. Although Mr.
McCrary acknowledged that crime scene analysis "is not
hard science where you can do controlled experiments
and come up with the ratios in all this," he said that "the
proof that there is validation and reliability in the process
is that it's being accepted. It's being used and the
demand is just outstripping our resources to provide it. 530

In its ruling, the trial court qualified McCrary as an expert on crime scene staging and
he was allowed to testify that the murders could be the work of more than one person.
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The court however, ruled that McCrary's testimony would not be admitted on the
issue of the motives for the murders. The trial court stated that "while the expert and
many of the other FBI profilers are a tremendous asset as an investigative tool in law
enforcement, the expert's testimony regarding the motivation of the suspect could not
comply with the Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 in terms of substantially assisting
the trier of fact, because there is no trustworthiness or reliability.,,531

The trial court also stated that it was not "convinced that this type of analysis has
been subject to adequate objective testing, or that it is based upon longstanding,
reliable, scientific principles.,,532 Justice Steve Dozier, delivering the judgment, also
stated that the testimony could not satisfy the McDaniet
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test of scientific reliability.

It should be noted that Stevens also called other witnesses, including family members,
co-workers, and neighbors, who testified that he was a good father, a good and
hardworking employee and always helped his neighbors. 534

Stevens was found guilty by the Criminal Court, Davidson County, Tennessee, and
sentenced to death for the murders and also sentenced to life without parole on the
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aggravated robbery charge. Corey Milliken pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and
was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction and the
sentence. The case automatically went to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, as it was a
death sentence for first degree murder. 535 Among other issues, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the trial court erred by limiting McCrary's testimony.
The Supreme Court agreed with both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
decisions and held that McDaniel applied to both scientific and non scientific
testimony.

On the issue of the reliability of the expert's testimony, the Supreme Court stated:
"Consequently, we are reluctant to measure the reliability of expert testimony that is
not based on scientific methodology under a rigid application of the McDaniel
factors. However, we are equally reluctant to admit nonscientific expert testimony
based on an unchallenged acceptance of the expert's qualifications and an
unquestioned reliance on the accuracy of the data supporting the expert's
conclusions. ,,536

Delivering the judgment ofthe Supreme Court, Justice Barker further stated that:
This type of crime scene analysis, developed by the FBI as a
means of criminal investigation, relies on the expert's
535
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subjective judgment to draw conclusions as to the type of
individual who committed this crime based on the physical
evidence found at the crime scene. Although we do not doubt
the usefulness of behavioral analysis to assist law enforcement
officials in their criminal investigations, we cannot allow an
individual's guilt or innocence to be determined by such
"opinion evidence connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit" of the expert. Essentially, the jury is encouraged to
conclude that because this crime scene has been identified by
an expert to exhibit certain patterns or telltale clues consistent
with previous sexual homicides triggered by "precipitating
stressors", then it is more likely that this crime was similarly
motivated. 537

Justice Barker also stated that:
Moreover, we find that the FBI's study revealing a seventyfive to eighty percent accuracy rate for crime scene analysis
lacks sufficient trustworthiness to constitute evidence of this
technique'S reliability. Although the frequency with which a
technique leads to accurate or erroneous results is certainly
one important factor to determine reliability, equally
important is the method for determining that rate of accuracy
or error. In this case, there is no testimony regarding how the
FBI determined the accuracy rate of this analysis. For
example, was accuracy determined by confessions or
convictions, or both? Even then, the absence of a confession
does not indicate the offender's innocence and thus an
inaccuracy in the technique. Clearly, the accuracy rate alone,
without any explanation of the methodologies used in the
study, is insufficient to serve as the foundation for the
admission of this testimony.
Therefore, because the behavioral analysis portion of Mr.
McCrary's testimony does not bear sufficient indicia of
reliability to substantially assist the trier of fact, we conclude
that this testimony was properly excluded. 538
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The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's arguments lacked merit and
therefore affirmed the death sentence. The Court stated that the exclusion of the
unreliable expert testimony by the trial court was not error.

In State v. Fortin,539 linkage analysis, signature analysis and results of the FBI's
ViCAP program were ruled inadmissible. Linkage analysis was also seen as an
opinion on the ultimate issue. Steven Fortin was charged with capital murder, having
killed the victim in the course of a gruesome sexual assault. The victim, Melissa
Padilla, aged twenty five, was found sexually assaulted, robbed and strangled to death
on August 11,1994 in Avenel, Woodbridge Township, New Jersey.540
Padilla's body was naked from the waist down. She was
wearing a shirt, but no bra. Bags of food, a partially eaten
sandwich, a store receipt, an earring, debris including
cigarette butts, and a bloody one-dollar bill were found
scattered near the body. Padilla's shorts, with her underwear
still inside them, were found on a nearby shrub.
Inside the concrete pipe was a large blood stain. The
assailant had brutally beaten Padilla about her face and head.
Her face was swollen and bruised, and her nose was broken.
She had been killed by manual strangulation. The autopsy
revealed rectal tearing, and bite marks on Padilla's left
breast, left nipple, and the left side of her chin. 541

On April 3, 1995, a Maine State Trooper, Vicki Gardner, aged thirty four, was also
sexually assaulted, beaten and strangled to unconsciousness. She survived. She was
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off duty on that day but was traveling in a marked police vehicle, when she saw a car
parked on the shoulder of Highway 95 in the state of Maine. State Trooper Gardner
stopped to check what was wrong. The defendant, Steven Fortin was inside the car.
The defendant had a learner's permit issued in New Jersey. Trooper Gardner noticed
that Fortin was under the influence of alcohol and gave him some sobriety tests. The
tests showed that Fortin was under the influence of alcohol and Gardner placed him
under arrest. She called her office and requested for an officer to come to assist her. It
was reported that while she was waiting for back-up to arrive, she was attacked by
Fortin. She was beaten, sexually assaulted and strangled into unconsciousness.

542

It

was reported that Fortin "then placed Gardner in the passenger's seat of the police
vehicle, and drove the police vehicle down the highway. Gardner regained
consciousness and partially jumped, and was partially pushed by defendant, from the
vehicle".543 Fortin lost control of the vehicle. He fled but was later arrested at a
nearby rest area.
Gardner's face was badly battered, and she suffered a broken
nose; bite marks to her chin, to her left breast nipple and on
the outer left side of her left breast; and vaginal and anal
tearing and lacerations. After defendant's attack, Gardner
was naked from the waist down. Her pants were pulled off,
with her underwear inside out. When interviewed later,
defendant said Gardner pulled her own rants off while
5
attempting to make sexual advances to him. 4
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At the trial for this case in the State of Maine, Fortin pleaded guilty to seven counts of
kidnapping, robbery, aggravated assault, assault on an officer, attempted gross sexual
assault, unlawful sexual contact, and criminal operation of motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol. 545 He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.

The New Jersey police were not making any progress in the investigation into
Padilla's death, until April 1995 when they were informed by the State of Maine
Police Department that Steven Fortin had been arrested and charged in Maine for the
sexual assault of Vicki Gardner. The Maine police contacted the New Jersey police to
know if Fortin had any prior convictions, since his leamer's permit showed that he
lived in New Jersey. After analyzing the two cases, Lieutenant Lawrence Nagle who
was involved with the investigation into Padilla's murder, felt that Fortin might have
committed the two sexual assauits. He found several similarities between the two
crimes. Further investigations also revealed that Fortin was indeed at the area where
Padilla was killed on the day of the murder. This was confirmed by Dawn Archer,
Fortin's girlfriend. 546

At trial, the State therefore filed a motion to admit evidence from the Maine incidence
to the present case in New Jersey, on the issue of identity. The State also informed the
court of their intention to call a former FBI Agent Roy Hazelwood to testify as to the
ritualistic and signature aspects of the crimes which will bolster their claim that the
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two crimes were committed by the same person. The defense objected to both
motions and argued that the testimony should not be allowed.

Agent Roy Hazelwood was called as an expert on modus operandi and ritualistic
behavior. "He is a former FBI agent, has over thirty-two years experience as a law
enforcement professional, a seventeen-year affiliation with the National Center for
the Analysis of Violent Crime, and has consulted on more than 7,000 crimes of
violence. He has published approximately thirty articles on topics of homicide, rape,
serial rape, other types of sexual assault, and various other criminal or deviant sexual
behavior, and has taught at various academies and at a few universities".547

A pre-trial hearing was conducted on the admissibility of the other-crime evidence
and on the admissibility of the expert testimony. The Superior Court, Law Division,
Middlesex County, New Jersey, ruled that the evidence that Fortin sexually assaulted
a police officer in Maine was admissible as other-crime evidence. The court also
ruled that Agent Hazelwood was qualified as an expert on ritualistic and signature
aspects of crime and so his testimony was permitted. The trial court in granting the
motion to introduce the other-crimes evidence, added that the defendant's guilty plea
in the State of Maine should be excluded during the State's case-in-chief. 548

In his testimony, Agent Hazelwood stated that he used "linkage analysis" and
reviewed the two crimes and that the modus operandi of the crimes showed fifteen
547
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similarities. That he was therefore, of the opinion that the two crimes were committed
by one person. The fifteen similarities according to Hazelwood are as follows:
1. High-risk crimes;
2. Crimes committed impulsively;
3. Victims are female;

4. Age of victims generally the same;

5. Victims crossed the path of the offender;
6. Victims were alone;

7. Assaults occurred at confrontation point;
. '1

8. Adjacent to or on well-traveled highway;
9. Occurred during darkness;
10. No weapons involved in assaults;
11. Blunt-force injuries inflicted with fists, with nose of victims broken;
12. Trauma primarily to upper face, no teeth damaged;
13. Lower garments totally removed, with panties found inside the shorts or pants of
the victims;
14. Shirt left on victims and breasts free; and
15. No seminal fluid found inion victims.

549

Agent Hazelwood also testified that the two crimes "were anger-motivated, and that the
offender demonstrated anger through the following identified "ritualistic" or "signature"
behavior in both crimes":
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1. Bites to the lower chin;
2. Bites to the lateral left breast;
3. Injurious anal penetration;
4. Brutal facial beating; and
5. Manual frontal strangulation. sso

It should be noted that the defense on the other hand, stated that there were sixteen

differences between the two crimes. "There are differences in the age, race, weight and
height of the victims. There is a significant difference in the status of each victim.
Trooper Gardner is a professional police officer and a potentially dangerous target for
someone to perpetrate a crime against, particularly when the defendant knew, prior to the
assault, that his identity was made known to the state police dispatcher by Trooper
Gardner. There are also differences in the type of assault. Trooper Gardner was anally
and vaginally assaulted, while Padilla was assaulted anally, but not vaginally".SSl

Apart from Hazelwood, the State also called other witnesses. Lieutenant Lawrence Nagle
of the New Jersey Police Department, one of the investigating officers also testified.
"Nagle described the injuries to Padilla, stating she had trauma to the head, was beat
about the face, was manually strangled, her pants were ripped down, there was rectal
tearing and there were marks on her left breast area and on the left side of her chin that
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appeared to be bite marks".552 Dr. Marvin Schuster, who performed the autopsy, testified
that the victim died as a result of "asphyxiation; assault and strangulation".553 Two police
officers from the Maine State Police also testified as to the events that happened in the
sexual assault of Vicki Gardner, and the type of injuries that she sustained. Dr. Lowell J.
Levine, a forensic odontologist also testified. He stated that his review and comparison of
the autopsy reports, the bite marks on both victims, dental casts and Fortin's bite-mark
samples, showed that the bite marks found on both victims came from the defendant's
teeth. Dr. Levine concluded that "based upon the comparison revealing similarities
among the bite marks, it is my opinion that the bite marks on both women could have
been caused by Steven Fortin".554

It should also be noted that DNA samples recovered from Padilla's body, a cigarette butt

found at the crime scene, fingernail clippings, a dollar bill with blood stain, and blood
samples from the victim and the defendant were analyzed. Some of the results were
inconclusive and some could not exclude the defendant as being the source of the
DNA. 555 The court ruled that the other-crime evidence and Hazelwood's testimony were
admissible.

The defendant appealed and argued that:
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1. The State should not be allowed to introduce inflammatory and severely
prejudicial evidence of allegedly similar crime under the provisions of the NJ.R.E
404(b) to substitute for its "paucity" of evidence.
2. The admission of evidence regarding the incident in the state of Maine would be
contrary to the established case law because the State failed to meet its burden to
prove the two crimes were sufficiently identical and because the prejudicial value
grossly outweighs the limited probative value.
3. The proffered testimony of Robert Hazelwood does not meet the standard of
admissibility for expert testimony as set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court
and the trial court's ruling was therefore erroneous.

556

In its ruling, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial judge's decision
that the other-crime evidence can be admitted on the issue of identity. Delivering the
opinion of the appellate division, Justice Fall stated that "given our standard of review,
we are satisfied the trial judge's decision was not "so wide off the mark that manifest
denial of justice resulted," or that his ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion .... The
judge carefully applied the four prong test outlined in Codjield in determining whether
the proffered other-crime evidence was admissible".557 Justice Fall further stated that
"the potential for prejudice by admission of the other-crime evidence in this crime is
great. Therefore, while we are in accord with the judge's ruling in permitting its
admission, at trial the judge must "sanitize" the other-crime evidence by confining its
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admissibility to those facts reasonably necessary for the probative purpose of "identity".
To an extent, the judge ruling inadmissible defendant's guilty plea in Maine, goes to this
effort of minimizing the prejudicial effect". 558

The appellate division however, ruled that Hazelwood's testimony using linkage analysis
is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible as expert evidence. 559 Justice Fall said:
Here, as the judge noted, Hazelwood testified "this analysis is
not based on science, but based on his training and experience
with violent crime". While not based on science in the
technical sense, his linkage analysis methodology is certainly
founded in the area of behavioral science, in that it analyzes
the conduct of the crime perpetrator in two or more crimes to
determine whether there is sufficient consistency of behavior
to conclude that one person committed both crimes.
We conclude that the same detailed analysis regarding
admission of scientific evidence is applicable and necessary in
determining whether linkage analysis expert testimony is
admissible. Theories or methods of explaining human conduct
and behavior have consistently been subject to significant
scrutiny and analysis by our courts when admission is
sought. 560

It should also be pointed out that Hazelwood in his testimony stated that modus operandi

and ritualistic behavior analysis was accepted by the law enforcement community. On
that issue, Justice Fall stated that "we have no doubt that these methods are valid and
have great value in performing the very difficult task of criminal investigation. We are
not persuaded, however, that these techniques are sufficiently reliable for an expert in
those fields to testify that the same person who committed one crime committed the other
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under the analysis of the facts and circumstances presented in this case".561 Justice Fall
further stated that:
Our examination of the authorities and literature authored by
Hazelwood convinces us that a linkage analysis as a foundation
for the expert behavior identification testimony proffered in
this case is wholly inappropriate. In the recent book The Evil
that Men Do, Stephen G. Michaud with Roy Hazelwood
(1988), there is significant discussion concerning the
application of linkage analysis in the identification of serial
offenders. ... Hazelwood defines therein a serial offender as
one who has committed three or more offenses. Additionally,
as described in this book, the use of linkage analysis leading to
identification of the perpetrator also involves an evaluation of
the personal history and background of the suspected
perpetrator, to develop a profile. 562

The Appellate Division therefore, held that "we are simply not convinced that the State
has satisfied its burden to establish that "the field testified to is at a state of art such that
an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable".563 The Appellate Division also saw
the testimony as an opinion on the ultimate issue. "Further, given the conclusive nature of
Hazelwood's testimony, we find there is no acceptable limiting instruction that could be
given to the jury to avoid the prohibition against an expert expressing his opinion in such
a way as to emphasize that the expert believes the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged under the statute". 564
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"In summary, we affirm the decision permitting the introduction of other-crime evidence,
after it is properly sanitized, and reverse the order permitting Hazelwood to give expert
testimony that the same person who committed the Maine crime also committed the New
Jersey crime". 565

The case reached the Supreme Court of New Jersey, on appeal and cross-appeal. On one
hand, the defendant sought a review of the appellate division's ruling that the other-crime
evidence was admissible. The State on the other hand, prayed the Court to review the
appellate division's ruling that Hazelwood's testimony was inadmissible. In its ruling, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that "for the reasons stated in its opinion, we agree
with the judgment of the Appellate Division that the proposed expert testimony of
Hazelwood concerning linkage analysis lacks sufficient scientific reliability to establish
that the same perpetrator committed the Maine and New Jersey crimes".566 Delivering the
opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice O'Hern added that linkage analysis is similar to the
rapist profile evidence which is inadmissible. That Hazelwood's testimony failed to
"meet the standards for the admission of testimony that relates to scientific knowledge.
Although Hazelwood possess sufficient expertise in his field and his intended testimony
is beyond the ken of the average juror, the field of linkage analysis is not at a "state of the
art" such that his testimony could be sufficiently reliable".567 Justice O'Hern went on to
say that "as the Appellate Division noted however, the authorities and literature authored
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by Hazelwood and others do not demonstrate that linkage analysis has attained such a
state of art as to have the scientific reliability of DNA testing". 568
Moreover, linkage analysis is a field in which only Hazelwood
and a few of his close associates are involved. Concerning
consensus on acceptance of "linkage analysis" in the scientific
community, the other experts mentioned by Hazelwood in his
testimony were either current or former co-workers. In this
respect, there are no peers to test his theories and no way in
which to duplicate his results. 569

Summing up Hazelwood's linkage analysis, Justice O'Hern stated that if "stripped of its
scientific mantra, the testimony is nothing more than a description of the physical
circumstances present".570 Justice O'Hern ruled that Hazelwood would have to prove the
reliability of linkage analysis by producing a reliable database from which it was based.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded the matter
to the Law Division for further proceedings. At the Superior Court, Law Division,
Middlesex County, Fortin was convicted of capital murder, aggravated sexual assault,
first-degree robbery, and felony murder. He was sentenced to death and he appealed.

The State filed a motion for clarification of certain aspects of the judgment. 571 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that:
1. trial court improperly limited voir dire by rejecting inquiry concerning evidence

of the defendant's sexual assault oflaw enforcement officer in another state;
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2. State's expert should not have been permitted to testify on violent sexual crimes
without producing a reliable database of violent sexual assault cases that he had
investigated, studied or analyzed;
3. defendant could waive protection of Ex Post Clause in order to obtain instruction
on life in prison without parole, if jury rejected death sentence;
4. convictions

for

manslaughter

several

years

earlier

and

sexual

assault

approximately eight months after murder were relevant and admissible at penalty
phase; and
5. aggravating factors are elements of capital murder and thus, must be submitted to
a grand jury and returned in an indictment; overruling State v. Martini, 131 N.J.
176,619 A.2d 1208. 572

The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for
a new trial.

At the retrial,573 the State presented several witnesses at the pretrial hearing. Dr. Geetha
Natarajan (the medical examiner who carried out the autopsy on Padilla), testified that in
more than twenty-five years that she had conducted autopsies that she could not
remember any other case in which the autopsy revealed bite marks on the chin of the
other victims. 574 Dr. Lawrence Ricci (an expert in emergency medicine and pediatrics)
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also "testified that both Padilla and Gardner suffered traumatic anal injuries, but could
not say that those injuries were any more distinctive than similar injuries inflicted on
other sexual assault victims".575 Dr. Lowell Levine (an odontologist) also testified that in
more than thirty years that he had been in the field that "he had never seen the
combination of bite marks on the chin, the left nipple, and the left breast that appeared on
both Gardner's and Padilla's bodies".576 He said that he compared the bite marks on the
two victims with Fortin's dental casts/impressions and was of the opinion that there was a
high degree of probability that the bite mark on Padilla's left breast was caused by the
defendant's teeth. 577The State also called Mark Safarik (FBI Supervisory Agent), who
testified that the results of a search of the FBI's ViCAP database showed a match
between the Gardner and Padilla assaults as signature-crime. Hence, he was of the
opinion that Fortin committed both crimes. It should be noted that the State decided not
to call Agent Hazelwood to testify again. They called Mark Safarik instead.
In his testimony, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Mark Safarik
described the Violent Criminal Apprehension Program, more
commonly known as ViCAP. Created in 1984, ViCAP is a
national database of approximately 167,000 reported violent
crimes (homicides, attempted homicides, and kidnappings)
maintained by the FBI in Quantico, Virginia. The database
represents about three to seven percent of the violent crimes
committed since ViCAP's inception. Participation in Vi CAP
nationwide is voluntary. Law enforcement agencies that
complete the ViCAP form answer numerous questions about
the crime for inclusion in the national database.
The general purpose of Vi CAP "is to identity similarities in
crimes" through a computer search isolating particular
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characteristics in the commission of the offense. Through such
a computer search focusing on specific crime criteria, one law
enforcement agency can contact and cooperate with another
agency working on a "similar case with similar
characteristics." According to Agent Safarik, the "Vi CAP
system is looking for ... solved or unsolved homicides, or
attempted homicides, missing persons cases, kidnappings,
where there is a strong possibility of foul play, or unidentified
dead bodies, where the manner of death is suspected to be
homicide. 578

There was a problem with the admission of Safarik's testimony.
Law enforcement authorities completed the ViCAP form for
the Padilla murder in a timely manner for inclusion in the
national database. The Maine State Police, however did not
complete a ViCAP form for the 1995 Gardner sexual assault.
In 2004, in preparation for the defendant's trial, the State
requested that Agent Safarik submit a ViCAP form for the
Gardner case. He did so with the assistance of a ViCAP
analyst and the Maine State Police. Agent Safarik then ran a
series of searches on the Vi CAP for specific criteria common
to both the Padilla and Gardner crimes, such as manual
strangulation, sexual assault, and bite marks on the face and
chest. The searches yielded only three cases - the Padilla
murder, the Gardner sexual assault, and a 1988 case from
Washington State. The State argued that the searches showed
that the similarities between the Padilla and Gardner crimes
were so unusual as to constitute a signature. Significantly,
Agent Safarik indicated that the ViCAP database could not
be released to defense counsel because of privacy concerns
and that it was exempt from the Freedom of Information
ACt. 579

On the other hand, the defense offered two expert witnesses. First, Dr. Norman D.
Sperber (the Chief Forensic Dentist in the San Diego Medical Examiner' s Office), stated
that there are doubts as to whether the marks on Padilla's breast and chin were indeed
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bite marks. 58o Dr. Sperber further stated that "even assuming the injuries to the breast and
chin were bite marks, that they were not caused by defendant's teeth".581 It should be
noted that Dr. Sperber testified in the original trial and all parties agreed that the
testimony should be used in this retrial hearing.

The defense also presented Dr. Grover Godwin, as an expert in statistical evaluation of
crime scenes. Dr. Godwin stated that the reliability of the ViCAP database was
questionable because of what he described as "a bias in entering the variables".582

The motion judge ruled that only the evidence on the bite marks which suggested
uniqueness, would be allowed. That the other injuries would not be allowed because they
were common to sexual crimes, and that these other injuries would be unduly prejudicial
to the defendant.

I""

"

'"""

The motion judge also maintained that the ViCAP database
might have applicability at trial. For instance, "absent the
insertion of the Maine crime, she found that the ViCAP
database would be a reliable database upon which the State
may rely to test the expert opinions." With regard to the
Gardner ViCAP form, she observed that it was prepared for
litigation purpose and therefore "failed to provide an
unbiased generation of data." Alternatively, she suggested
that "if the ViCAP database could be crafted to report on the
uniqueness of the human bite mark criteria alone, "the
database would then be useful in proving "a signature-like
crime. To be useful, for example, the ViCAP analysis would
have "to determine how many, if any, cases involve bite
marks on the chin." The judge noted, however, that the
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Vi CAP forms do not contain a box for bite marks to the
583
chin.

The State filed a motion appealing the motion judge's decision, but it was denied by the
Appellate Division. The State therefore, filed an interlocutory appeal at the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. The State argued that there were three errors in the motion judge's
ruling.
1. The motion judge conditioned the introduction of the signature-crime evidence on
expert testimony explaining the uniqueness of the bite marks in the Padilla and
Gardner cases;
2. The motion judge would not admit evidence of the injuries sustained by Gardner
other than the bite marks, thereby denying the jury the necessary context in which
to determine whether the two crimes are indeed signature crimes;
3. The motion judge would not allow the Vi CAP database to be used to show that a
computer search revealed only three cases with the pattern of bite marks to the
breast and chin - the Padilla and Gardner cases, and a Washington State case.

584

In their ruling, the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: "We did not consider in Fortin 1
whether, absent expert testimony, the Gardner-other-crime evidence would be admissible
to establish that the Padilla murder was the distinctive handiwork of defendant. We now
hold that the comparative analysis necessary to determine whether the Padilla murder and
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Gardner sexual assault are signature crimes is outside of the ordinary experience and
knowledge of jurors and requires the assistance of expert testimony". 585

Delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, Justice Albin stated that the motion judge
did not err by conditioning the signature-crime evidence on the presentation of expert
testimony.586 Justice Albin further stated that the motion judge did not abuse her
discretion by asking the State to provide the defense with the database of cases from
which Dr. Levine and Dr. Natarajan based their opinion. Additionally, Justice Albin
stated that "our evidentiary rules provide trial courts with the authority to require pretrial
disclosure of "the underlying facts or data" that supports an expert's opinion".587 Justice
Albin also stated that "significantly, although the State presented Agent Safarik to
explain the functions of ViCAP, neither he nor any other expert witness vouched that a
ViCAP crime match, such as the one in this case, constituted reliable signature-crime
evidence".588 Justice Albin said:
We share the judge's concern that only relevant evidence
should bear on the issues that must be decided by the jury. We
disagree, however, that details of the Gardner assault can be so
finely parsed. Although the other injuries suffered by Gardner
do not fall into the category of signature evidence, the bite
marks were inflicted during a vicious sexual assault. That
reality cannot be ignored or withheld from the jury without
seriously distorting the import of the bite-mark evidence. By
its very nature, signature-crime evidence carries the potential
for prejudice. Nevertheless, signature-crime evidence may be
highly probative, and in this case, we conclude that its
585
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probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. ...
Therefore, we will allow the State to present the bitemark
evidence within the general narrative of the sexual assault on
Trooper Gardner. 589

It was held that "placing the bite-mark evidence in context will permit the jury to better
fulfill its truth-seeking function. That approach benefits defendant as much as the State.
Sanitizing the Gardner assault would keep from the jury the many differences between
the two crimes that might lead it to reject the signature-crime evidence".59o Therefore,
Justice Albin stated that allowing all the material details from the Gardner assault was
fair.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the motion judge's ruling with modifications.
Justice Albin stated that "the State must be permitted to present the bite-mark evidence in
context and therefore material details of the Gardner sexual assault cannot be censored.
Testimony describing that assault, however, is subject to specific jury instructions
explaining the limited use of "other-crimes" evidence under NJ.R.E. 404(b). Finally,
because the State's experts have not relied on the Vi CAP database to form their opinions,
the ViCAP database should not be admissible to bolster those opinions".591

Justice Albin acknowledged the fact that Vi CAP is a very useful tool of crime
investigation but stated that "ultimately, in conducting a fair trial, courts must ensure that
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only reliable evidence is submitted to our juries consistent with our evidentiary rules. As
presented, Vi CAP does not meet the standards for admissibility of evidence".592

The Supreme Court of New Jersey therefore, remanded the case for further proceedings.

As we can see from this case, offender profiling evidence, no matter which label it has
been dressed up in, still need to be based upon reliable facts or data. In this case, we have
seen the terms linkage analysis, ritualistic behavior, signature-crime analysis, and Vi CAP
program all being used to show one thing - that bite marks on two victims came from one
"I'

individual. This case clearly supports my argument that some profilers have the tendency
to dress up their testimony in different labels so that it will be admitted. Offender
profiling and its derivatives or its other labels should not be admitted as evidence until its
foundation can be properly and objectively ascertained. The foundations must be proved
by reliable facts and data.

At this point, it should be noted that a few studies have been carried out on the
accuracy of profilers. In 1990, for instance, Pinnizzotto and Finkel carried out a study
in United States. 593 The study was made up of five groups - (1) four pro filers from
the FBI, (expert/teachers) (2) six police detectives who had been trained by the FBI
profilers, (3) six experienced police homicide and sex detectives, with no training in
criminal personality profiling, (4) six clinical psychologists, who according to

rd, at 606.
Anthony 1. Pinizzotto., and Norman J. Finkel, "Criminal Profiling: An Outcome and Process Study",
Law and Human Behavior, vol. 14, No.3, (1990), 215 - 233.
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Pinizzotto and Finkel were "naive to both criminal profiling and criminal
investigations,,,s94 and (5) six undergraduate psychology students.

The five groups were given two real and solved cases - one sex offense case and one
homicide case. Pinizzotto and Finkel noted that this study was based on the rationale
that, "given the growing use of the personality profile and the fact that this growing
use is largely supported by testimonials and accuracy figures that were not obtained
through controlled studies, this research was undertaken to provide more precise
answers to both outcome and process questions."s9s The materials given to the
participants for this study, in the homicide case, included crime scene reports, crime

II .

scene photographs, autopsy and toxicology reports, as well as the victim report. S96 For
the sexual offense case, the participants also received victim statement, police reports

ii,
:1

and victim reports. S97

This study, even though it was based on a very small sample, generated interesting
and controversial results. First, the study found out that "for both the homicide and
the sex offense cases, the profiles written by the professional profilers were indeed
richer than the nonprofiler groups of detectives, psychologists, and students."s98 The
result also showed that "an analysis of the specific questions for each case shows that
594
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pro filers achieved higher group scores for the sex offense case in questions dealing
with the age of the offender, the education of the offender, age, and condition of the
offender's automobile, and the victim-offender relationship."s99

Interestingly, the results also showed that "the profilers did not achieve higher scores
than subjects in the other groups in these same categories for the homicide case.,,600
In the homicide case, "profilers, however, do not appear to process this material in a
way qualitatively different from any other groUp.,,601

In the lineup rankings, the study also showed that "in the sex offense case, the
expert/teachers were accurate in picking out the offender 100% of the time, and the
profilers were accurate 83% of the time. As for the other groups, accuracy is lower,
and declines as we move from detectives (67%) to psychologists (50%) to students
(16%).,,602

Based on the results of this study, Pinizzotto and Finkel concluded that; "Concerning
the outcome issue, professional pro filers are more accurate (i.e., more correct
answers, higher-accuracy scores, more correct lineup identifications) for the sex
offense case than nonprofilers, but these accuracy differences disipate when we look
at the homicide case. There were, however, significant outcome differences between
599
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pro filer and nonprofiler groups for the homicide case in all the analyses of the written
profile.,,603

It should be noted that the authors did acknowledge certain limitations of this study.

On the small sample, the authors noted that they "were unable to locate sufficient
numbers of expert/teachers who were both actively engaged in profiling and willing
to cooperate in this study.,,604 This goes a long way in highlighting my argument that
there is a need for closer cooperation among the different segments involved in
offender profiling. It is noteworthy to point out that Pinizzotto after this study, joined
the FBI.

Finally, Pinizzotto and Finkel also noted that "while the overall outcome superiority
of the profilers is most likely indicative of greater expertise, it must be kept in mind
that an "investment" factor could also be invoked to explain these results.
Psychologists and students may see this task as an interesting exercise, whereas
profilers, and detectives, perhaps, see it as the "blood and guts" of their professions,
and therefore generate lengthier profiles and spend more time on the task.,,605

603

Id, at 227.

604

I d,at218.

605

Id, at 227.

259

This study undoubtedly has been criticized. Kocsis et al argued that "only 15 items of
offender information were processed by Pinizzotto and Finkel, and there was no
scrutiny of the types of information on which profilers were more accurate.,,606

Risinger and Loop were also highly critical of this study. They maintained that
"Pinizzotto and Finkel reanalyzed the results giving half credit for some of the
inaccurate multiple choice answers based on the judgment of the "expert" profiler
subgroup that some wrong answers were less wrong than others; however, they never
set out the results of that reanalysis, simply asserting that for both cases the only
significant differences that emerged were an advantage of the profiler group
compared to the student group. ,,607 Risinger and Loop further argued that the authors
only set out the number of accurate predictions without adding the number of
inaccurate predictions. 608 As such Risinger and Loop concluded that "the profilers got
one-third of the questions wrong even in the rape case, and two-thirds wrong in the
homicide case. ,,609

It should be noted also that in 1995, FBI profilers came up with what they called the

key attributes of successful profilers. In their work, Hazelwood et al maintained that
Richard N. Kocsis., Harvey 1. Irwin., Andrew F. Hayes., and Ronald Nunn, "Expertise in Psychological
Profiling: A Comparative Assessment", Journal ofInterpersonal Violence, vol. 15, No.3, 314 (2000).
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See footnote 320, in Michael D. Rissinger., and Jeffrey L. Loop, "Three Card Monte, Monty Hall,
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Evidence", 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 193,320 (Nov. 2002).
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the main attributes for successful profilers are knowledge of the criminal mind,
investigative experience, objectivity, logical reasoning/critical thinking and a high
level of intuition. 610

In 2000, Kocsis et al replicated the study by Pinizzotto and Finkel. This study
involved four groups:
(1) Five profilers. These profilers were those who had gIVen some form of
psychological profiling advice to a law enforcement agency.
(2) Thirty-five active police officers.
(3) Thirty Australian psychologists with no prior study of forensic or criminal
psychology.
(4) Thirty-one Australian science and economics university undergraduates.
'",

(5) Twenty Australian psychics. These are those psychics who believed that their
paranormal abilities could be useful in constructing an offender profile.

611

Kocsis et al chose these groups because they are believed to possess the key attributes
outlined by Hazelwood et al. Thus, the psychologists were chosen for appreciation of
criminal mind, police officers for their investigative experience, university students for
objectivity and logical reasoning and psychics for intuition. Kocsis et al stated that this
study was aimed at investigating the "skills underlying the effective performance of

Hazelwood, R.R., Ressler, R.K, Duppue, R.L., and Douglas, J.e., "Criminal Investigative Analysis: An
Overview", in R.R. Hazelwood and A.W. Burgess, (eds) Practical Aspects of Rape Investigation: A
nd
Multidiciplinary Approach, 2 ed. (1995).
611 Kocsis, Irwin, Hayes, and Nunn, supra note 606, at 316.
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criminal psychological profiling.,,612 In order to achieve this, the study groups were
presented with a solved murder case. In this study, the performance of the groups were
compared in the profiling task.

In the five-part survey inventory, the groups were given detailed information about this
solved murder case. They were presented with several materials including the crime
scene report, crime scene photographs, photos of the victim's body, a forensic biologist's
report, a forensic entomologist's report, a ballistics report, autopsy reports, and basic
background information of the victim. 613 In this study, the participants were asked

"'<I

II"

questions about the physical characteristics, cognitive processes, offense behaviors and
social history and habits of the offender. 614
',II

The results of the study showed that the "five groups did differ in their total accuracy but
only marginally.,,615 In order to specifically answer the question of whether profilers were
more accurate than nonprofilers, Kocsis et al decided to collapse the psychologists, police
officers, students and psychics into one group (nonprofiliers) and then compared their
performance with that of the profilers. The result showed that "on every measure of
accuracy, the profilers answered more questions correctly than the nonprofilers.

612

Id, at 311.

6I3

Id ,at317.

614

I d,at319.

615

Id, at 320.

262

Furthennore, this difference was statistically significant on the total accuracy
measure.,,616

The results of this study also showed that "in spite of their training, knowledge, and
experience, profilers did no better than anyone else in the correct identification of
features of the offender or offense.,,617 It should be noted however, that "the profilers did
descriptively outperfonn all other groups on the two omnibus measures of accuracy and
on two of the submeasures (cognitive processes and social status and behavior). On the
other two submeasures, the profilers were the second most accurate group with the
difference between them and the most accurate group (psychologists) negligible and
easily attributable to sampling error.,,618

The results also showed that "in comparison to the police and perhaps the psychics, the
group of psychologists showed superior perfonnance on several components of the task.
"

",I'

The study's findings therefore might be taken to suggest that specifically psychological
knowledge is more pertinent to successful profiling than are investigative experience and
intuition.,,619

The authors noted however, that:
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In any event, the study does encourage the view that
an educated insight into human behavior could play
an important role in the process of psychological
profiling. At the same time, it must be stressed that
the psychologists' performance did not differ
significantly from that of the student group, so it
remains uncertain whether the psychologists'
advantage over some other groups was predominately
in regard to specific knowledge of the behavioral
science or to a broader capacity for objective and
logical analysis. 62o

The result also showed that the police officers did not perform well in the profiling task.
Kocsis et al therefore, disagreed with the earlier work by the FBI profilers which stated
that investigative experience is a key attribute of successful profilers. The study also
showed that "the accuracy of the psychics was not high and indeed, unlike all other
groups used in the project, these participants showed no insight into the nature of the
offender beyond what reasonably could be gleaned from the prevailing social stereotype
of a murderer. Notwithstanding anecdotal reports of the successful use of psychics in
police investigations, this study certainly does not serve to encourage reliance on
psychics by police services.,,621

Kocsis et al noted the problem with the small sample of profilers in their study (only
five), which they correctly noted "not only impeded the chances of statistical significance
but also raised substantial doubts about this groups' representativeness of profilers as a
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whole.,,622 It should be noted that Kocsis et al invited more than forty pro filers in several
countries to participate in this study but only five agreed.

This study has been criticized extensively. It has been argued that the data was a mere
reflection of the differences in intelligence across the groups. 623

Kocsis et al carried out other studies in their effort to provide an empirical foundation for
the key skills and abilities necessary for successful profiling. In 2002, Kocsis et al carried
out another study involving senior detectives, homicide detectives, trainee detectives,
police recruits and university students. This study also involved details of a solved
murder case. The results of the study showed that the university students performed better
than other groups on all the submeasures except on cognitive processes and offense
behaviors. 624 The result also showed that groups with post-secondary education
outperformed those without post-secondary education. Kocsis et al therefore concluded
that based on this study, investigative experience is not a key attribute of effective
profiling.

In 2003, Kocsis carried out another study involving nine groups -

profilers,

psychologists, undergraduate students, specialist detectives, general police officers,
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623 Richard N. Kocsis., Harvey J. Irwin., Andrew F. Hayes., and Ronald Nunn, "Expertise in Psychological
Profiling: A Comparative Assessment", Journal oflnterpersonal Violence, vol. 15, No.3, (2000), at 326,
citing an anonymous referee.
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Profiling of a Violent Crime." Journal oflnterpersonal Violence, 17 (2002) 811 - 823.
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police recruits, non-police specialists and psychics. 625 In this study, the profilers scored
highest, followed by undergraduate students and psychologists. Kocsis concluded that
logical reasoning ability and appreciation of criminal mind are the key attributes.

In 2004, and using arson cases, Kocsis carried out another study involving detectives
(specialists in arson), arson investigators from the fire service, professional profilers, and
undergraduate university students. 626 There was a control group of community college
students. The results of the study showed that profilers were more accurate than
detectives, followed by undergraduate students, arson investigators, the control group and
police detectives. Based on the results of this study, Kocsis again concluded that logical
reasoning ability was the key attribute for effective profiling.

Many scholars have criticized the studies by Kocsis. Bennell et aI, for instance, argued
that Kocsis did not provide an operational definition of logical reasoning/critical thinking
and also failed to "assess whether or not the skills that are supposedly being examined are
actually possessed by their participants.,,627 Further studies are still needed.

In this chapter, we have examined the central admissibility problems with offender
profiling testimony in United States. We have noted the different areas of attacking
Richard N. Kocsis, "Criminal Psychological Profiling: Validities and Abilities', International Journal of
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47 (2003) 126 - 144.

625

Richard N. Kocsis, "Psychological Profiling of Serial Arson Offenses: An Assessment of Skills and
Accuracy', Criminal Justice and Behavior, 31 (1004) 341 - 361.

626

627 Craig Bennel!., Shevaun Corey., Alyssa Taylor., and John Ecker, "What Skills are required for Effective
Offender Profiling? An Examination of the Relationship between Critical Thinking Ability and Profile
Accuracy", Paper presented at the 35th annual conference of the Society for Police and Criminal
Psychology, Washington/Chevy Chase Maryland, October 26,2006.
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offender profiling evidence and answered such questions as:- is offender profiling
impermissible character evidence? Who is qualified to give expert offender profiling
evidence? Is offender profiling too prejudicial than probative? Is offender profiling an
opinion on the ultimate issue? Is offender profiling sufficiently reliable as to be
admissible? It has also been noted that in some cases, offender profiling is an improper
subject for expert testimony. This chapter has also highlighted the impact of the three
rules of admissibility on offender profiling. The Federal Rule of Evidence being loose
and too liberal has created problems for trial judges in making decisions on offender
profiling cases. Under the Rule, almost anybody can qualify as an expert, and can give
testimony either on a scientific, technical or other specialized field of knowledge. Under
a stringent application of Frye, it has to be shown that offender profiling has achieved
widespread acceptance by the relevant community. A strict application of Daubert
requires offender profiling evidence to satisfy the four factors, especially the requirement
that the technique must be based on a reliable data or foundation. In the next chapter, we
examine offender profiling in other countries.
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Chapter Five
Offender Profiling in Comparative Perspective

England

The prevIOUS chapter has shown that United States courts are inconsistent in their
decisions on cases involving offender profiling. In England on the other hand, offender
profiling evidence is generally seen as inadmissible at the moment. Several reasons
account for this, but first we examine the rules governing the admissibility of expert
testimony in England. In general terms, the English law of evidence provides that all
relevant evidence is admissible so long as it is not excluded by other laws of evidence,
such as the hearsay rule, opinion on character evidence rule, as well as conduct on other
occasions rule.

In England, the main rule governing the admission of expert evidence was arguably laid
down in the case of Folkes v. Chadd, 628 where it was held that:
The opinion of scientific men upon proven facts may be
given by men of science within their own science. An
expert's opinion is admissible to furnish the court with
scientific information which is likely to be outside the
experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the
proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions
without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary.
In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it
makes judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert
witness has impressive scientific qualifications does not by

628

Folkes v. Chadd, (J 782) 3 Doug KB 157.

268

that fact alone make his opmlOn on matters of human
nature and behaviour within the limits of normality any
more helpful than that of the jurors themselves; but there is
a danger that they may think it does. 629

In this case, the issue was whether the embankment erected by the plaintiff for the
purpose of preventing the overflowing of Wells Harbour caused the decay/silting up of
the harbour, by stopping the back water. The embankment was erected in 1758 and the
harbour started to choke/fill up soon after that. The case was tried three times before it
reached the Court of Appeal. First, at the last Lent Assizes for the County of Norfolk, Mr.
Milne, an engineer was called by the plaintiffs, and he testified that in his opinion that the
embankment was not the cause of the decay. The plaintiffs also proffered evidence that
',,11

showed that "other harbours on the same coast, similarly situated, where there were no
embankments, had begun to fill up and to be choked about the same time as Wells
Harbour.,,63o At the trial presided over by Mr. Justice Ashurst, the jury ruled in the
defendant's favor.

At the Court of Chancery, the plaintiffs called another expert, Mr. John Smeaton, a civil
engineer. He stated that in his opinion the bank did not cause the choking and filling up
of the harbor. He also stated that removing the embankment would not solve the problem.
An objection was raised. It was argued that "the inquiring into the site of other harbour
was introducing a multiplicity of facts which the parties were not prepared to meet.,,631
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"It was also objected that the evidence of Mr. Smeaton was a matter of opinion, which

could be no foundation for the verdict of the jury, which was to be built entirely on facts,
and not on opinions.,,632 The testimony was admitted. The Court of Chancery ruled in the
plaintiffs' favor and the defendants asked for a new trial. At the lower court, Chief Justice
Gould rejected Smeaton's evidence and stated that the evidence was mere opinion, based
on speculation and not based on direct observation.

On appeal, Lord Mansfield permitted the evidence and stated that "this is a matter of
opinion, the whole case is a question of opinion, from facts agreed upon".633 Delivering
the judgment, Lord Mansfield noted that; "On the first trial, the evidence of Mr. Milne,
who has constructed harbours, and observed the effects of different causes operating
upon them, was received; and it never entered into the head of any man at the Bar that it
was improper; nor did the Chief Baron, who tried the cause, think so. On the motion for
II ~ , I

the new trial, the receiving Mr. Milne's evidence was not objected to as improper; but it
was moved for on the ground of that evidence being a surprise; and the ground was
material, for, in matters of science, the reasonings of men of science can only be
answered by men of science,,634.

In reversing the lower court's decision, Lord Mansfield said:
It is objected that Mr. Smeaton is going to speak, not as to
facts, but as to opinion. That opinion, however, is deduced
from facts which are not disputed - the situation of banks, the
632
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course of tides and of winds, and the shifting of sands. His
opinion, deduced from all these facts, is, that, mathematically
speaking, the bank may contribute to the mischief, but not
sensibly. Mr. Smeaton understands the construction of
harbours, the causes of their destruction, and how remedied.
In matters of science no other witnesses can be called. An
instance frequently occurs in actions for unskillfully
navigating ships. The question then depends on the evidence
of those who understand such matters; and when such
questions come before me, I always send for some of the
brethren of the Trinity House. I cannot believe that where the
question is, whether a defect arises from a natural or an
artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be
received. Hand-writing is proved every day by opinion; and
for false evidence on such questions a man may be indicted
for perjury. Many nice questions may arise as to forgery, and
as to the impressions of seals; whether the impression was
made from the seal itself, or from an impression wax. In such
cases I cannot say that the opinion of seal-makers is not to be
taken. I have myself received the opinion of Mr. Smeaton
respecting mills, as a matter of science. The cause of the
decay of the harbour is also a matter of science, and still
more so, whether the removal of the bank can be beneficial.
Of this, such men as Mr. Smeaton alone can judge. Therefore
we are of the opinion that his judgment, formed on facts, was
very proper evidence. 635

The above decision in Folkes v. Chadd, was later supported by Justice Lawton in R v.

Turner.636 This decision in Turner, also known as the Turner Rule, established the
boundaries as to the admissibility of expert evidence in England. Under the Turner rule,
expert evidence is inadmissible unless it provides the courts with such information that is
outside the common experience and knowledge of the judge or jury. Turner also states
that expert evidence must be based upon facts which can themselves be proved by
admissible evidence.
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In Turner, the defendant, Terence Stuart Turner, was charged with the murder of his
girlfriend, Wendy Butterfield, by hitting her with a hammer fifteen times. The defendant
claimed that he was provoked by the victim's statement that while he was in prison that
she had slept with two other men and that the child she was expecting was not his. After
killing her, the defendant called the police, admitted the killing and his defence was
provocation. 637

At the trial, the defendant sought to call a psychiatrist, Dr. Smith, who would give
evidence that he was not "suffering from a mental illness, that he was not violent by
nature but that his personality was such that he could have been provoked in the
11,.11

circumstances and that he was likely to be telling the truth,,638. The defense stated that the
psychiatrist's opinion would be based on information from the defendant, his medical
records, his family and friends. That the psychiatric evidence will help establish lack of
intent, help establish that Turner was likely to be easily provoked and to show that Turner
was likely to have told the truth in his statements. 639 In the psychiatric report, Dr. Smith
stated that "from all accounts his personality has always been that of a placid, rather quiet
and passive person who is quite sensitive to the feelings of other people. He was always
regarded by his family and friends as an even-tempered person who is not in any way
aggressive. In general until the night of the crime he seems to have displayed remarkably
good impulse control".64o
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The Crown (prosecution) objected to the admission of this evidence. The Crown argued
that the psychiatric evidence should not be admitted. Mr. Calcutt, the prosecution counsel
argued that the evidence should be excluded because, first, the defendant had not put his
character in issue, and second that the report did not mention the fact that the defendant
was convicted in November 1971 for unlawful possession of an offensive weapon and
was also convicted in May 1972 of assault with intent to rob. 641 The Crown argued that
allowing the psychiatric evidence would "put the defendant before the jury as having a
character and disposition which in the light of his previous record of violence he had not
got,,642.

At Bristol Crown Court, Justice Bridge ruled that the psychiatric evidence was irrelevant
and inadmissible. Justice Bridge also stated that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay
character evidence. Turner was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He
appealed, arguing that the judge erred by excluding the psychiatric evidence. He also
contended that it was error for the trial judge to rule that provocation was not a matter for
expert medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the psychiatric evidence was hearsay
character evidence and therefore inadmissible. Lord Justice Lawton, delivering the
judgment, stated that "it is not for this court to instruct psychiatrists how to draft their
reports, but those who call psychiatrists as witnesses should remember that the facts upon
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which they base their opinions must be proved by admissible evidence. This elementary
principle is frequently overlooked".643

The Court of Appeal held that:
Before a court can assess the value of an opinion it must
know the facts upon which it is based. If the expert has been
misinformed about the facts or has taken irrelevant facts into
consideration or has omitted to consider relevant ones, the
opinion is likely to be valueless. In our judgment, counsel
calling an expert should in examination in chief ask his
witness to state the facts upon which his opinion is based. It
is wrong to leave the other side to elicit the facts by crossexamination. 644

On the issue of whether the psychiatric evidence was relevant to the facts of the case, the

',1'

!'II'

Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge's ruling that it was irrelevant. Lord Justice
Lawton stated that:
In our judgment the psychiatrist's OpInIOn was relevant.
Relevance, however, does not result in evidence being
admissible: it is a condition precedent to admissibility. Our
law excludes evidence of many matters which in life outside
the courts sensible people take into consideration when
making decisions. Two broad heads of exclusion are hearsay
and opinion. As we have already pointed out, the
psychiatrist's report contained a lot of hearsay which was
inadmissible. A ruling on this ground, however, would
merely have trimmed the psychiatrist's evidence: it would
not have excluded it altogether. Was it inadmissible because
of the rules relating to opinion evidence? 645
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The Court of Appeal stated that the foundation of these rules was laid down in Folkes v.

Chadd. It was held "that, since the question whether the defendant was suffering from a
mental illness as defined by the Mental Health Act 1958 was not in issue, the psychiatric
evidence that the defendant was not suffering from a mental illness although admissible,
was irrelevant and had been rightly excluded,,646. Lord Justice Lawton said:
We all know that both men and women who are deeply in
love can, and sometimes do, have outbursts of blind rage
when discovering unexpected wantonness on the part of their
loved ones: the wife taken in adultery is the classical example
of the application of the defence of "provocation"; and when
death or serious injury results, profound grief usually
follows. Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how
ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental illness
are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life. It follows
that the proposed evidence was not admissible to establish
that the defendant was likely to have been provoked. The
same reasoning applies to its suggested admissibility on the
issue of credibility. The jury had to decide what reliance they
could put upon the defendant's evidence. He had to be
judged as someone who was not mentally disordered. This is
what juries are empanelled to do. The law assumes they can
perform their duties properly. The jury in this case did not
need, and should not have been offered, the evidence of a
psychiatrist to help decide whether the defendant's evidence
was truthful. 647

The Court of Appeal dismissed the case and concluded that "we are firmly of the opinion
that psychiatry has not yet become a satisfactory substitute for the common sense of
juries or magistrates on matters within their experience of life,,648.
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In England, a technique, method or field of knowledge does not have to be generally
accepted before it can be admitted. However, it must be sufficiently established to be
reliable, before it can be admitted. This was established in R v. Robb,649 where it was held
that general acceptance was not a condition for the admissibility of expert testimony. In
this case, a phonetics lecturer was allowed by the trial court to give expert opinion on
voice identification. The expert was qualified by training and experience but in his
analysis he used a method which was not generally accepted by the majority of the
experts in the field unless it was supplemented by another form of acoustic analysis based
on physical measurements of resonance frequency. The defendant objected to the
admission of this evidence. The trial judge however, admitted the evidence. The
defendant was convicted and he appealed.

The Court of Appeal, through Lord Justice Bingham stated that the trial judge did not err
in admitting the evidence and upheld the judgment. It was also held that expert evidence
does not have to be scientific to be admitted. Lord Justice Bingham said:
Expert evidence is not limited to the core areas. Expert
evidence of fingerprinting, handwriting, and accident
reconstruction is regularly given. Opinions may be given of
the market value of land, ships, pictures, or rights. Expert
opinions may be given of the quality of commodities, or on
the literary, artistic, scientific or other merit of works alleged
to be obscene. Some of these fields are far removed from
anything which could be called a formal scientific discipline.
Yet while receiving this evidence the courts would not accept
the evidence of an astrologer, a soothsayer, a witch-doctor or
an amateur psychologist and might hesitate to receive
evidence of attributed authorship based on stylometric
analysis. 65o
649
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It should also be noted that in R v. Stockwell,651 it was held that "one should not set one's

face against fresh developments, provided they have a proper foundation,,652.

Having examined the main rules guiding the admission of expert testimony in England,
we now examine specifically the admissibility of offender profiling evidence. In contrast
to United States, offender profiling has not been admitted by any court in England. The
first case where the prosecution sought to introduce offender profiling evidence was in R
v. Stagg,653 where the trial judge refused to admit the evidence. In Stagg, Justice Ognall
stated that there was "no authority in any common law jurisdiction to the effect that such
evidence has ever been treated as properly admissible in proof of identity,,654. The trial
judge was highly critical of the manner in which the evidence was gathered. Justice
Ognall also stated that "it was doubtful that psychological profile evidence is sufficiently
well established or 'generally accepted' as a scientific method to be received as expert
evidence. And that such a novel technique must satisfy tests such as those in Frye v. US
(1923) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow (1993)". Justice Ognall further stated that he "would
not wish to give encouragement either to investigating or prosecuting authorities to
construct or seek to supplement their cases on this kind of basis,,655. Following the
rejection of the evidence, the case collapsed. There was no full trial. There has been no
attempt since then by any party to introduce such evidence in the English courtroom. This
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leads us to the question - How will English courts receive offender profiling evidence in
future?

Lord Taylor, the Lord Chief Justice of England is not in support of the admission of
offender profiling in the courtroom. In a lecture delivered to the British Academy of
Forensic Science on November 1, 1994, Lord Taylor echoed the problems with the
proliferation of experts in court and was critical of the introduction of offender profiling
evidence in courtS. 656 Lord Taylor called on experts to maintain integrity and clarity, and
he said:
Sometimes, however, although helpful in criminal
investigation, a technique may not produce admissible
evidence. So-called 'personality profiling' is an example:
used properly, this technique can be of great assistance in
helping the police to target their investigative work upon a
limited number oflikely suspects.
But we must not confuse such techniques, or their results,
with evidence admissible in a court of law. The rules of
criminal evidence have grown up gradually over many years.
Some of them, particularly the embargo on hearsay, are now
of dubious value and I hope will soon be extensively
reformed as the Royal Commission has recommended. But
the rules have grown up in response to the essential need to
ensure that the material which is considered by the jury is
only that which, as a matter of logic, actually tends to
demonstrate guilt or innocence, not that which creates a
suspicion and therefore, invites the making of assumptions
for which there is no proper basis. The rules exist to ensure
that a conviction of a criminal offence is founded upon fact
not guesswork or conjecture. They afford vital protection of
our freedom under the law. 657

Rt. Hon. Lord Taylor of Gosforth, "The Lund Lecture", Medicine, Science and the Law, Vol. 35, No.1,
January 1995, at 3.
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Professor Ormerod maintained that if offender profiling evidence is introduced in English
courts in future, that the two hurdles of the law of evide;nce have to be overcome relevance and admissibility,658 He argued that the profile must render the facts more
probable or less probable before it is legally relevant. He also noted that "English courts
have, in recent years, adopted a strict interpretation of relevance in relation to both
prosecution and defence evidence,,659, Professor Ormerod contended that a typical profile
contains much information and that not all of the information will be relevant to any
given case,660

It has also been argued that in England, profile evidence will be excluded as being
insufficiently relevant, unreliable, prejudicial and unscientific,661 Ormerod and Sturman
argued that ''unless a profiler can show that psychology can support with sufficient
strength a claim that he can reliably and consistently identify behavioural traits from
scenes of crime and related information the evidence would lack a reliable foundation,
and the English courts would rule it inadmissible,,662, Professor Ormerod concluded that
"the prosecutor seeking to rely on a profile (if such a thing exists) or even part of a profile
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will have to navigate his way through practically all the most difficult rules of
evidence,,663. Professor Ormerod further maintained that:
The rules of evidence also present difficulties for the criminal
psychologist. If involved in the presentation of the case the
criminal psychologist will have to face extensive questioning
as to his expertise, the reliability of his methodology and
working practices, the availability of alternative
methodologies and their success rates. There would also be
the inevitably detailed and testing questions in the light of
evidence provided by the opposing party's own criminal
psychologist who will have cast doubt on the methodology,
the interpretations etc. In addition, the psychologist will have
been constrained by the evidential rules even before setting
foot in court. The hearsay rule will inhibit reliance on data
even though it may be the most reliable available, the
provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 will
also necessitate the proof of computer reliability.
In the case of a prosecution profile, the story does not end
there. In the event that all of these problems are overcome by
both the psychologist and the prosecutor, the court may still
exclude the evidence, in its discretion, on the ground that it
would be unfair to the accused. 664

Professor Ormerod further argued that English courts will exclude offender profiling
evidence because of its extreme prejudice. He contended that "the prejudice contained in
a profile will in almost all cases exceed the limited probative value of such an
opinion,,665. Ormerod contended that offender profiling evidence will not be accorded
much weight by the trier of fact because of its unreliability. Hence, "in any future trial in

663 David Ormerod, "Criminal Profiling: Trial by Judge and Jury, not Criminal Psychologist", in D. Canter
(ed) Profiling in Policy and Practice, 242 (1999)
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which is sought to adduce psychological profile evidence, these problems of reliability
will be a hotly contested issue,,666.

In fact, there are three main areas where offender profiling evidence is likely to be ruled
inadmissible if it is introduced in a future trial in England. First, and as we have noted
throughout this research, offender profiling is a technique without any adequate, reliable
or objective foundation at the moment. As such, English courts will likely rule it
inadmissible based on the Turner rule which requires that expert evidence must be based
on facts which can themselves be proved by admissible evidence. If offender profiling
evidence is introduced again in an English court, the trial judge is also likely to draw on
United states court decisions that have rejected the evidence. English courts will likely
adopt the decision in State v. Cavallo,667 where the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that "until the scientific reliability of this type of evidence is established, it is not
admissible,,668.

The extreme prejudicial effect of offender profiling evidence is also another area where it
is likely to be excluded in future trials in England. Indeed as Professor Ormerod and
Sturman have pointed out "the prejudicial effect includes risks that the jurors could:
convict a defendant on the basis of the characteristic alone (where it is reprehensible);
assign a disproportionate weight to the evidence of the characteristic; deny the accused
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the benefit of doubt and convict on less than the full standard of proof; and the police
could be inclined to 'round up the usual suspects",669.

Above all, where the manner and methods of offender profiling were questionable, a trial
judge will apply Section 78 of PACE (Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984), and
exclude the evidence. This is one rule that may be applied to exclude offender profiling
evidence in any future trial in English courts. Under Section 78 of PACE, a judge is
allowed to exclude evidence "if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would
have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to
admit it":

In England, expert testimony on any form of offender profiling is not likely to be
excluded merely on the hearsay rule. There are many exceptions to the rule. In fact, in R
v. Abadom,670 it was held that once the primary facts on which an opinion is based have
been proved by admissible evidence, the expert is entitled to draw on the work of others
as part of arriving at his own conclusions. This was also supported in English Exporters
(London) v. Eldonwall Limited. 671 Professor U glow also maintained that "where the

primary information consists mainly or entirely of hearsay, the judge would be justified
in warning the jury about the flimsiness of any foundation for that opinion". 672
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I.
, I

I,

In the final analysis, one can safely say that in England, there are more rules and reasons
supporting the exclusion of offender profiling evidence than are rules or reasons for its
admission. Offender profiling deals with character traits, is too prejudicial than probative,
not based on any reliable or objective data at the moment and Section 78 of PACE gives
judges the wide discretion to exclude such evidence that is unfair to an accused.

Canada

Canada is a close neighbor of United States. It is not surprising therefore, that some
forms of offender profiling have been admitted in Canadian courtrooms. There is general
disagreement amongst scholars as to whether there is a specific rule governing the
admissibility of expert evidence in Canada. As Professor Bernstein has pointed out,
"most courts have adopted some version of a reliability test, while a minority apply the
general acceptance test".673 Arguably, the main rule governing the admissibility of expert
evidence in Canada today was laid down in R v. Mohan,674 where the Supreme Court of
Canada laid down four factors that should be examined when faced with a decision to
admit or exclude expert evidence. Prior to Mohan, two court rulings provided some

David E. Bernstein, "Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth", 21 Yale 1. Int'} L. 123,
140 (Winter 1996).
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guidelines to trial judges. The first is R v. Beland, 675 a case that involved the admissibility
of polygraph. In this case, the defendant offered polygraph evidence but the prosecution
argued that it should be excluded because it has not reached an acceptable standard of
reliability. Delivering the judgment, Justice McIntyre stated that "even the finding of a
significant percentage of error in the results of a polygraph would not by itself, be
sufficient to exclude it as an instrument for use in courts,,676. The second case is R v.

Lavellee,677 where evidence of battered woman syndrome was ruled admissible.
Delivering the opinion, Justice Wilson stated that expert evidence is admissible if it was
beyond the common experience and knowledge of jurors. Concurring, Justice Sopinka
said that expert opinion should be based on forms of enquiry and practice accepted within
the expertise. 678

In Mohan, the defendant, Dr. Chikmaglur Mohan, a pediatrician was charged with four
counts of sexual assault of four of his patients. The patients, all females, were aged
between thirteen and sixteen at the time of the assaults. The assaults took place at the
defendant's medical office. 679 "The alleged assaults consisted of fondling of the girls'
breasts and digital penetration and stimulation of their vaginal areas, accompanied by
intrusive questioning of them as to their sexual activities. All of the complainants testified
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that the respondent did not wear gloves while examining them internally. The respondent,
who testified in his own defence, denied the complainants' evidence,,68o.

At the trial, the defence sought to introduce a psychiatrist, Dr. Hill, "who would testify
that the perpetrator of the offences alleged to have been committed would be part of a
limited and unusual group of individuals and that the respondent did not fall within that
narrow class because he did not possess the characteristics belonging to that group,,681.
Dr. Hill stated that he had interviewed and treated three doctors who were accused of
sexual assault of their patients. He also stated that based on a psychological profile, the
likely offender in the first three sexual assaults was likely to be a pedophile, and that the
perpetrator of the fourth sexual assault was likely to be a sexual psychopath. 682
In the voir dire, Dr. Hill, the expert, began his testimony by
explaining that there are three general personality groups that
have unusual personality traits in terms of their psychological
profile perspective. The first group encompasses the
psychosexual who suffers from major mental illnesses (e.g.,
schizophrenia) and engages in inappropriate sexual behaviour
occasionally. The second and largest group contains the sexual
deviation types. This group of individuals shows distinct
abnormalities in terms of the choice of individuals with whom
they report excitement and with whom they would like to
engage in some type of sexual activity. The third group is that
of the sexual psychopaths. These individuals have a callous
disregard for people around them, including a disregard for the
consequences of their sexual behaviour towards other
individuals. Another group would include pedophiles who gain
sexual excitement from young adolescents, probably pubertal
or post-pubertal. 683
680
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Dr. Hill stated that pedophiles and sexual psychopaths constitute an unusual and limited
class of individuals. Dr. Hill stated that he was of the opinion that Mohan does not
possess the characteristics of pedophiles or sexual psychopaths and so would not have
sexually assaulted the four victims. The trial judge, Justice Bernstein, ruled that the
testimony was inadmissible. Justice Bernstein stated that the testimony was unnecessary
and that the jury could decide for themselves. Justice Bernstein said:
The evidence of Doctor Hill is not sufficient, I believe, to
establish that doctors who commit sexual assaults on patients
are in a significantly more limited group in psychiatric terms
than are other members of society. There is no scientific data
available to warrant that conclusion. A sample of three
offenders is not a sufficient basis for such a conclusion. Even
the allegations of the fourth complainant are not so unusual, as
sex offenders go, to warrant a conclusion that the perpetrator
must have belonged to a sufficiently narrow class. 684

Justice Bernstein concluded that "if the evidence was received as proposed, it would
merely be character evidence of a type that is inadmissible as going beyond evidence of
general reputation, and does not fall within the proper sphere of expert evidence". Mohan
was convicted and sentenced to nine months imprisonment on each count, concurrently
and two years probation. 685

The defendant appealed and the Crown also appealed arguing that the sentence was too
light. At the Ontario Court of Appeal,686 Finlayson J.A. ruled that the trial judge erred by

684

Id, at 425.

685

Id, at 423.

686

R v. Mohan, (1992) 8 o.R. 3d 173.

286

excluding the testimony by Dr. Hill. Justice Finyalson stated that the testimony was
admissible on two basis.
On the first basis, given that similar fact evidence was
admitted showing that the acts compared are so unusual and
strikingly similar that their similarities cannot be attributed to
coincidence, Dr. Hill's testimony was admissible to show
that the offences alleged were unlikely to have been
committed by the same person.
On the second basis, it was admissible to show that the
respondent was not a member of either the unusual groups of
aberrant personalities which could have committed the
offences alleged. 687

Justice Finyalson also stated that the trial judge's conclusion was based on a
misapprehension of the evidence. Justice Finyalson further stated that in his view, the
expert did not base his opinion only on the three cases with three doctors, but based his
opinion on all of his experience. 688 The Court of Appeal therefore, reversed the judgment
and remanded for a new trial.

The case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, where Justice Sopinka stated that "on the
basis of the principles relating to exceptions to the character evidence rule and under the
principles governing the admissibility of expert evidence, the limitations on the use of
this type of evidence require that the evidence in this case be excluded,,689. The Supreme
Court of Canada held that the admission of expert evidence depends on the application of
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the following criteria - (a) relevance; (b) necessity in assisting the trier of fact; (c) the
absence of any exclusionary rule; and (d) a properly qualified expert. 690

On the relevance of expert evidence, Justice Sopinka stated that:
Relevance is a threshold requirement for the admission of
expert evidence as with all other evidence. Relevance is a
matter to be decided by a judge as question of law. Although
prima facie admissible if so related to a fact in issue that it
tends to establish it, that does not end the inquiry. This
merely determines the logical relevance of the evidence.
Other considerations enter into the decision as to
admissibility. This further inquiry may be described as a cost
benefit analysis, that is "whether its value is worth what it
costs": ... Cost in this context is not used in its traditional
economic sense but rather in terms of its impact on the trial
process. Evidence that is otherwise logically relevant may be
excluded on this basis, if its probative value is overborne by
its prejudicial effect, if it involves an inordinate amount of
time which is not commensurate with its value or if it is
misleading in the sense that its effect on the trier of fact,
particularly a jury, is out of proportion to its reliability.691

Justice Sopinka further stated that "in summary, therefore, it appears from the foregoing
that expert evidence which advances a novel scientific theory or technique is subjected to
special scrutiny to determine whether it meets a basic threshold of reliability and whether
it is essential in the sense that the trier of fact will be unable to come to a satisfactory
conclusion without the assistance of the expert. The closer the evidence approaches an
opinion on an ultimate issue, the stricter the application of this principle,,692.
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Addressing the issue of expert evidence as to disposition, Justice Sopinka stated that in
his opinion,
In order to be relevant on the issue of identity the evidence must
tend to show that the accused shared a distinctive unusual
behavioral trait with the perpetrator of the crime. The trait must
be sufficiently distinctive that it operates virtually as a badge or
mark identifying the perpetrator.
Conversely, the fact that the accused is a member of an abnormal
group some of the members which have the unusual behavioral
characteristics shown to have been possessed by the perpetrator
is not sufficient. In some cases it may, however, be shown that
all members of the group have the distinctive unusual
characteristics. If a reasonable inference can be drawn that the
accused has these traits then the evidence is relevant subject to
the trial judge's obligation to exclude it if its prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value. The greater the number of persons
in society having these tendencies, the less relevant the evidence
on the issue of identity and the more likely that its prejudicial
effect predominates over its probative value. 693

The Supreme Court of Canada also held that:
"Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition of an accused, or
another is admissible provided:
(a) the evidence is relevant to some issue in the case;
(b) the evidence is not excluded by a policy rule;
(c) the evidence falls within the proper sphere of expert evidence.

693
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One of purposes for which psychiatric evidence may be admitted is to prove identity
when that is an issue in the case, since psychical as well as physical characteristics may
be relevant to identify the perpetrator of the crime".694

"Psychiatric evidence with respect to the personality traits or disposition of the accused,
or another, if it meets the three conditions of admissibility above set out, is also
admissible, however, as bearing on the probability of the accused, or another, having
committed the offence".695 Justice Sopinka further stated that "where the crime under
consideration does not have features which indicate that the perpetrator was a member of
an abnormal group, psychiatric evidence that the accused has a normal mental make-up
but does not have a disposition for violence or dishonesty or other relevant traits
frequently found in ordinary people is inadmissible. The psychiatric evidence in the
circumstances postulated is not relevant on the issue of identity to exclude the accused as
the perpetrator any more than the possession of violent or dishonest tendencies by the
accused or a third person would be admissible to identify the accused or the third person
as the perpetrator of the crime".696

The Supreme Court of Canada therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal
and upheld the trial court's ruling.
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In R v. Ranger,697the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the trial judge erred by admitting
expert testimony on crime scene staging, where the expert went into 'criminal profiling'.
On August 16, 1995, two sisters Marsha (19) and Tamara Ottey (16) were stabbed to
death in their home in Scarborough. The defendant, Rohan Ranger and his cousin Adrian
Kinkead were charged with the murders. The defendants were tried and convicted
separately. Marsha was the Ranger's girlfriend but she ended the relationship because the
defendant was very possessive and abusive. The Crown claimed that Ranger refused to
accept that the relationship was over and that Ranger killed Marsha after he heard that
Marsha was moving to United States to start college. The prosecution claimed that
Ranger killed Marsha because "ifhe could not have her, nobody else can,,698.

The defendant claimed that he was not in the house at the time of the murders and that
Kinkead committed the murders. Police investigation showed that the house was
ransacked but only three items belonging to Marsha were taken. The three items were a
gold necklace given to Marsha by the defendant, a videotape of Marsha playing soccer
and Marsha's electronic organizer. 699 The Crown therefore, decided to call a crime scene
reconstruction expert and criminal profiling expert, who testified that the crime scene was
staged and made to look like a burglary. The expert, Detective Inspector Kathryn Lines
(Manager of the Behavioral Sciences Section of the Ontario Provincial Police) testified
that the crime scene was staged by "someone who had an association or relationship with
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the victim, M., and who had a particular interest in M. 's possessions".7oo Detective
Inspector Lines stated that she based her opinion on the crime scene photographs, crime
scene videotapes, police reports and autopsy reports.

At the trial, several witnesses testified for the Crown. Kinkead also testified for the
Crown. The Crown also introduced evidence of the defendant's trip to Jamaica in January
1996, where he overstayed and was arrested. The defense argued that the evidence should
be excluded because it was prejudicial. Five witnesses also testified that they saw a man
fitting the description of the defendant near the victims' home around 7.30 am on the day
of the murder and the day before the murders. The defendant on the other hand,
introduced a security video tape showing that he was at a shopping mall at 8.08am on the
day of the murder. It should be noted that the time of death of the victims was given as
7.30am. The prosecution contended that the defendant created a false alibi by going to the
shopping mall so that he can be captured on the security video camera. 701

The defense argued that the expert testimony by Detective Inspector Lines should not be
admitted. They argued that the jury did not need expert assistance to determine whether
the crime scene was staged or not. That the expert evidence by Detective Lines was not
required since the crime scene photographs and videotapes had already been provided to
the court by Detective Ian Mann.
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The trial judge ruled that the expert evidence was admissible and he said: "I am satisfied
that opinion evidence is needed in this case in the sense that it will likely provide
information that is outside the experience and knowledge of the jury. The factual issue of
whether a break and entry is authentic or staged is not likely to be a subject within the
common knowledge of the jurors. This, of course, is subject to the Crown qualifying the
proposed expert as an expert in this particular area".702 Detective Inspector Lines was
qualified by the court as an expert on crime scene staging and her testimony was
admitted.

The defendants were convicted. Ranger was convicted of first degree murder for the
death of Marsha and convicted of manslaughter for the death of Tamara. He appealed,
arguing that he received an unfair trial. He contended that the trial judge erred by
admitting the unscientific expert evidence by Detective Inspector Lines; that the trial
judge erred by admitting evidence of his arrest in Jamaica; and that the trial judge's
instructions to the jury were insufficient. The defendant also argued that the expert
evidence did not meet the reliability or necessity criteria as required by the Supreme
Court decision in Mohan.

At the Court of Appeal, Charron J .A, ruled that the trial judge erred and that there were
five errors. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Charron said: "". Detective
Inspector Lines's testimony was not confined to the opinion that the crime scene was
staged. Notwithstanding the Crown's assurance that he would not elicit evidence relating
to motivation, Detective Inspector Lines' examination-in-chief included an opinion about
702
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the motivation of the perpetrator for staging the scene and a description of the most likely
suspects as someone who had a particular interest in Marsha Ottey". 703

Justice Charron restated the fact that the Mohan requirements must be satisfied and she
said; "The party seeking to introduce expert opinion evidence must meet four criteria:
relevance, necessity, the absence of any other exclusionary rule, and a properly qualified
expert. Even where these requirements are met, the evidence may be rejected if its
prejudicial effect on the conduct of the trial outweighs its probative value. The first two
criteria and the assessment of whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial
effect also include an inquiry into the reliability of the proposed evidence". 704

Justice Charron also stated that the Mohan criteria applies on a case by case basis. Justice
Charron further stated that "Detective Inspector Lines' testimony, from the outset, went
far beyond the scope of properly admissible evidence and, eventually, profiling that, in
my view, was clearly inadmissible". Furthermore, "the manner in which the crime scene
evidence was packaged for the jury in this case exemplifies the usual dangers associated
with expert opinion evidence".70s Justice Charron stated that:
In this case, Detective Inspector Lines' opinions about the
perpetrator's likely motivation for staging the crime scene
and his characteristics as a person associated with the victims
and having a particular interest in Marsha constituted
evidence of criminal profiling. Criminal profiling is a novel
field of scientific evidence, the reliability of which was not
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demonstrated at trial. To the contrary, it would appear from
her limited testimony about the available verification of
opinions in her field of work that her opinions amounted to
no more than educated guesses. As such, her criminal
profiling evidence was inadmissible. The criminal profiling
evidence also approached the ultimate issue in this case and,
hence, was highly prejudicial. The prejudice was further
heightened by the limits placed on defence counsel's crossexamination and by the prominence that the trial judge gave
to Detective Inspector Lines' evidence in his charge. 706

Charron J.A, also ruled that the evidence about the defendant's trip and arrest in Jamaica
was of no probative value and was very prejudicial. The Court of Appeal concluded that
the errors were harmful and remanded for a new trial.

In R v. Clark, 707 the Court of Appeal for Ontario ruled that expert evidence on crime
scene staging was admissible even though it went into criminal profiling. This is quite in
contrast with its prior decision in Ranger discussed above. On December 26, 1995, the
bodies of William Tweed and his wife Phyllis were found in their home in Thornhill,
Ontario. They have been stabbed to death. Police investigators suspected that the
perpetrator had staged the crime scene to show forced entry and burglary. The defendant,
Clark, was the main suspect. Investigations showed that a few weeks before the murders
that Clark had stolen the victims' credit card and used it to buy an engagement ring for
his girlfriend. 708 It should be noted that the defendant lived with his grandmother near the
Tweeds and that his grandmother was very close to the Tweeds. The defendant also visits
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the Tweeds regularly as he helps them out with some odd jobs. They were so close that
the Tweeds gave his grandmother a duplicate key to their house to keep in case of
emergency. 709

It should be pointed out that blood stains found on the defendant's pants matched Mr.

Tweed's DNA. Furthermore, while he was in custody, the defendant confided in his cell
mate (an undercover police officer), Sergent Matthews, that he stabbed the Tweeds and
that he could not understand how the police were still able to detect blood on his pants
because he had washed the pants after the murders.71 0

The defendant admitted stealing the credit card but denied the murders. He stated that
another man, Marcel Whyte committed the murders. 711 At the trial, the Crown called a
crime scene reconstruction expert to testify. Detective Inspector Kathryn Lines stated that
the crime scene examination revealed elements of crime scene staging and that one
individual was responsible for the murders. She stated that she based her opinion on the
crime scene photographs, crime scene videotapes, personal visit to the house, police
reports and autopsy reports. Detective Inspector Lines testified that the crime scene had
been staged to look like a burglary, and that the killer was "someone who had some
knowledge or relationship with the victims and some knowledge of the layout of their
apartment".712 She also stated that it was a blitz-attack and that the victims were sleeping
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at the time they were killed. In his ruling, Justice Peter Howden admitted the evidence.
The defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and he appealed.

Among other claims, the defendant argued that the expert testimony by Detective
Inspector Lines should not have been admitted because it was unnecessary, unreliable
and too prejudicial than probative. The defendant also argued that much of the testimony
by Detective Inspector Lines constituted inadmissible criminal profiling evidence.

Delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeal, Justice Moldaver ruled that the trial judge
did not err in admitting the expert evidence. Justive Moldaver however, stated that a
small amount of the evidence was impermissible criminal profiling evidence, but the
small amount could not have affected the outcome. The Court of Appeal held that:

I

A properly qualified expert in crime scene analysis can offer
opinion evidence about what occurred at the crime scene and how
the crime was committed (crime scene reconstruction evidence).
Crime scene reconstruction evidence is potentially admissible. Its
ultimate acceptance or rejection will depend on whether it
conforms with the rules that govern the admissibility of expert
evidence in general. In respect of crime scene reconstruction
evidence, the following three areas will generally require close
attention: whether the evidence is necessary in the sense that it is
likely to fall outside the knowledge or normal experience of the
average juror; whether the opinion is reliable in the sense that it is
anchored in the evidence and not the product of guesswork or
speculation; and whether there is a real danger that the jury will be
overwhelmed by the evidence and give it more weight than it
deserves. Crime scene reconstruction evidence is to be contrasted
with expert evidence offered to explain why the crime was
committed in a particular manner (the perpetrator's motivation)
more particularly, who is more likely to have committed the crime
("criminal profiling evidence"). Criminal profiling evidence will
generally be inadmissible, as criminal profiling is a novel field of
scientific evidence and often appears to be based on nothing more
than educated guesses. In this case, the police officer's evidence
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that the crime scene was staged was properly admitted, as was her
evidence as to how the crime was committed. She was qualified to
express an opinion about staging and her evidence fell outside the
knowledge and experience of the average juror. Her opinion was
reliable in the sense that it was anchored in the evidence and not
the product of guesswork or speCUlation, and the evidence of
staging was not so complex or technical that the jury was likel~ to
be overwhelmed by it and give it more weight than it deserved. 13

Justice Moldaver went on to say that the expert evidence was not an opinion on the
ultimate issue. Justice Moldver stated that there was overwhelming evidence against the
defendant that the some amount of criminal profiling could not have affected the
outcome. 714

In dismissing the appeal, Justice Moldaver stated that the crime scene reconstruction
evidence was properly admitted even though it contained some amount of criminal
profiling evidence. This is quite in contrast with the Court's earlier ruling in Ranger on
the admissibility of criminal profiling evidence. This case also supports our call for extra
judicial control in all cases involving offender profiling or its derivatives.

Offender Profiling in Other Countries

Offender profiling is still in its infancy but it has been used in criminal investigations in a
few countries, including Australia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Russia and South
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Africa. This does not mean that it has been admitted in the courtroom. In Australia,
offender profiling per se has not been admitted in any court. There has been no major
court decision banning the reception of offender profiling evidence in courts. Under the
Australian rules of evidence, expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant to the facts at
issue and not excluded by other evidence rules, such as the expertise rule, the common
knowledge rule, the factual basis rule and the ultimate issue rule. Generally speaking, and
as Petherick et al have pointed out, "the rules of expert evidence in Australia allow for
profiling as expert testimony, even if only in a limited fashion, perhaps in some lower
levels of the criminal justice system. As profiling receives more attention through
practical application and academic literature, it stands to reason that it will receive a
greater chance of being accepted in court".715

In Finland, offender profiling is only used in crime investigations. It is not admissible in
courts. Courts see offender profiling and its derivatives as an aid to crime investigation,
not admissible evidence. In Netherlands, the Criminal Investigative analysis/FBI
approach has been adopted, and is done by the Offender Profiling Unit of the National
Intelligence Division of the National Police Agency.

As we mentioned earlier, offender profiling technique is still in its infancy, hence the
technique is not used in many countries, especially the developing countries. For
instance, in countries like Nigeria, the technique has not been used in crime investigation.

715 Wayne Petherick, David Field, Andrew Lowe and Elizabeth Fry, "Criminal Profiling as Expert
Evidence", in Wayne Petherick (ed), Serial Crime: Theoretical and Practical Issues in Behavioral Profiling,
94 (2006).
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As such, the evidential implications of such evidence has not arisen.

However, it is

important to examine how the courts will receive such evidence if offered in future trials.
Offender profiling deals with the character traits of an individual. In Nigeria, it is likely
to be seen by the courts as permissible character evidence. In Nigeria, "the general rule is
that the fact an accused has committed some other offences or other misconduct on other
previous occasions or is of bad character or reputation is not relevant in subsequent
proceedings. The rationale behind this rule is that the accused person's guilt has to be
independently proved by the prosecution. The admissibility of previous misconduct will
only go to prejudice the mind of a court. Section 69(1) of the Nigerian Evidence Act,716
provides that the fact that an accused person is of bad character is irrelevant in
subsequent proceedings, but this general rule is subject to some exceptions".717 The
exceptions are contained in Section 69(2) of the Evidence Act, which states that:
"The fact that an accused person is of bad character is relevant:
(a) when the bad character of the accused person is a fact in issue;
(b) when the accused person has given evidence of his good character;

It is noteworthy to point out that Nigeria is a former colony of Britain, hence the Nigerian
legal system is based on the English common law tradition. In fact, the Nigerian rules of
expert evidence is virtually the same as that of England. Thus, a witness must be
qualified as an expert and the opinion must be outside the experience and knowledge of

716

Evidence Act, Laws of the Federation, 1990.
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Adah C. Eche, The Nigerian Law of Evidence, 115 (2000).
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the judge or jury.718 In Nigeria, the general principle is that the facts upon which an
expert based his opinion must be provided. This is where offender profiling evidence will
likely be ruled inadmissible if it is to be introduced in a Nigerian court today. The
Nigerian Supreme Court will likely draw from the position of English courts on the
admissibility of offender profiling. They are also likely to state that such evidence should
not be admitted until its reliability can be established. Thus, in Dickson Arisa v. The
State,719 the Supreme Court of Nigerian ruled that opinion evidence by an expert on

mental disease/natural mental infinity had no evidential weight because the expert failed
to provide the basis for his opinion. Justice Agbaje stated that the law required that for
expert evidence to be admitted, the facts upon which the opinion was based must be
provided. Nigerian courts may not accord much weight to expert evidence where the
factual basis was not produced. 72o Furthermore, "where there are two conflicting expert
opinions, the court will rely on that of the expert who shows the data on which he based
his opinion".721 It should also be noted that in Nigeria, a technique, method or field of
knowledge does not have to be scientific before it can be admitted. In a nut shell, the
main area where offender profiling evidence is likely to be excluded in Nigeria, in future,
is the lack of reliable data upon which the technique is based. The prejudicial effect of
offender profiling will probably be another strong area for exclusion of offender profiling
evidence.

718 There is a legal provision for a jury in Nigerian, but jurors are not used. The trier of fact is the judge and
whether expert opinion will assist him is not an issue to be contested by the parties.
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Dickson Arisa v. The State, [1988] 7 S.C.NJ (Pt.1) 76,84.
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In this chapter, we have examined the state of offender profiling in various jurisdictions.
In all jurisdictions examined in this work, the trial judge has enormous latitude to decide
who is qualified to give expert evidence and when such evidence is needed. Similarly, no
jurisdiction examined in this study requires an expert to have gained the expertise in a
certain way. An expert can be qualified by education, skill, training, or knowledge. All
jurisdictions appear to be liberal in deciding who is qualified to give expert testimony.
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Conclusion

Offender profiling is a crime investigation technique that is normally used when an
offender did not leave any physical traces at the scene of crime. It aims to predict the
likely characteristics of the unknown offender by looking at behavioral patterns and other
non physical clues. Profiling in general was not originally intended to be used for crime
investigation or for courtroom purpose. Offender profiling began from the early attempts
by criminologists to explain criminality and to predict criminals. It then moved on to the
next stage of using it to profile heads of states (for intelligence purposes only and not for
crime

investigation).

Later,

psychiatrists

and

psychologists

starting providing

psychological profiles because they felt it could assist the police to find unknown killers.
Following this stage, the FBI discovered that psychological profiles were indeed very
helpful in their pursuit of unknown serial killers, and they devoted much attention into it
and came up with their crime scene analysis approach. Today offender profiling has
become one of the most controversial, useful, but worrying technique of crime
investigation. It is submitted that we should now move on to the next stage of using
offender profiling as a crime prevention technique.

This dissertation concludes that there is an uneasy relationship among the different
segments involved with offender profiling. All the different segments/approaches to
offender profiling have a parochial view. Each segment sees offender profiling as their
own monopoly, their exclusive club. As a result, the potential of offender profiling has
been limited. Therefore the sharing of knowledge and experience is suggested. We need
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an integrated approach, whereby all the segments can come together as a team. This will
also ensure that we move on to the next level of using offender profiles in producing
crime prevention measures. Psychiatrists, psychologists, criminologists, and law
enforcement agents all have a role to play, not only in crime investigations, but also in
coming up with crime prevention measures and programs. These professionals have
knowledge of the kind of individuals likely to commit certain types of crime, knowledge
of the location a particular crime is likely to happen, and knowledge about the type of
individual that is likely to be a victim of a certain type of crime. Therefore, by coming
together as a team and pulling resources together, the future of offender profiling looks
very exciting and will prove to be an invaluable technique of crime investigation and
crime prevention. As we have seen, offender profiling has not yet reached the level to be
called a hard science at the moment, but in time it will be. It has been pointed out
elsewhere that "if a technique cannot be proved, then it is not science,,722. Offender
profiling at the moment cannot be proved, therefore, it is not science.

The current lack of unity, cooperation, and absence of sharing information among the
different segments further creates a legal dilemma - how much can one convince the
courts as to the reliability and validity of offender profiling? Until all the different
segments come together as a team, the search for the scientific basis and for general
acceptance of this technique will continue to be a mirage. A way forward in the United
States, for instance, will be the establishment of a professional body for offender pro filers
where all the different professionals can come together and become members. The wellestablished professional bodies can playa big role in this issue by organizing well
722

Ebisike, supra note 12, at 93.
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publicized interdisciplinary conferences, where all the different segments should be
encouraged to attend and present papers. Such professional bodies, as the American
Psychological Association, the Academy of Forensic Sciences, and the Society for Police
and Criminal Psychology are best suited for this function. There is no gainsaying the fact
however, that offender profiling at the moment is a 'specialized field of knowledge,' that
is very useful in crime investigation. At the moment, there has been the tendency for the
different segments to publish their work in their own preferred/particular journals. This is
also hampering the potential of offender profiling.

This research study has shown that at the moment, all the different approaches base their
arguments on assumptions, inferences, on probabilities, on personal intuition, as well as
on their clinical practice experience. Suffice it to say therefore, that none of these
approaches can properly be described as being sufficiently reliable as to be used in
proving the guilt or innocence of a defendant. We have also seen that offender profiling
at best should be described as a multi-disciplinary practice that calls for knowledge and
experience in such fields as criminology, psychiatry, psychology and law enforcement.

This study supports the idea put forward by Professor David Ormerod that for offender
profiling to be easily admitted in courts, the profile should be produced by a 'profiling
team' rather than by individual profilers. We believe that courts are reluctant to accept
expert opinion of a profiler because more of it is based on personal intuition.
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The three main rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony in United States
have their various strengths and weaknesses. Arguably, the Frye test offers ease of
application. Trial judges do not have to become scientists to be able to decide on
scientific evidence, thereby ensuring less burden on trial judges. The Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 is too loose and too liberal. Almost anything can be admitted as expert
evidence - be it scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. Similarly, almost
anybody can qualify as an expert under the Federal Rule of Evidence 702, either by way
of knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Daubert has proved very
problematic in application, and is arguably not favored by many trial judges. Daubert has
raised more questions than answers.

Our examination of the three rules has shown the confusion and inconsistencies resulting
from the adoption of these three rules of admissibility. This leads to one obvious question
- is it possible to adopt one particular rule? The Frye test, the Federal Rules of Evidence
and Daubert are not constitutional constructions. As such they are not binding on the
states. The United States operates a federal system of government. Hence, the states have
always enjoyed the freedom to choose the rule they prefer. Above all, the United States
Supreme Court has not given any reason why states should adopt one particular rule.

It is hereby submitted that Frye, combined with the Federal Rules of Evidence, offers the

most appropriate standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. This is not new and
its success has been noted in Christophersen v. Allied -Signal Corp.,723 It is submitted

723

supra at 132.

306

that the United States Supreme Court should revisit the issue and give the lower courts
and the states reasons justifying the need for the adoption of one rule. Then we can have
some sort of uniformity in judicial decisions. Then the lower courts will not face the risk
of having their decision reversed, simply because their state has adopted a rule different
from the one adopted by the federal courts.

One of the main issues surrounding the admissibility of expert testimony has been on
general acceptance. Many states are in favor of the Frye test. Interestingly, many trial
judges generally accept and prefer the Frye test. Several research studies have supported
this argument. 724 Dahir et aI, for instance, carried out a study of 325 state trial judges
(from the 50 states and the District of Columbia) and found out that there is "a strong
tendency for judges to continue to rely on more traditional standards such as general
acceptance and qualifications of the expert when assessing psychological syndrome and
profile evidence.,,725 Their study also suggests that "judges do understand some of the
less technical guidelines (i.e., general acceptance and peer review and publication) but
not the more technical ones (i.e., falsifiability and error rate), and that they prefer general
acceptance and qualifications of the expert as guidelines when determining the
admissibility of psychological evidence.,,726 The study therefore, concluded that "judges

724 See generally, Veronica B. Dahir., James T. Richardson., Gerald P. Ginsburg., Sophia I. Gatowski.,
Shirley A. Dobbin, and Mara L. Merlino, "Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and
Profile Evidence", 11 Psycho!. Pub. Pol'y & L. 62, 74 (March 2005).

725 Veronica B. Dahir., James T. Richardson., Gerald P. Ginsburg., Sophia I. Gatowski., Shirley A. Dobbin,
and Mara L. Merlino, "Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological Syndrome and Profile Evidence",
11 Psycho!. Pub. Pol'y & L. 62, 73 (March 2005).

726

Id, at 75.

I

j

J

307

...,
j
are relying on criteria and habits of analysis familiar to them (mainly Frye v. United

States's [l923) general acceptance standard, relevance, and qualifications and credibility
of the expert) even as they struggle with new ideas foisted on them from above.,,727 It
makes sense therefore, to adopt a standard which is generally accepted by trial judges as
being the appropriate standard, bearing in mind that these trial judges are the
'gatekeepers. '

Offender profiling is a multidisciplinary practice that falls under many disciplines.
Offender profiling is largely based on intuition, guesswork and speculation. At the
moment it can best be described as an art with the potential of becoming a science. When
it comes to general acceptance, offender profiling should be generally accepted as being
sufficiently reliable by the general profiling community, not just the law enforcement
community. At the moment, it is only those in the law enforcement segment/community
that see offender profiling or its derivatives as reliable techniques for courtroom
purposes. Until the different segments come together as a team, offender profiling should
not be taken as a technique that has achieved widespread recognition as to be
admittedlintroduced into the courtroom as evidence.

This research has noted that many of the experts who give testimony on offender
profiling have the tendency to flaunt their qualifications in front of the courts. The result
is that courts tend to be seduced by these impressive and sometimes "intimidating
credentials". This also results in many of these experts testifying beyond their expertise.

I

J
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What is happening today is that many of the pro filers who are supposed to be criminal
investigators have now assumed the role of criminal prosecutors. They tend to forget that
their role is to testify and not to decide cases. It is therefore, submitted that there should
be extra judicial control when dealing with expert testimony on offender profiling. In all
cases involving offender profiling, the trial judge should inform the jury at the onset that
offender profiling evidence does not identify a specific offender; that it is not
identification evidence; and that its reliability cannot be objectively ascertained at the
moment. The trial judge should limit the testimony to patterns of behavior and crime
scene characteristics, which in some cases may assist the trier of fact in understanding the
circumstances of a case. It is worrying that in some cases, profile testimony has even
been admitted by trial courts, when it was clearly irrelevant to the case, as in United
States v. Baldwin. 728 There should be a jury instruction in all cases involving offender

profiling and its derivatives. The trial judge should inform the jury about the level of
reliability and validity of this technique. This will help them to determine the weight (if
any) that should be accorded to the testimony.

The above problem has been compounded by the Federal Rule of Evidence 702 which as
we have found out in this study is too liberal. Almost anybody can qualify as an expert
either by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Offender profiling as we
have seen falls under a specialized field of knowledge, but Rule 702 has created problems
for trial judges when deciding who is qualified to give expert offender profiling
testimony.

728
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This research has also noted that offender profiling testimony is more effective when it is
being proffered by the defendant to show innocence, than when it is being offered by the
prosecution to show that the defendant is likely to have committed the crime. This
argument merits further research though. Offender profiling is also effective when there
are co-defendants and it is being offered to show that one defendant is less likely to have
committed the crime. With offender profiling evidence, it is easier to prove innocence
than guilt, but this does not mean that it is reliable.

Offender profiling per se, is supposedly inadmissible in many jurisdictions, including the
United States and Canada. However, when it is labeled differently and dressed up in
other terms, courts have admitted it. Perhaps this is because many people including
judges do not understand what offender profiling is and the different forms or shapes of
offender profiling. Or is it that some criminal pro filers are playing on the intelligence of
judges, lawyers and jurors? It is suggested that more research is needed in this area. If an
expert witness says that he or she is going to testify on 'offender profiling', it will not be
allowed, but if the same expert says he or she is going to testify on the same thing under a
different label, then it will be allowed. Two of the cases in Canada at least have clearly
highlighted this issue. There are other cases where an expert has been allowed to testify
for instance, on crime scene staging, and then had gone beyond that area and eventually
touched on the ultimate issue. It seems therefore, that in many cases, whether any form of
offender profiling will be admitted depends on the label the expert is using, not on the
content/issue involved. In United States for instance, profiling evidence on motivational
analysis has been allowed in some cases. In Canada on the other hand, expert testimony

j
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on motivational analysis is supposedly not allowed, but when it is dressed up as
testimony on crime scene reconstruction analysis, then it may be admitted. Who is
fooling who?

After a critical examination of issues and several cases we conclude that offender
profiling is not sufficiently reliable as to be admissible. It is also submitted that offender
profiling is too prejudicial than probative. The findings of this research also supports my
claim that there is an uneasy relationship among the different segments involved with
offender profiling. As a result, the potential of this technique has been limited. There are
doubts as to the reliability and validity of this technique. It is submitted that offender
profiling should not be used in the courtroom until its reliability can be properly and
objectively ascertained. The guessing game of offender profiling should not be played in
the courtroom. Offender profiling and its derivatives should not be admitted until their
reliability can be objectively ascertained. Offender profiling is a technique based on
probabilities and we conclude that no individual should be convicted on probability.
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